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8f0ffd08c0
...
a1c146aff3
|
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@ -477,19 +477,12 @@ jobs:
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working-directory: ostp-gui
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run: |
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npm install
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# TUN mode shells out to this helper, elevated via pkexec. Only the
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# Windows job used to build it, so the Linux package shipped without
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# it and TUN could never start.
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cargo build -p ostp-tun-helper --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} --manifest-path ../Cargo.toml
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npx tauri build --no-bundle --target ${{ matrix.target }}
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- name: Package Portable Tarball
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run: |
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set -euo pipefail
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mkdir ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}
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cp ostp-gui/src-tauri/target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/ostp-gui ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}/
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# The GUI looks for the helper next to its own executable first.
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cp target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/ostp-tun-helper ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}/
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tar -czf ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.tar.gz ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}
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- name: Upload to GitHub Release
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|
|
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@ -2,5 +2,5 @@
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"target_version": "0.4.3",
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"branch": "beta",
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"alpha_iteration": 0,
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"beta_iteration": 2
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"beta_iteration": 1
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}
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|
|
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@ -23,12 +23,6 @@ use crate::tunnel::{ProxyEvent, ProxyToClientMsg};
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/// candidate address is tried.
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const UOT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(4);
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/// How long to keep retrying a resume-triggered reconnect before handing the
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/// problem back to the ordinary stall path. That path is what releases the
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/// system proxy, so this is really a bound on how long the machine may be left
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/// with no working internet at all after waking.
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const RESUME_RECONNECT_GIVE_UP: Duration = Duration::from_secs(45);
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static SOCKET_PROTECTOR: std::sync::OnceLock<Box<dyn Fn(i32) -> bool + Send + Sync>> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
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pub fn set_socket_protector<F>(f: F)
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@ -153,11 +147,6 @@ pub struct Bridge {
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/// fire at all. Retrying until success removes the dependency on either.
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forced_reconnect_pending: bool,
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last_forced_reconnect_try: Instant,
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/// Wall-clock start of the current resume-reconnect campaign, used to bound
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/// it. Wall clock rather than Instant because the monotonic clock does not
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/// advance across suspend on Windows, so it cannot measure anything that
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/// begins at wake.
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forced_reconnect_started: Option<SystemTime>,
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}
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impl Bridge {
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@ -196,7 +185,6 @@ impl Bridge {
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last_valid_recv: Instant::now(),
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forced_reconnect_pending: false,
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last_forced_reconnect_try: Instant::now(),
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forced_reconnect_started: None,
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})
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}
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@ -280,45 +268,9 @@ impl Bridge {
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"Resumed after ~{}s suspend — forcing clean reconnect", wall_gap.as_secs()
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))).await;
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self.forced_reconnect_pending = true;
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self.forced_reconnect_started = Some(SystemTime::now());
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self.last_forced_reconnect_try = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(60);
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}
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// Give up if resume reconnects keep failing. Retrying forever
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// looks harmless but is not: the system proxy stays pointed at
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// our local listener the whole time, so the machine has NO
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// working internet — not merely no tunnel — while the UI sits
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// on "connecting". Handing the retry to the ordinary keepalive
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// path restores the proxy through its hard-timeout branch,
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// which force=true deliberately skips.
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//
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// Measured on the wall clock: Instant does not advance across
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// suspend on Windows (QPC stops), so a monotonic deadline can
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// not bound anything that starts at wake.
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if self.forced_reconnect_pending {
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let pending_for = self
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.forced_reconnect_started
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.and_then(|t| t.elapsed().ok())
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.unwrap_or_default();
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if pending_for > RESUME_RECONNECT_GIVE_UP {
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self.forced_reconnect_pending = false;
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self.forced_reconnect_started = None;
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let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log(format!(
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"Reconnect after suspend failed for {}s — releasing the system \
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proxy so normal traffic works; will keep retrying in the \
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background",
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pending_for.as_secs()
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))).await;
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// Make the ordinary stall path fire on the next
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// keepalive tick: it is the one that tears the proxy
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// back down (or, with kill switch on, deliberately
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// keeps blocking).
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self.last_valid_recv = Instant::now()
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.checked_sub(Duration::from_secs(3600))
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.unwrap_or_else(Instant::now);
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}
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}
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// Keep retrying a resume-triggered reconnect until one lands.
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// The first attempt fires within half a second of waking, when
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// the NIC is typically still reassociating, so treating it as
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|
|
@ -334,7 +286,6 @@ impl Bridge {
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// success check rather than "we tried".
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if self.last_valid_recv.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(3) {
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self.forced_reconnect_pending = false;
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self.forced_reconnect_started = None;
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let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log("Reconnected after suspend".into())).await;
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}
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}
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|
|
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|||
|
|
@ -418,22 +418,19 @@ pub struct RelayServerConfig {
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pub upstream_tcp: String,
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/// Upstream address for UDP traffic
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pub upstream_udp: String,
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// ── Deprecated ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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// The relay used to authenticate clients itself and pulled the access-key
|
||||
// list from the target server's management API to do it. It no longer does:
|
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// sessions are authenticated end-to-end by the target server, and a relay
|
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// that re-checks credentials only adds a weaker second gate plus a copy of
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// the key list on a machine that does not need one. These are kept solely
|
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// so existing relay configs still parse; they are ignored.
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#[serde(default)]
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/// Target server's API URL, for key sync
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pub upstream_api_url: String,
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/// Bearer token for the target server's API
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#[serde(default)]
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pub upstream_api_token: String,
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#[serde(default)]
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/// Key sync interval in seconds (default 30)
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#[serde(default = "default_sync_interval")]
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pub sync_interval_secs: u64,
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pub debug: Option<bool>,
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}
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fn default_sync_interval() -> u64 { 30 }
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/// Supports both a single string "0.0.0.0:50000" and an array
|
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/// ["0.0.0.0:50000", "[::]:50000"].
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#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Clone)]
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|
|
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|||
|
|
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ publish_to: 'none' # Remove this line if you wish to publish to pub.dev
|
|||
# https://developer.apple.com/library/archive/documentation/General/Reference/InfoPlistKeyReference/Articles/CoreFoundationKeys.html
|
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# In Windows, build-name is used as the major, minor, and patch parts
|
||||
# of the product and file versions while build-number is used as the build suffix.
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version: 0.4.3+27
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version: 0.4.3+26
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environment:
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sdk: ^3.11.4
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|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -229,47 +229,9 @@ fn set_autostart(enable: bool) -> Result<(), String> {
|
|||
.output();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
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{
|
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// XDG autostart: desktop environments launch every .desktop file in
|
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// ~/.config/autostart on login. This is the portable equivalent of the
|
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// HKCU Run key above and needs no elevation.
|
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let path = linux_autostart_path().ok_or("Cannot determine the autostart directory")?;
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if enable {
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let exe = std::env::current_exe().map_err(|e| format!("Cannot get exe path: {}", e))?;
|
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if let Some(dir) = path.parent() {
|
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std::fs::create_dir_all(dir)
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.map_err(|e| format!("Cannot create {}: {}", dir.display(), e))?;
|
||||
}
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let entry = format!(
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"[Desktop Entry]\n\
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Type=Application\n\
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Name=OSTP\n\
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Exec=\"{}\"\n\
|
||||
Terminal=false\n\
|
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X-GNOME-Autostart-enabled=true\n",
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exe.display()
|
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);
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std::fs::write(&path, entry)
|
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.map_err(|e| format!("Cannot write {}: {}", path.display(), e))?;
|
||||
} else if path.exists() {
|
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std::fs::remove_file(&path)
|
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.map_err(|e| format!("Cannot remove {}: {}", path.display(), e))?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
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Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
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/// Path of the XDG autostart entry, honouring XDG_CONFIG_HOME.
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||||
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
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fn linux_autostart_path() -> Option<PathBuf> {
|
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let base = std::env::var_os("XDG_CONFIG_HOME")
|
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.map(PathBuf::from)
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||||
.filter(|p| !p.as_os_str().is_empty())
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.or_else(|| std::env::var_os("HOME").map(|h| PathBuf::from(h).join(".config")))?;
|
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Some(base.join("autostart").join("ostp.desktop"))
|
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}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Checks if the app is currently in Windows startup.
|
||||
#[tauri::command]
|
||||
fn get_autostart() -> bool {
|
||||
|
|
@ -284,12 +246,6 @@ fn get_autostart() -> bool {
|
|||
return o.status.success();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||
{
|
||||
if let Some(path) = linux_autostart_path() {
|
||||
return path.exists();
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
false
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||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -669,18 +625,13 @@ async fn start_tun_via_helper(
|
|||
raw: &ClientConfigRaw,
|
||||
app: tauri::AppHandle,
|
||||
) -> Result<bool, String> {
|
||||
// TUN goes through a privileged helper. Elevation is implemented for
|
||||
// Windows (UAC) and Linux (polkit/pkexec); anywhere else launch_as_admin
|
||||
// reports that plainly rather than letting this fail later as a confusing
|
||||
// missing-file error.
|
||||
let port = {
|
||||
let listener = std::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").map_err(|e| format!("Bind error: {}", e))?;
|
||||
listener.local_addr().unwrap().port()
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let auth_token = rand::random::<u64>().to_string();
|
||||
let helper_exe = find_helper_exe()
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| format!("{HELPER_EXE_NAME} not found next to the app or in target/."))?;
|
||||
let helper_exe = find_helper_exe().ok_or_else(|| "ostp-tun-helper.exe not found.".to_string())?;
|
||||
launch_as_admin(&helper_exe, &auth_token, port).map_err(|e| format!("Failed to launch helper: {}", e))?;
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(1500)).await;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -754,32 +705,21 @@ struct HelperPipeState {
|
|||
error_msg: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Executable name of the TUN helper for the current platform.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The ".exe" suffix was hardcoded, so on Linux every lookup below searched for
|
||||
/// a file that cannot exist and the GUI reported the helper as missing on a
|
||||
/// platform where it ships without an extension.
|
||||
const HELPER_EXE_NAME: &str = if cfg!(windows) {
|
||||
"ostp-tun-helper.exe"
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"ostp-tun-helper"
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
fn find_helper_exe() -> Option<PathBuf> {
|
||||
if let Ok(exe) = std::env::current_exe() {
|
||||
if let Some(dir) = exe.parent() {
|
||||
// 1. Release/Production adjacent
|
||||
let candidate = dir.join(HELPER_EXE_NAME);
|
||||
let candidate = dir.join("ostp-tun-helper.exe");
|
||||
if candidate.exists() { return Some(candidate); }
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
// 2. Tauri target directory fallback
|
||||
// e.g. from ostp-gui/src-tauri/target/debug/deps/
|
||||
let mut parent = dir;
|
||||
while let Some(p) = parent.parent() {
|
||||
if p.file_name().map(|n| n == "target").unwrap_or(false) {
|
||||
let deb = p.join("debug").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME);
|
||||
let deb = p.join("debug").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe");
|
||||
if deb.exists() { return Some(deb); }
|
||||
let rel = p.join("release").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME);
|
||||
let rel = p.join("release").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe");
|
||||
if rel.exists() { return Some(rel); }
|
||||
}
|
||||
parent = p;
|
||||
|
|
@ -789,13 +729,13 @@ fn find_helper_exe() -> Option<PathBuf> {
|
|||
// 3. Current working directory target fallback
|
||||
let cwd = std::env::current_dir().unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
let candidates = [
|
||||
cwd.join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("target").join("debug").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("target").join("release").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("target").join("debug").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("target").join("release").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("..").join("target").join("debug").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("..").join("target").join("release").join(HELPER_EXE_NAME),
|
||||
cwd.join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
cwd.join("target").join("debug").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
cwd.join("target").join("release").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("target").join("debug").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("target").join("release").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("..").join("target").join("debug").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
cwd.join("..").join("..").join("target").join("release").join("ostp-tun-helper.exe"),
|
||||
];
|
||||
for path in &candidates {
|
||||
if path.exists() { return Some(path.clone()); }
|
||||
|
|
@ -857,50 +797,8 @@ fn launch_as_admin(exe: &std::path::PathBuf, token: &str, port: u16) -> anyhow::
|
|||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
|
||||
fn launch_as_admin(exe: &PathBuf, token: &str, port: u16) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
|
||||
use std::process::Command;
|
||||
|
||||
// Same shape as the Windows path: the token goes through a file rather than
|
||||
// argv, so it never shows up in the process list.
|
||||
let token_file = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!("ostp_auth_{}.tmp", rand::random::<u32>()));
|
||||
std::fs::write(&token_file, token)?;
|
||||
// Unlike Windows, /tmp is world-readable here, and this token authenticates
|
||||
// control of the privileged tunnel helper — restrict it to the owner.
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::set_permissions(&token_file, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600));
|
||||
|
||||
// pkexec is polkit's front-end: in a desktop session it raises a graphical
|
||||
// authentication dialog. sudo is not an option from a GUI process, which has
|
||||
// no terminal to prompt on.
|
||||
match Command::new("pkexec")
|
||||
.arg(exe)
|
||||
.arg("--port")
|
||||
.arg(port.to_string())
|
||||
.arg("--token-file")
|
||||
.arg(&token_file)
|
||||
.spawn()
|
||||
{
|
||||
Ok(_) => Ok(()),
|
||||
Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::NotFound => {
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&token_file);
|
||||
anyhow::bail!(
|
||||
"pkexec was not found, so the TUN helper cannot be granted the privileges it \
|
||||
needs. Install polkit (package \"policykit-1\" on Debian/Ubuntu, \"polkit\" on \
|
||||
Fedora/Arch), or use proxy mode, which needs no elevation."
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&token_file);
|
||||
Err(e.into())
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(not(any(target_os = "windows", target_os = "linux")))]
|
||||
fn launch_as_admin(_exe: &PathBuf, _token: &str, _port: u16) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("TUN mode needs a privileged helper, which is implemented on Windows and Linux only. Use proxy mode on this platform.");
|
||||
}
|
||||
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
|
||||
fn launch_as_admin(_exe: &PathBuf, _token: &str, _port: u16) -> Result<()> { anyhow::bail!("Windows only."); }
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
|
||||
fn show_error_dialog(msg: &str) {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -11,11 +11,9 @@
|
|||
"windows": [
|
||||
{
|
||||
"title": "OSTP",
|
||||
"width": 400,
|
||||
"height": 720,
|
||||
"minWidth": 360,
|
||||
"minHeight": 560,
|
||||
"resizable": true
|
||||
"width": 360,
|
||||
"height": 680,
|
||||
"resizable": false
|
||||
}
|
||||
],
|
||||
"security": {
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -660,13 +660,6 @@ function loadSettingsIntoForm() {
|
|||
updateClientVisibility();
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Last values actually pushed to the OS / backend, so repeated saves that did
|
||||
// not change them stay free. Undefined until the first save, which is correct:
|
||||
// the first one should apply.
|
||||
let lastAppliedAutostart;
|
||||
let lastAppliedTunnelConfig;
|
||||
let hotReloadTimer;
|
||||
|
||||
function collectAndSaveSettings() {
|
||||
const s = {
|
||||
tun: inTun.checked,
|
||||
|
|
@ -693,41 +686,19 @@ function collectAndSaveSettings() {
|
|||
fragChunk: parseInt(inFragChunk.value) || 2,
|
||||
fragSleep: !isNaN(parseInt(inFragSleep.value)) ? parseInt(inFragSleep.value) : 2,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Cheap and local: safe to run on every debounced keystroke.
|
||||
saveClientSettings(s);
|
||||
updateClientVisibility();
|
||||
|
||||
// Everything below talks to the OS or restarts the tunnel. Running it per
|
||||
// keystroke is what made typing in the exclusion fields lag by seconds: the
|
||||
// 400ms debounce fires during natural pauses in typing, and each firing hit
|
||||
// the Windows registry and then tore down and rebuilt the tunnel.
|
||||
// Set autostart
|
||||
invoke('set_autostart', { enable: s.launchStartup }).catch(() => {});
|
||||
|
||||
// Only touch autostart when it actually changed — this is a registry write.
|
||||
if (s.launchStartup !== lastAppliedAutostart) {
|
||||
lastAppliedAutostart = s.launchStartup;
|
||||
invoke('set_autostart', { enable: s.launchStartup }).catch(() => {});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Hot-reload the tunnel only when something it actually reads has changed,
|
||||
// and on a much longer debounce: a reload is disruptive, so it should land
|
||||
// once the user has stopped editing rather than between keystrokes.
|
||||
// Hot-reload exclusions if connected
|
||||
if (appState === 'connected') {
|
||||
const tunnelRelevant = JSON.stringify([
|
||||
s.tun, s.killSwitch, s.mux, s.muxSessions, s.mtu, s.dns, s.socks,
|
||||
s.exDomains, s.exIps, s.exProcs, s.junkEnabled, s.junkPcMin, s.junkPcMax,
|
||||
s.junkPsMin, s.junkPsMax, s.tcpFrag, s.fragChunk, s.fragSleep,
|
||||
]);
|
||||
if (tunnelRelevant !== lastAppliedTunnelConfig) {
|
||||
clearTimeout(hotReloadTimer);
|
||||
hotReloadTimer = setTimeout(() => {
|
||||
lastAppliedTunnelConfig = tunnelRelevant;
|
||||
const cfg = buildConfig();
|
||||
if (cfg) {
|
||||
invoke('save_config', { jsonContent: JSON.stringify(cfg, null, 2) })
|
||||
.then(() => invoke('reload_tunnel'))
|
||||
.catch(() => {});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}, 1500);
|
||||
const cfg = buildConfig();
|
||||
if (cfg) {
|
||||
invoke('save_config', { jsonContent: JSON.stringify(cfg, null, 2) })
|
||||
.then(() => invoke('reload_tunnel'))
|
||||
.catch(() => {});
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -99,13 +99,6 @@ a { text-decoration: none; }
|
|||
.app-root {
|
||||
position: relative;
|
||||
width: 100%;
|
||||
/* The window is resizable so users on desktops where the toolkit does not
|
||||
apply our DPI scaling (WebKitGTK on HiDPI Linux renders the configured
|
||||
size as raw pixels, giving a postage-stamp window) can size it themselves.
|
||||
Capping and centring the column keeps the intended narrow layout instead of
|
||||
stretching controls across a wide window. */
|
||||
max-width: 460px;
|
||||
margin: 0 auto;
|
||||
height: 100%;
|
||||
display: flex;
|
||||
flex-direction: column;
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -48,23 +48,10 @@ pub async fn connect_target(
|
|||
}
|
||||
if action == OutboundAction::Proxy {
|
||||
let proxy_addr = format!("{}:{}", outbound.address, outbound.port);
|
||||
// Case-insensitive: a config saying "SOCKS5" means the same thing
|
||||
// as "socks5", and silently treating it as unknown is a trap.
|
||||
return match outbound.protocol.to_ascii_lowercase().as_str() {
|
||||
return match outbound.protocol.as_str() {
|
||||
"socks5" => connect_via_socks5(&proxy_addr, target).await,
|
||||
"http" => connect_via_http(&proxy_addr, target).await,
|
||||
// FAIL CLOSED. This used to fall through to a direct
|
||||
// connection, so any unrecognised protocol string — a typo,
|
||||
// a case difference, an empty value — silently sent ALL TCP
|
||||
// straight out of the server while the operator believed it
|
||||
// was proxied. Combined with the same bug on the UDP path,
|
||||
// that is how one session ends up presenting two different
|
||||
// exit addresses to the remote site.
|
||||
other => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
|
||||
"outbound.protocol is \"{other}\", which is not a supported proxy type \
|
||||
(expected \"socks5\" or \"http\"); refusing to connect to {target} \
|
||||
directly, because the rules asked for the proxy"
|
||||
)),
|
||||
_ => connect_direct(target, connect_timeout).await,
|
||||
};
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -383,22 +370,10 @@ pub async fn connect_udp_target(
|
|||
}
|
||||
if action == OutboundAction::Proxy {
|
||||
let proxy_addr = format!("{}:{}", outbound.address, outbound.port);
|
||||
if outbound.protocol.eq_ignore_ascii_case("socks5") {
|
||||
if outbound.protocol == "socks5" {
|
||||
return connect_udp_via_socks5(&proxy_addr, server_udp).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// FAIL CLOSED. HTTP CONNECT genuinely cannot carry UDP — but the
|
||||
// answer to that is not to send the datagrams in the clear. The
|
||||
// previous "fallback to direct" honoured a Proxy rule by
|
||||
// egressing from the server's own address, so with an HTTP
|
||||
// upstream every UDP flow (QUIC, DNS) leaked while TCP stayed
|
||||
// proxied, presenting two exit IPs to the same remote site.
|
||||
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
|
||||
"outbound rules route UDP to {target} through the proxy, but the upstream \
|
||||
protocol is \"{}\", which cannot carry UDP. Refusing to send directly. \
|
||||
Use a socks5 upstream, or add an explicit udp rule with action \"direct\" \
|
||||
or \"block\" so the intent is recorded in the config.",
|
||||
outbound.protocol
|
||||
));
|
||||
// HTTP CONNECT does not support UDP. Fallback to direct.
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -1,460 +1,425 @@
|
|||
//! Transparent relay node.
|
||||
//! Authenticated Relay Node
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Forwards traffic to a fixed upstream OSTP server:
|
||||
//! Принимает входящие UDP/TCP (UoT) соединения от клиентов,
|
||||
//! валидирует HMAC-подпись клиента, используя ключи синхронизированные с upstream-сервера,
|
||||
//! и слепо пробрасывает авторизованный трафик к целевому upstream-серверу.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Client -> [Relay] -> [Target server]
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! ## Why this performs no authentication of its own
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! The previous design had the relay authenticate clients itself, with an
|
||||
//! HMAC handshake and a background job that pulled the access-key list from the
|
||||
//! target server's management API. That was wrong on two counts.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! It did not work: no OSTP client has ever produced those credentials. The TCP
|
||||
//! path expected an HTTP request (`GET /stream` with an `Authorization: Bearer`
|
||||
//! header) and the UDP path expected a `timestamp || HMAC` preamble, while the
|
||||
//! client sends junk frames followed by length-prefixed OSTP frames, and an
|
||||
//! obfuscated Noise handshake, respectively. Every connection was rejected.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! It was also weak where it did apply: the HMAC covered only an 8-byte
|
||||
//! timestamp, so a captured signature was a bearer token that anyone could
|
||||
//! replay from any address for the length of the clock-skew window. And the
|
||||
//! HTTP handshake was a plaintext `GET /stream` on the wire, a greppable
|
||||
//! signature in a protocol whose entire premise is that no byte is
|
||||
//! recognisable.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Authentication belongs where it is cryptographically meaningful: the target
|
||||
//! server already authenticates every session end-to-end via Noise with a PSK
|
||||
//! derived from the access key, and silently drops anything that fails. A relay
|
||||
//! that re-checks credentials adds a second, weaker gate and a copy of the key
|
||||
//! list on a machine that has no need for it. So this relay makes no security
|
||||
//! decisions at all — it is a pipe, and says so.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! What it does need is protection against being used as a resource sink, which
|
||||
//! is what the session cap and admission rate limit below are for. It forwards
|
||||
//! only to one fixed upstream and returns replies only to the sender, so it is
|
||||
//! not a reflector: the amplification factor is one.
|
||||
//! Архитектура цепочек:
|
||||
//! Клиент -> [Relay 1] -> [Relay 2] -> ... -> [Target Server]
|
||||
//! Каждый Relay скачивает access_keys напрямую с Target Server API.
|
||||
|
||||
use anyhow::{Context, Result};
|
||||
use anyhow::Result;
|
||||
use bytes::Bytes;
|
||||
use hmac::{Hmac, Mac};
|
||||
use sha2::Sha256;
|
||||
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
||||
use std::net::SocketAddr;
|
||||
use std::sync::Arc;
|
||||
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
|
||||
use std::sync::{Arc, RwLock};
|
||||
use std::time::{Duration, Instant, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
|
||||
use tokio::net::{TcpListener, TcpStream, UdpSocket};
|
||||
use tokio::sync::Mutex;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Configuration for a relay node.
|
||||
/// Конфигурация Relay-узла.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct RelayConfig {
|
||||
/// Address(es) to accept client traffic on (UDP and TCP both bind here).
|
||||
/// Адрес(а) для прослушивания входящих соединений (UDP + TCP).
|
||||
pub listen_addrs: Vec<String>,
|
||||
/// Upstream target for TCP (UoT) traffic.
|
||||
/// Адрес upstream TCP для пересылки (обычно тот же порт, что и у target-сервера).
|
||||
pub upstream_tcp: String,
|
||||
/// Upstream target for UDP traffic.
|
||||
/// Адрес upstream UDP.
|
||||
pub upstream_udp: String,
|
||||
/// URL API target-сервера для получения access_keys.
|
||||
/// Пример: "http://127.0.0.1:9090"
|
||||
pub upstream_api_url: String,
|
||||
/// Bearer-токен для аутентификации на API target-сервера.
|
||||
pub upstream_api_token: String,
|
||||
/// Интервал синхронизации ключей (секунды).
|
||||
pub sync_interval_secs: u64,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Maximum concurrent UDP client sessions. Each holds one upstream socket and
|
||||
/// one reader task, so this bounds both file descriptors and tasks.
|
||||
const MAX_UDP_SESSIONS: usize = 4096;
|
||||
/// A UDP session with no traffic for this long is reclaimed. Mobile NAT
|
||||
/// bindings are typically shorter-lived than this, so it is generous enough not
|
||||
/// to break roaming clients.
|
||||
const UDP_SESSION_IDLE: Duration = Duration::from_secs(120);
|
||||
/// Maximum concurrent relayed TCP connections.
|
||||
const MAX_TCP_CONNECTIONS: usize = 4096;
|
||||
/// Sustained rate (and burst ceiling) for admitting NEW sessions, per second.
|
||||
/// Established sessions are never rate limited; this only bounds how fast an
|
||||
/// unknown source can cause state to be allocated.
|
||||
const NEW_SESSION_RATE: f64 = 200.0;
|
||||
/// How long to wait for the upstream TCP connection before giving up.
|
||||
const UPSTREAM_CONNECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(8);
|
||||
type SharedKeys = Arc<RwLock<Vec<String>>>;
|
||||
|
||||
/// Token bucket bounding how fast new sessions may be created.
|
||||
struct AdmissionLimiter {
|
||||
tokens: f64,
|
||||
last_refill: Instant,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl AdmissionLimiter {
|
||||
fn new() -> Self {
|
||||
Self { tokens: NEW_SESSION_RATE, last_refill: Instant::now() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Consume one admission slot, or report that the caller should drop.
|
||||
fn try_admit(&mut self) -> bool {
|
||||
let now = Instant::now();
|
||||
let elapsed = now.duration_since(self.last_refill).as_secs_f64();
|
||||
self.last_refill = now;
|
||||
self.tokens = (self.tokens + elapsed * NEW_SESSION_RATE).min(NEW_SESSION_RATE);
|
||||
if self.tokens >= 1.0 {
|
||||
self.tokens -= 1.0;
|
||||
true
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Entry point.
|
||||
/// Точка входа Relay-узла.
|
||||
pub async fn run_relay_node(cfg: RelayConfig) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let udp_cfg = cfg.clone();
|
||||
let shared_keys: SharedKeys = Arc::new(RwLock::new(Vec::new()));
|
||||
|
||||
// Первоначальная синхронизация ключей
|
||||
if let Err(e) = sync_keys(&cfg, &shared_keys).await {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay: initial key sync failed: {}. Will retry.", e);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
let count = shared_keys.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner()).len();
|
||||
tracing::info!("Relay: synced {} access key(s) from upstream API", count);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Фоновый синхронизатор ключей
|
||||
let cfg_clone = cfg.clone();
|
||||
let keys_clone = shared_keys.clone();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = run_udp_relay(udp_cfg).await {
|
||||
tracing::error!("Relay UDP loop error: {e}");
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(cfg_clone.sync_interval_secs)).await;
|
||||
match sync_keys(&cfg_clone, &keys_clone).await {
|
||||
Ok(count) => tracing::debug!("Relay: refreshed {} access key(s)", count),
|
||||
Err(e) => tracing::warn!("Relay: key sync error: {}", e),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
run_tcp_relay(cfg).await
|
||||
// Запуск UDP relay
|
||||
{
|
||||
let cfg_udp = cfg.clone();
|
||||
let keys_udp = shared_keys.clone();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = run_udp_relay(cfg_udp, keys_udp).await {
|
||||
tracing::error!("Relay UDP loop error: {}", e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Запуск TCP (UoT) relay
|
||||
run_tcp_relay(cfg, shared_keys).await
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── UDP ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
/// Синхронизация access_keys с upstream API.
|
||||
async fn sync_keys(cfg: &RelayConfig, shared_keys: &SharedKeys) -> Result<usize> {
|
||||
let url = format!("{}/api/users", cfg.upstream_api_url.trim_end_matches('/'));
|
||||
|
||||
struct UdpSession {
|
||||
upstream: Arc<UdpSocket>,
|
||||
last_seen: Instant,
|
||||
let client = reqwest::Client::builder()
|
||||
.timeout(Duration::from_secs(10))
|
||||
.build()?;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut req = client.get(&url);
|
||||
if !cfg.upstream_api_token.is_empty() {
|
||||
req = req.header("Authorization", format!("Bearer {}", cfg.upstream_api_token));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let resp = req.send().await?;
|
||||
if !resp.status().is_success() {
|
||||
// 404 here almost always means the URL is missing the panel's secret
|
||||
// path segment rather than the server being down or the token being
|
||||
// wrong. The management API is not served at /api — it is nested under
|
||||
// the configured `api.webpath` (see create_api_router), which exists to
|
||||
// keep the panel from being discoverable by scanners. A bare
|
||||
// host:port therefore resolves to a route that does not exist, and the
|
||||
// token is never even looked at, which makes "404" a deeply misleading
|
||||
// thing to report on its own.
|
||||
if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_FOUND {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!(
|
||||
"API returned HTTP 404 for {url}. The management API is served under the \
|
||||
target server's secret `api.webpath`, not at /api — set upstream_api_url \
|
||||
to include it, e.g. \"http://HOST:9090/<webpath>\" (the same path you open \
|
||||
the web panel at). Check `api.webpath` in the target server's config."
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!(
|
||||
"API returned HTTP 401 for {url}: upstream_api_token does not match the \
|
||||
target server's `api.token`."
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("API returned HTTP {} for {url}", resp.status());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct UserStatsSnapshot {
|
||||
access_key: String,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
|
||||
struct ApiResponse {
|
||||
ok: bool,
|
||||
data: Option<Vec<UserStatsSnapshot>>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let body: ApiResponse = resp.json().await?;
|
||||
if !body.ok {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("API returned error ok=false");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let keys: Vec<String> = body.data.unwrap_or_default().into_iter().map(|u| u.access_key).collect();
|
||||
let count = keys.len();
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut lock = shared_keys.write().unwrap();
|
||||
*lock = keys;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Ok(count)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
async fn run_udp_relay(cfg: RelayConfig) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// client address -> the upstream socket carrying that client's flow
|
||||
let sessions: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<SocketAddr, UdpSession>>> =
|
||||
/// Проверяет HMAC-подпись клиента по набору ключей.
|
||||
/// Возвращает true если хотя бы один ключ подходит.
|
||||
fn verify_hmac(ts_bytes: &[u8; 8], provided_mac: &[u8], keys: &[String]) -> bool {
|
||||
let client_ts = u64::from_be_bytes(*ts_bytes);
|
||||
let now = SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.as_secs();
|
||||
|
||||
// Защита от replay: ±60 секунд
|
||||
if client_ts > now + 30 || client_ts < now.saturating_sub(60) {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for key in keys {
|
||||
if let Ok(mut mac) = Hmac::<Sha256>::new_from_slice(key.as_bytes()) {
|
||||
mac.update(ts_bytes);
|
||||
if mac.verify_slice(provided_mac).is_ok() {
|
||||
return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
false
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── UDP Relay ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async fn run_udp_relay(cfg: RelayConfig, shared_keys: SharedKeys) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// NAT-таблица: client_addr -> (upstream_socket, last_seen)
|
||||
let nat_table: Arc<Mutex<HashMap<SocketAddr, (Arc<UdpSocket>, Instant)>>> =
|
||||
Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new()));
|
||||
let limiter = Arc::new(Mutex::new(AdmissionLimiter::new()));
|
||||
|
||||
for bind_addr in &cfg.listen_addrs {
|
||||
let sock = Arc::new(
|
||||
UdpSocket::bind(bind_addr)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("relay: failed to bind UDP on {bind_addr}"))?,
|
||||
);
|
||||
tracing::info!("Relay UDP listening on {bind_addr} -> {}", cfg.upstream_udp);
|
||||
|
||||
let upstream_addr = cfg.upstream_udp.clone();
|
||||
let sessions = sessions.clone();
|
||||
let limiter = limiter.clone();
|
||||
let sock = UdpSocket::bind(bind_addr).await?;
|
||||
tracing::info!("Relay UDP listening on {}", bind_addr);
|
||||
let sock = Arc::new(sock);
|
||||
let upstream_udp = cfg.upstream_udp.clone();
|
||||
let keys = shared_keys.clone();
|
||||
let nat = nat_table.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 65535];
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let (len, peer) = match sock.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
|
||||
let (n, peer) = match sock.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
|
||||
Ok(v) => v,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay UDP recv error: {e}");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => continue,
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Fast path: an established session just forwards.
|
||||
let packet = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Быстрая проверка: первый UDP-пакет от нового клиента содержит Noise handshake.
|
||||
// Мы берём из него первые 8 байт как timestamp + 32 байта MAC.
|
||||
// Если пакет достаточно длинный, проверяем подпись.
|
||||
// Для уже авторизованных клиентов (есть в NAT) — пропускаем проверку.
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut map = sessions.lock().await;
|
||||
if let Some(session) = map.get_mut(&peer) {
|
||||
session.last_seen = Instant::now();
|
||||
let upstream = session.upstream.clone();
|
||||
drop(map);
|
||||
let _ = upstream.send(&buf[..len]).await;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
let nat_lock = nat.lock().await;
|
||||
if !nat_lock.contains_key(&peer) {
|
||||
drop(nat_lock);
|
||||
|
||||
// Пакет должен быть >= 40 байт (8 ts + 32 hmac) для первичной проверки
|
||||
if packet.len() < 40 {
|
||||
tracing::debug!("Relay UDP: dropping short packet from {}", peer);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let ts_bytes: [u8; 8] = packet[0..8].try_into().unwrap();
|
||||
let provided_mac = &packet[8..40];
|
||||
let keys_guard = keys.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||||
|
||||
if !verify_hmac(&ts_bytes, provided_mac, &keys_guard) {
|
||||
tracing::debug!("Relay UDP: unauthorized probe from {}, dropped", peer);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
tracing::debug!("Relay UDP: authorized new client {}", peer);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// New client: bounded by both a hard cap and an admission rate,
|
||||
// so a flood of spoofed sources cannot exhaust sockets or tasks.
|
||||
{
|
||||
let map = sessions.lock().await;
|
||||
if map.len() >= MAX_UDP_SESSIONS {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if !limiter.lock().await.try_admit() {
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Находим или создаём upstream socket для этого клиента
|
||||
let upstream_sock = {
|
||||
let mut nat_lock = nat.lock().await;
|
||||
if let Some(entry) = nat_lock.get_mut(&peer) {
|
||||
entry.1 = Instant::now();
|
||||
entry.0.clone()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
// Новый upstream socket для этого клиента
|
||||
let usock = match UdpSocket::bind("0.0.0.0:0").await {
|
||||
Ok(s) => Arc::new(s),
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay UDP: failed to bind upstream socket: {}", e);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
if usock.connect(&upstream_udp).await.is_err() {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay UDP: failed to connect to upstream {}", upstream_udp);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let upstream = match new_upstream_socket(&upstream_addr).await {
|
||||
Ok(s) => s,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay UDP: cannot reach upstream {upstream_addr}: {e}");
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
nat_lock.insert(peer, (usock.clone(), Instant::now()));
|
||||
|
||||
sessions.lock().await.insert(
|
||||
peer,
|
||||
UdpSession { upstream: upstream.clone(), last_seen: Instant::now() },
|
||||
);
|
||||
|
||||
// Reverse direction for this client.
|
||||
let back_sock = sock.clone();
|
||||
let sessions_rx = sessions.clone();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let mut rbuf = vec![0u8; 65535];
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
match upstream.recv(&mut rbuf).await {
|
||||
Ok(n) => {
|
||||
if back_sock.send_to(&rbuf[..n], peer).await.is_err() {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if let Some(s) = sessions_rx.lock().await.get_mut(&peer) {
|
||||
s.last_seen = Instant::now();
|
||||
// Задача: читаем ответы от upstream и отправляем клиенту
|
||||
let usock_rx = usock.clone();
|
||||
let client_sock = sock.clone();
|
||||
let peer_addr = peer;
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let mut rbuf = vec![0u8; 65535];
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
match usock_rx.recv(&mut rbuf).await {
|
||||
Ok(n) => {
|
||||
let _ = client_sock.send_to(&rbuf[..n], peer_addr).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => break,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Err(_) => break,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
sessions_rx.lock().await.remove(&peer);
|
||||
});
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let _ = sessions
|
||||
.lock()
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.get(&peer)
|
||||
.map(|s| s.upstream.clone())
|
||||
.unwrap()
|
||||
.send(&buf[..len])
|
||||
.await;
|
||||
usock
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
// Пересылаем пакет в upstream
|
||||
let _ = upstream_sock.send(&packet).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Reclaim idle sessions. Dropping the entry closes the upstream socket,
|
||||
// which ends that session's reader task.
|
||||
// Периодически чистим устаревшие NAT записи (timeout 120 сек)
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_secs(30)).await;
|
||||
let mut nat_lock = nat_table.lock().await;
|
||||
let now = Instant::now();
|
||||
let mut map = sessions.lock().await;
|
||||
let before = map.len();
|
||||
map.retain(|_, s| now.duration_since(s.last_seen) < UDP_SESSION_IDLE);
|
||||
let reclaimed = before - map.len();
|
||||
if reclaimed > 0 {
|
||||
tracing::debug!("Relay UDP: reclaimed {reclaimed} idle session(s), {} active", map.len());
|
||||
}
|
||||
nat_lock.retain(|_, (_, last)| now.duration_since(*last) < Duration::from_secs(120));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// One upstream socket per client, `connect`ed so replies can be read with
|
||||
/// `recv` and cannot come from anywhere else.
|
||||
async fn new_upstream_socket(upstream: &str) -> Result<Arc<UdpSocket>> {
|
||||
// Resolve first, then bind the SAME address family. Binding "[::]:0" and
|
||||
// connecting to an IPv4 upstream fails anywhere IPV6_V6ONLY defaults on
|
||||
// (Windows, and many Linux configurations) — which is every deployment with
|
||||
// an IPv4 target server, i.e. the common case.
|
||||
let addr: SocketAddr = tokio::net::lookup_host(upstream)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("resolve upstream {upstream}"))?
|
||||
.next()
|
||||
.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("upstream {upstream} resolved to no addresses"))?;
|
||||
|
||||
let bind: SocketAddr = if addr.is_ipv6() {
|
||||
"[::]:0".parse().expect("valid literal")
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
"0.0.0.0:0".parse().expect("valid literal")
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let sock = UdpSocket::bind(bind).await?;
|
||||
sock.connect(addr)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("connect to upstream {addr}"))?;
|
||||
Ok(Arc::new(sock))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// ── TCP (UoT) ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async fn run_tcp_relay(cfg: RelayConfig) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let live = Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
|
||||
// ── TCP (UoT) Relay ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||||
|
||||
async fn run_tcp_relay(cfg: RelayConfig, shared_keys: SharedKeys) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
for bind_addr in &cfg.listen_addrs {
|
||||
let listener = TcpListener::bind(bind_addr)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("relay: failed to bind TCP on {bind_addr}"))?;
|
||||
tracing::info!("Relay TCP (UoT) listening on {bind_addr} -> {}", cfg.upstream_tcp);
|
||||
let listener = TcpListener::bind(bind_addr).await?;
|
||||
tracing::info!("Relay TCP (UoT) listening on {}", bind_addr);
|
||||
|
||||
let upstream = cfg.upstream_tcp.clone();
|
||||
let live = live.clone();
|
||||
let upstream_tcp = cfg.upstream_tcp.clone();
|
||||
let keys = shared_keys.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let (client, peer) = match listener.accept().await {
|
||||
let (stream, peer_addr) = match listener.accept().await {
|
||||
Ok(v) => v,
|
||||
Err(e) => {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay TCP accept error: {e}");
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Relay TCP accept error: {}", e);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
use std::sync::atomic::Ordering;
|
||||
if live.load(Ordering::Relaxed) >= MAX_TCP_CONNECTIONS {
|
||||
// Close immediately rather than queueing unbounded work.
|
||||
drop(client);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
live.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
|
||||
let upstream = upstream_tcp.clone();
|
||||
let keys_clone = keys.clone();
|
||||
|
||||
let upstream = upstream.clone();
|
||||
let live = live.clone();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
if let Err(e) = splice_tcp(client, &upstream).await {
|
||||
tracing::debug!("Relay TCP {peer} closed: {e}");
|
||||
if let Err(e) = handle_tcp_client(stream, peer_addr, upstream, keys_clone).await {
|
||||
tracing::debug!("Relay TCP client {} closed: {}", peer_addr, e);
|
||||
}
|
||||
live.fetch_sub(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Держим поток живым
|
||||
futures_util::future::pending::<()>().await;
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Splice a client connection to the upstream, byte for byte.
|
||||
/// Обработка одного TCP (UoT) соединения.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Nothing is parsed or rewritten: the relay must stay agnostic to the payload,
|
||||
/// both because the payload is an opaque encrypted stream and because any
|
||||
/// parsing would be a place for the relay to disagree with the endpoints.
|
||||
async fn splice_tcp(mut client: TcpStream, upstream_addr: &str) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
let mut upstream = tokio::time::timeout(
|
||||
UPSTREAM_CONNECT_TIMEOUT,
|
||||
TcpStream::connect(upstream_addr),
|
||||
/// Алгоритм:
|
||||
/// 1. Читаем HTTP-заголовки (фейковый WebSocket upgrade).
|
||||
/// 2. Извлекаем HMAC-подпись из Authorization: Bearer.
|
||||
/// 3. Проверяем подпись по синхронизированным ключам.
|
||||
/// 4. Если авторизован — открываем соединение к upstream и пайпим потоки.
|
||||
async fn handle_tcp_client(
|
||||
mut client: TcpStream,
|
||||
peer_addr: SocketAddr,
|
||||
upstream_addr: String,
|
||||
shared_keys: SharedKeys,
|
||||
) -> Result<()> {
|
||||
// Читаем HTTP-заголовки (до \r\n\r\n)
|
||||
let mut header_buf = vec![0u8; 4096];
|
||||
let mut header_len = 0usize;
|
||||
|
||||
loop {
|
||||
let n = client.read(&mut header_buf[header_len..]).await?;
|
||||
if n == 0 {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("connection closed before handshake");
|
||||
}
|
||||
header_len += n;
|
||||
if header_buf[..header_len].windows(4).any(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if header_len >= header_buf.len() {
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("headers too large");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let headers_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&header_buf[..header_len]);
|
||||
|
||||
// Быстрая проверка: должен быть GET /stream
|
||||
if !headers_str.starts_with("GET /stream HTTP/1.1\r\n") {
|
||||
// Возвращаем 404 как обычный сервер (anti-scan)
|
||||
let _ = client.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\nContent-Length: 9\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nNot Found").await;
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("invalid request from {}", peer_addr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// Извлекаем HMAC-подпись
|
||||
let mut sig_b64 = None;
|
||||
for line in headers_str.lines() {
|
||||
let lower = line.to_ascii_lowercase();
|
||||
if lower.starts_with("authorization: bearer ") {
|
||||
sig_b64 = Some(line[22..].trim().to_string());
|
||||
} else if lower.starts_with("cookie: ostp_token=") {
|
||||
sig_b64 = Some(line[19..].trim().to_string());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
let sig_b64 = match sig_b64 {
|
||||
Some(s) => s,
|
||||
None => {
|
||||
let _ = client.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\nContent-Length: 9\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nNot Found").await;
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("missing authorization from {}", peer_addr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
let sig_bytes = base64::Engine::decode(
|
||||
&base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD_NO_PAD,
|
||||
&sig_b64,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("upstream {upstream_addr} connect timed out"))?
|
||||
.with_context(|| format!("connect to upstream {upstream_addr}"))?;
|
||||
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("invalid base64 from {}", peer_addr))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Both sides carry latency-sensitive framed traffic; Nagle would add delay
|
||||
// for no benefit on an already-batched stream.
|
||||
let _ = client.set_nodelay(true);
|
||||
let _ = upstream.set_nodelay(true);
|
||||
if sig_bytes.len() < 40 {
|
||||
let _ = client.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized\r\nContent-Length: 12\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nUnauthorized").await;
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("signature too short from {}", peer_addr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tokio::io::copy_bidirectional(&mut client, &mut upstream).await?;
|
||||
let ts_bytes: [u8; 8] = sig_bytes[0..8].try_into().unwrap();
|
||||
let provided_mac = &sig_bytes[8..];
|
||||
|
||||
// Проверяем по синхронизированным ключам
|
||||
let authorized = {
|
||||
let keys = shared_keys.read().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
|
||||
verify_hmac(&ts_bytes, provided_mac, &keys)
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
if !authorized {
|
||||
let _ = client.write_all(b"HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\r\nContent-Length: 9\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nNot Found").await;
|
||||
anyhow::bail!("unauthorized client {}", peer_addr);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tracing::info!("Relay TCP: authorized client {}, forwarding to {}", peer_addr, upstream_addr);
|
||||
|
||||
// Подключаемся к upstream
|
||||
let mut upstream = TcpStream::connect(&upstream_addr).await
|
||||
.map_err(|e| anyhow::anyhow!("failed to connect to upstream {}: {}", upstream_addr, e))?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Пересылаем upstream заголовки AS-IS (он сам проверит подпись)
|
||||
upstream.write_all(&header_buf[..header_len]).await?;
|
||||
|
||||
// Пайпим оба потока: client <-> upstream
|
||||
let (mut cr, mut cw) = client.into_split();
|
||||
let (mut ur, mut uw) = upstream.into_split();
|
||||
|
||||
let c2u = tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let _ = tokio::io::copy(&mut cr, &mut uw).await;
|
||||
});
|
||||
let u2c = tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let _ = tokio::io::copy(&mut ur, &mut cw).await;
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let _ = tokio::join!(c2u, u2c);
|
||||
Ok(())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
/// The admission limiter is what replaced per-client authentication as the
|
||||
/// defence against resource abuse, so it has to actually stop admitting.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn admission_limiter_stops_at_the_burst_ceiling() {
|
||||
let mut limiter = AdmissionLimiter::new();
|
||||
let mut admitted = 0usize;
|
||||
// Ask for far more than one burst without letting time pass.
|
||||
for _ in 0..(NEW_SESSION_RATE as usize * 3) {
|
||||
if limiter.try_admit() {
|
||||
admitted += 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
admitted <= NEW_SESSION_RATE as usize + 1,
|
||||
"admitted {admitted} sessions in one instant, ceiling is {NEW_SESSION_RATE}"
|
||||
);
|
||||
assert!(admitted > 0, "limiter admitted nothing at all");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// It must also refill, or the relay would accept a burst once and then
|
||||
/// refuse every client forever.
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn admission_limiter_refills_over_time() {
|
||||
let mut limiter = AdmissionLimiter::new();
|
||||
while limiter.try_admit() {}
|
||||
assert!(!limiter.try_admit(), "bucket should be empty");
|
||||
|
||||
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(50));
|
||||
assert!(
|
||||
limiter.try_admit(),
|
||||
"limiter never refilled; the relay would stop accepting new clients"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// End-to-end through the real UDP path: a client datagram reaches the
|
||||
/// upstream and the reply comes back to that same client. This is the whole
|
||||
/// job of the relay, and it is what the previous implementation could not do
|
||||
/// with a real client, because it demanded credentials no client sends.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn udp_relay_forwards_both_directions() {
|
||||
// Stand-in upstream that echoes with a marker.
|
||||
let upstream = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let upstream_addr = upstream.local_addr().unwrap();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
|
||||
while let Ok((n, from)) = upstream.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
|
||||
let mut reply = b"echo:".to_vec();
|
||||
reply.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
|
||||
let _ = upstream.send_to(&reply, from).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let relay_listen = {
|
||||
let probe = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let a = probe.local_addr().unwrap();
|
||||
drop(probe);
|
||||
a
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
tokio::spawn(run_udp_relay(RelayConfig {
|
||||
listen_addrs: vec![relay_listen.to_string()],
|
||||
upstream_tcp: upstream_addr.to_string(),
|
||||
upstream_udp: upstream_addr.to_string(),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
|
||||
|
||||
// A plain OSTP-looking datagram: no credentials, no preamble.
|
||||
let client = UdpSocket::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.send_to(b"opaque-payload", relay_listen).await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = [0u8; 1500];
|
||||
let (n, _) = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), client.recv_from(&mut buf))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("relay did not deliver a reply within 3s")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(
|
||||
&buf[..n],
|
||||
b"echo:opaque-payload",
|
||||
"relay did not forward the payload verbatim in both directions"
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Same for TCP: bytes must cross unmodified in both directions, with no
|
||||
/// handshake demanded of the client.
|
||||
#[tokio::test]
|
||||
async fn tcp_relay_splices_both_directions() {
|
||||
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
|
||||
|
||||
let upstream = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let upstream_addr = upstream.local_addr().unwrap();
|
||||
tokio::spawn(async move {
|
||||
if let Ok((mut sock, _)) = upstream.accept().await {
|
||||
let mut buf = [0u8; 128];
|
||||
if let Ok(n) = sock.read(&mut buf).await {
|
||||
let mut reply = b"echo:".to_vec();
|
||||
reply.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
|
||||
let _ = sock.write_all(&reply).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
let relay_listen = {
|
||||
let probe = TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
|
||||
let a = probe.local_addr().unwrap();
|
||||
drop(probe);
|
||||
a
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
tokio::spawn(run_tcp_relay(RelayConfig {
|
||||
listen_addrs: vec![relay_listen.to_string()],
|
||||
upstream_tcp: upstream_addr.to_string(),
|
||||
upstream_udp: upstream_addr.to_string(),
|
||||
}));
|
||||
tokio::time::sleep(Duration::from_millis(150)).await;
|
||||
|
||||
let mut client = TcpStream::connect(relay_listen).await.unwrap();
|
||||
client.write_all(b"opaque-stream").await.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
let mut buf = [0u8; 128];
|
||||
let n = tokio::time::timeout(Duration::from_secs(3), client.read(&mut buf))
|
||||
.await
|
||||
.expect("relay did not deliver a reply within 3s")
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
|
||||
assert_eq!(&buf[..n], b"echo:opaque-stream");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -47,29 +47,12 @@ impl Router {
|
|||
|
||||
let mut proxy = None;
|
||||
if let Some(ref c) = cfg {
|
||||
if c.enabled {
|
||||
if c.protocol == "socks5" {
|
||||
let proxy_addr = format!("{}:{}", c.address, c.port);
|
||||
match crate::outbound::connect_udp_via_socks5(&proxy_addr, server_udp.clone()).await {
|
||||
Ok(p) => proxy = Some(Arc::new(p)),
|
||||
// Warn unconditionally, not only under `debug`. Every UDP
|
||||
// flow the rules want proxied is now dropped instead of
|
||||
// sent, so an operator who cannot see this has a session
|
||||
// where TCP works and UDP silently does not.
|
||||
Err(e) => tracing::warn!(
|
||||
"SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE to {proxy_addr} failed: {e}. UDP that the \
|
||||
outbound rules route through the proxy will be DROPPED (it is not \
|
||||
sent directly, which would expose this server's address)."
|
||||
),
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
tracing::warn!(
|
||||
"Upstream proxy protocol is '{}', which cannot carry UDP. UDP matching \
|
||||
a Proxy rule will be DROPPED. Use a socks5 upstream for UDP, or add an \
|
||||
explicit udp rule with action \"direct\" or \"block\" to make the \
|
||||
intent explicit.",
|
||||
c.protocol
|
||||
);
|
||||
if c.enabled && c.protocol == "socks5" {
|
||||
let proxy_addr = format!("{}:{}", c.address, c.port);
|
||||
if let Ok(p) = crate::outbound::connect_udp_via_socks5(&proxy_addr, server_udp.clone()).await {
|
||||
proxy = Some(Arc::new(p));
|
||||
} else if self.debug {
|
||||
tracing::warn!("Failed to establish SOCKS5 UDP Associate");
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -104,28 +87,9 @@ impl UdpSessionRouter {
|
|||
return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("blocked by outbound udp rule: {}", target));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if action == crate::outbound::OutboundAction::Proxy {
|
||||
return match &self.proxy {
|
||||
Some(p) => p.send_to(data, target).await,
|
||||
// FAIL CLOSED. This used to fall through to the direct
|
||||
// socket, so whenever the UDP proxy was unavailable —
|
||||
// the SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE failed, or the upstream is an
|
||||
// HTTP proxy, which cannot carry UDP at all — every UDP
|
||||
// datagram silently egressed from the server's own
|
||||
// address while TCP still went through the proxy. The
|
||||
// session then had two different exit IPs, which is what
|
||||
// Google flags and why YouTube (QUIC, i.e. UDP/443)
|
||||
// geolocated to the server instead of the proxy exit.
|
||||
//
|
||||
// A rule that says "proxy" must never be satisfied by
|
||||
// sending in the clear: a dropped datagram is visible and
|
||||
// debuggable, a deanonymising leak is neither.
|
||||
None => Err(anyhow::anyhow!(
|
||||
"outbound rule requires the proxy for UDP to {target}, but no UDP \
|
||||
proxy is available (SOCKS5 UDP ASSOCIATE failed, or the upstream \
|
||||
is an HTTP proxy, which cannot carry UDP) - dropping rather than \
|
||||
leaking the server's own address"
|
||||
)),
|
||||
};
|
||||
if let Some(p) = &self.proxy {
|
||||
return p.send_to(data, target).await;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -4,21 +4,6 @@
|
|||
// or launched via ShellExecuteW("runas").
|
||||
|
||||
fn main() {
|
||||
// Key off the TARGET, not the host. In a build script `cfg(windows)`
|
||||
// describes the machine doing the building, so cross-compiling the helper
|
||||
// from Windows to Linux took this branch and failed with "Can only compile
|
||||
// resource file when target_env is gnu or msvc". CARGO_CFG_TARGET_OS is the
|
||||
// target being built for, which is what actually decides whether a Windows
|
||||
// manifest belongs in the binary.
|
||||
let target_os = std::env::var("CARGO_CFG_TARGET_OS").unwrap_or_default();
|
||||
if target_os != "windows" {
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
// Second gate, on the HOST: winres is declared under
|
||||
// [target.'cfg(windows)'.build-dependencies], and build-dependencies are
|
||||
// resolved against the host triple, so the crate simply does not exist when
|
||||
// building on Linux. Referencing it unconditionally would fail to compile
|
||||
// there even though the target check above already passed.
|
||||
#[cfg(windows)]
|
||||
{
|
||||
let mut res = winres::WindowsResource::new();
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -799,16 +799,36 @@ fn run_setup_wizard(config_path: &std::path::Path) -> Result<()> {
|
|||
let listen = wizard_prompt("Listen address (host:port)", "0.0.0.0:50000");
|
||||
let upstream = wizard_prompt("Upstream server address (host:port)", "");
|
||||
if upstream.is_empty() { anyhow::bail!("Upstream address cannot be empty."); }
|
||||
let api_url = wizard_prompt(
|
||||
"Upstream API URL, including the panel's secret path (e.g. http://1.2.3.4:9090/bNAzr8Ss)",
|
||||
"",
|
||||
);
|
||||
// The management API lives under the target server's api.webpath, so
|
||||
// a bare host:port 404s on every key sync without ever checking the
|
||||
// token. Catch that here instead of leaving it to be debugged from
|
||||
// relay logs.
|
||||
let has_path = api_url
|
||||
.split("://")
|
||||
.nth(1)
|
||||
.map(|rest| rest.contains('/') && !rest.trim_end_matches('/').split('/').nth(1).unwrap_or("").is_empty())
|
||||
.unwrap_or(false);
|
||||
if !api_url.is_empty() && !has_path {
|
||||
wizard_warn(
|
||||
"This URL has no path segment. The API is served under the target server's \
|
||||
api.webpath - key sync will fail with 404 unless you append it.",
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
let api_token = wizard_prompt("Upstream API token (must equal api.token on the target server)", "");
|
||||
|
||||
wizard_step(2, TOTAL, "Saving configuration");
|
||||
// No credentials are collected: the relay forwards transparently and
|
||||
// authenticates nothing, so it needs neither the target's API nor a
|
||||
// copy of the access keys.
|
||||
let relay_json = serde_json::json!({
|
||||
"mode": "relay",
|
||||
"listen": listen,
|
||||
"upstream_tcp": upstream,
|
||||
"upstream_udp": upstream,
|
||||
"upstream_api_url": api_url,
|
||||
"upstream_api_token": api_token,
|
||||
"sync_interval_secs": 30,
|
||||
"debug": false
|
||||
});
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1135,9 +1155,7 @@ async fn run_app() -> Result<()> {
|
|||
println!(" Listen: {:?}", r.listen.primary().cyan());
|
||||
println!(" Upstream TCP: {}", r.upstream_tcp.cyan());
|
||||
println!(" Upstream UDP: {}", r.upstream_udp.cyan());
|
||||
if !r.upstream_api_url.is_empty() {
|
||||
println!(" {}", "upstream_api_url is set but no longer used - safe to remove".yellow());
|
||||
}
|
||||
println!(" API sync: {}", r.upstream_api_url.yellow());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
@ -1213,9 +1231,15 @@ async fn run_app() -> Result<()> {
|
|||
"listen": "0.0.0.0:50000",
|
||||
"upstream_tcp": "TARGET_SERVER_IP:50000",
|
||||
"upstream_udp": "TARGET_SERVER_IP:50000",
|
||||
// The relay forwards transparently and holds no keys: sessions are
|
||||
// authenticated end-to-end by the target server, which drops anything that
|
||||
// fails. Nothing else needs configuring here.
|
||||
// MUST include the target server's secret api.webpath. The management API is
|
||||
// nested under it (that path is what hides the panel from scanners), so a
|
||||
// bare host:port hits a route that does not exist and key sync fails with 404
|
||||
// before the token is ever checked. This is the same URL you open the panel
|
||||
// at, e.g. "http://1.2.3.4:9090/bNAzr8Ss".
|
||||
"upstream_api_url": "http://TARGET_SERVER_IP:9090/TARGET_SERVER_WEBPATH",
|
||||
// Must equal api.token on the target server (NOT the panel password).
|
||||
"upstream_api_token": "YOUR_API_TOKEN_HERE",
|
||||
"sync_interval_secs": 30,
|
||||
"debug": false
|
||||
}"#.to_string()
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
|
|
@ -1414,18 +1438,14 @@ async fn run_app() -> Result<()> {
|
|||
println!("{} Starting relay node on {:?}", "[ostp]".cyan().bold(), listen_addrs);
|
||||
println!("{} Upstream TCP: {}", "[ostp]".cyan().bold(), relay_cfg.upstream_tcp);
|
||||
println!("{} Upstream UDP: {}", "[ostp]".cyan().bold(), relay_cfg.upstream_udp);
|
||||
if !relay_cfg.upstream_api_url.is_empty() {
|
||||
println!(
|
||||
"{} Note: upstream_api_url is no longer used and can be removed. The relay \
|
||||
forwards transparently; sessions are authenticated end-to-end by the target \
|
||||
server.",
|
||||
"[ostp]".yellow().bold()
|
||||
);
|
||||
}
|
||||
println!("{} Key sync API: {}", "[ostp]".cyan().bold(), relay_cfg.upstream_api_url);
|
||||
let relay_config = ostp_server::RelayConfig {
|
||||
listen_addrs,
|
||||
upstream_tcp: relay_cfg.upstream_tcp,
|
||||
upstream_udp: relay_cfg.upstream_udp,
|
||||
upstream_api_url: relay_cfg.upstream_api_url,
|
||||
upstream_api_token: relay_cfg.upstream_api_token,
|
||||
sync_interval_secs: relay_cfg.sync_interval_secs,
|
||||
};
|
||||
ostp_server::relay_node::run_relay_node(relay_config).await?;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue