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@ -1,151 +1,29 @@
name: CI/CD
# `run-name` is evaluated at workflow-start, BEFORE any job runs - it cannot
# see resolve-channel's computed tag_name (e.g. "0.4.3-alpha"), only the
# `github.*` context. The old "release version ${{ github.ref_name }}" showed
# the bare branch name ("alpha"/"beta") for every run, which reads
# exactly like a literal release tag and caused real confusion - the actual
# release tag has been correct (versioned) all along; only this label lied
# about it. Spell out "channel" so nobody mistakes one for the other again.
# NOTE: this value MUST be quoted. The GHA string literal below contains
# "Release build: {0}" - an unquoted YAML plain scalar treats ": " (colon
# then space) as starting a nested mapping, which is exactly what broke every
# single push since this line was introduced: GitHub rejected the whole
# workflow file at parse time (before any job runs), silently burning an
# Actions-minutes-billed run per push for nothing.
run-name: "${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') && (contains(github.ref_name, 'beta') && format('CI/CD: beta version {0}', github.ref_name) || contains(github.ref_name, 'alpha') && format('CI/CD: alpha version {0}', github.ref_name) || format('CI/CD: release version {0}', github.ref_name)) || format('CI/CD: {0} channel build', github.ref_name) }}"
name: Universal CI/CD Release Matrix
on:
push:
tags:
- "v*"
workflow_dispatch:
inputs:
channel:
description: >-
Manually build+release just this rolling channel. Stable releases
are NEVER picked here on purpose - cut those only via a real
"vX.Y.Z" tag push, so a manual dispatch can't accidentally publish
a "stable" release.
type: choice
required: true
default: alpha
options:
- alpha
- beta
permissions:
contents: write
# -- Global defaults ---------------------------------------------------------
# ── Global defaults ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
env:
CARGO_TERM_COLOR: always
CARGO_INCREMENTAL: 0
RUST_BACKTRACE: short
jobs:
# Computes ONE channel + release tag for this whole run, so every build
# job (native matrix + all 3 GUI platforms + Android) uploads to the exact
# same release under the exact same tag, instead of repeating this logic
# (and risking it drifting out of sync) in five separate places.
#
# Tag shape:
# - real "vX.Y.Z" / "vX.Y.Z-beta.N" tag push -> tag used as-is (stable promotion)
# - push to `alpha` -> "{version}-alpha" (rolling, same tag every push)
# - push to `beta` -> "{version}-beta" (rolling, same tag every push)
# - workflow_dispatch -> forced by the `channel` input (alpha|beta only)
resolve-channel:
name: Resolve release channel
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
outputs:
channel: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.channel }}
tag_name: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.tag_name }}
prerelease: ${{ steps.resolve.outputs.prerelease }}
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Resolve channel, version, and release tag
id: resolve
shell: bash
run: |
set -euo pipefail
BASE_VERSION=$(grep -m1 '^version' Cargo.toml | sed -E 's/version *= *"([^"]+)"/\1/')
if [[ "${{ github.ref }}" == refs/tags/v* ]]; then
# A pushed tag is authoritative — use it AS-IS (never recompute it
# from Cargo.toml, or the release would upload to a different tag than
# the one that triggered this run). The channel, and thus prerelease,
# is decided by the tag's suffix: v0.4.7-beta / v0.4.7-alpha are
# prereleases; a bare vX.Y.Z is the only thing that becomes stable.
TAG="${{ github.ref_name }}"
case "$TAG" in
*-alpha*) CHANNEL="alpha" ;;
*-beta*) CHANNEL="beta" ;;
*) CHANNEL="stable" ;;
esac
else
# No tag (workflow_dispatch, or a legacy branch push): pick the
# channel, then synthesize the rolling tag from Cargo.toml's version.
if [ "${{ github.event_name }}" = "workflow_dispatch" ]; then
CHANNEL="${{ github.event.inputs.channel }}"
elif [ "${{ github.ref_name }}" = "beta" ]; then
CHANNEL="beta"
else
CHANNEL="alpha"
fi
TAG="v${BASE_VERSION}-${CHANNEL}"
fi
echo "Resolved channel=$CHANNEL tag=$TAG (base version $BASE_VERSION)"
echo "channel=$CHANNEL" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "tag_name=$TAG" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
echo "prerelease=$([ "$CHANNEL" = "stable" ] && echo false || echo true)" >> "$GITHUB_OUTPUT"
check-and-test:
name: Check & Test
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Setup Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
toolchain: stable
- name: Restore Cargo cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry/index/
~/.cargo/registry/cache/
~/.cargo/git/db/
target/
key: cargo-check-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: cargo-check-
- name: Install musl-tools
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools
- name: Create dummy dist for rust-embed
run: mkdir -p ostp-control/dist && touch ostp-control/dist/index.html
- name: cargo check
run: cargo check --workspace
- name: cargo test
run: cargo test --workspace --lib
publish-release-matrix:
name: Release for ${{ matrix.target }}
needs: [check-and-test, resolve-channel]
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
include:
# -- Windows ------------------------------------------------------
# ── Windows ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- os: windows-latest
target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
artifact_name: ostp.exe
@ -164,7 +42,7 @@ jobs:
release_name: ostp-windows-arm64.zip
wintun_arch: arm64
# -- macOS ---------------------------------------------------------
# ── macOS ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- os: macos-latest
target: x86_64-apple-darwin
artifact_name: ostp
@ -175,7 +53,7 @@ jobs:
artifact_name: ostp
release_name: ostp-darwin-arm64.tar.gz
# -- Linux native --------------------------------------------------
# ── Linux native ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-musl
artifact_name: ostp
@ -187,7 +65,7 @@ jobs:
release_name: ostp-linux-386.tar.gz
use_cross: true
# -- Linux cross ---------------------------------------------------
# ── Linux cross ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
- os: ubuntu-latest
target: aarch64-unknown-linux-musl
artifact_name: ostp
@ -225,31 +103,25 @@ jobs:
- name: Checkout code
uses: actions/checkout@v4
# -- Frontend Build -----------------------------------------------------
# ── Frontend Build ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Setup Node.js
uses: actions/setup-node@v4
with:
node-version: 20
- name: Build Web Panel (skip if no source; use committed dist/)
shell: bash
- name: Build Web Panel
working-directory: ostp-control
run: |
mkdir -p ostp-control/dist
cd ostp-control
if [ -f package.json ]; then
npm install && npm run build
else
echo "ostp-control has no package.json - using committed dist/"
[ -f dist/index.html ] || echo '<!doctype html><title>OSTP</title>' > dist/index.html
fi
npm install
npm run build
# -- Rust toolchain -----------------------------------------------------
# ── Rust toolchain ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Setup Rust toolchain
uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
with:
toolchain: ${{ matrix.toolchain || 'stable' }}
targets: ${{ !matrix.use_cross && matrix.target || '' }}
# -- Cargo cache (shared per target) -----------------------------------
# ── Cargo cache (shared per target) ───────────────────────────────────
- name: Restore Cargo cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
@ -262,18 +134,18 @@ jobs:
restore-keys: |
cargo-${{ matrix.target }}-
# -- MUSL tools for native Linux musl builds ----------------------------
# ── MUSL tools for native Linux musl builds ────────────────────────────
- name: Install musl-tools
if: ${{ matrix.os == 'ubuntu-latest' && !matrix.use_cross }}
run: sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y musl-tools
# -- Native build -------------------------------------------------------
# ── Native build ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Build (native)
if: ${{ !matrix.use_cross }}
shell: bash
run: cargo build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} --bin ostp
# -- Cross build --------------------------------------------------------
# ── Cross build ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Restore cross binary cache
if: ${{ matrix.use_cross }}
id: cross-cache
@ -284,21 +156,13 @@ jobs:
- name: Install cross (if not cached)
if: ${{ matrix.use_cross && steps.cross-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true' }}
# cross-rs's own source (not ours, not a dependency of ours) uses a
# macro-at-end-of-block pattern that trips rustc's
# semicolon_in_expressions_from_macros lint on current toolchains -
# harmless in cross's actual behavior, but `cargo install` compiles
# the installed package as the "local" crate, so dependency lint
# capping doesn't shield it. --cap-lints=warn is the standard escape
# hatch for building a third-party tool against a newer compiler than
# its own lint config assumed; it doesn't touch our own build.
run: RUSTFLAGS="--cap-lints=warn" cargo install cross --git https://github.com/cross-rs/cross.git --locked
run: cargo install cross --git https://github.com/cross-rs/cross.git --locked
- name: Build (cross)
if: ${{ matrix.use_cross }}
run: cross build --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} --bin ostp
# -- Driver dependencies ------------------------------------------------
# ── Driver dependencies ────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Download wintun (Windows)
if: ${{ matrix.os == 'windows-latest' }}
shell: pwsh
@ -310,7 +174,7 @@ jobs:
Get-ChildItem "$dir/wt_tmp" -Filter "wintun.dll" -Recurse | Where-Object { $_.FullName -match 'bin[\\/]${{ matrix.wintun_arch }}[\\/]' } | Copy-Item -Destination "$dir/"
Remove-Item "$dir/wt.zip","$dir/wt_tmp" -Recurse -Force
# -- Package ------------------------------------------------------------
# ── Package ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Package (Windows)
if: ${{ matrix.os == 'windows-latest' }}
shell: pwsh
@ -329,23 +193,17 @@ jobs:
FILES="${{ matrix.artifact_name }}"
tar -czf "${{ matrix.release_name }}" -C "$dir" $FILES
# -- Upload -------------------------------------------------------------
# ── Upload ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
- name: Upload to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
# Computed once in resolve-channel so every platform/job in this run
# lands on the exact same tag: "{version}-alpha" / "{version}-beta"
# for rolling channel pushes, or the pushed "vX.Y.Z" tag as-is for a
# real stable release.
tag_name: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.tag_name }}
prerelease: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.prerelease }}
files: ${{ matrix.release_name }}
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
build-windows-gui:
name: Build Windows GUI (Tauri) - ${{ matrix.arch }}
needs: [check-and-test, resolve-channel]
runs-on: windows-latest
strategy:
matrix:
@ -378,15 +236,7 @@ jobs:
~/.cargo/registry/cache/
~/.cargo/git/db/
target/
ostp-gui/src-tauri/target/
key: cargo-windows-gui-${{ matrix.target }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
# Without a prefix fallback this cache NEVER restored on a release:
# cutting a release rewrites every Cargo.lock (version bump), which
# changes hashFiles(), which misses the exact key — so each release
# rebuilt every dependency from scratch. That is why the GUI jobs ran
# 2-4x longer than the plain release targets, which had this all along.
restore-keys: |
cargo-windows-gui-${{ matrix.target }}-
- name: Download wintun
shell: pwsh
@ -418,21 +268,15 @@ jobs:
Compress-Archive -Path "$dir/*" -DestinationPath "ostp-windows-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.zip" -Force
- name: Upload to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
# Computed once in resolve-channel so every platform/job in this run
# lands on the exact same tag: "{version}-alpha" / "{version}-beta"
# for rolling channel pushes, or the pushed "vX.Y.Z" tag as-is for a
# real stable release.
tag_name: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.tag_name }}
prerelease: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.prerelease }}
files: ostp-windows-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.zip
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
build-linux-gui:
name: Build Linux GUI (Tauri) - ${{ matrix.arch }}
needs: [check-and-test, resolve-channel]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
matrix:
@ -468,46 +312,30 @@ jobs:
~/.cargo/registry/cache/
~/.cargo/git/db/
target/
ostp-gui/src-tauri/target/
key: cargo-linux-gui-${{ matrix.target }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
cargo-linux-gui-${{ matrix.target }}-
- name: Build Tauri App
working-directory: ostp-gui
run: |
npm install
# TUN mode shells out to this helper, elevated via pkexec. Only the
# Windows job used to build it, so the Linux package shipped without
# it and TUN could never start.
cargo build -p ostp-tun-helper --release --target ${{ matrix.target }} --manifest-path ../Cargo.toml
npx tauri build --no-bundle --target ${{ matrix.target }}
- name: Package Portable Tarball
run: |
set -euo pipefail
mkdir ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}
cp ostp-gui/src-tauri/target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/ostp-gui ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}/
# The GUI looks for the helper next to its own executable first.
cp target/${{ matrix.target }}/release/ostp-tun-helper ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}/
tar -czf ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.tar.gz ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}
- name: Upload to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
# Computed once in resolve-channel so every platform/job in this run
# lands on the exact same tag: "{version}-alpha" / "{version}-beta"
# for rolling channel pushes, or the pushed "vX.Y.Z" tag as-is for a
# real stable release.
tag_name: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.tag_name }}
prerelease: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.prerelease }}
files: ostp-linux-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.tar.gz
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
build-macos-gui:
name: Build macOS GUI (Tauri) - ${{ matrix.arch }}
needs: [check-and-test, resolve-channel]
runs-on: macos-latest
strategy:
matrix:
@ -540,10 +368,7 @@ jobs:
~/.cargo/registry/cache/
~/.cargo/git/db/
target/
ostp-gui/src-tauri/target/
key: cargo-macos-gui-${{ matrix.target }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
cargo-macos-gui-${{ matrix.target }}-
- name: Build Tauri App
working-directory: ostp-gui
@ -558,21 +383,15 @@ jobs:
tar -czf ostp-macos-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.tar.gz ostp-macos-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}
- name: Upload to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
# Computed once in resolve-channel so every platform/job in this run
# lands on the exact same tag: "{version}-alpha" / "{version}-beta"
# for rolling channel pushes, or the pushed "vX.Y.Z" tag as-is for a
# real stable release.
tag_name: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.tag_name }}
prerelease: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.prerelease }}
files: ostp-macos-gui-${{ matrix.arch }}.tar.gz
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}
build-android:
name: Build Android Client (Flutter) - ${{ matrix.arch }}
needs: [check-and-test, resolve-channel]
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
strategy:
matrix:
@ -583,6 +402,7 @@ jobs:
- arch: armeabi-v7a
rust_target: armv7-linux-androideabi
flutter_target: android-arm
tun2socks_arch: linux-armv7
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
@ -608,117 +428,32 @@ jobs:
with:
ndk-version: r26b
# The Android jobs had no Rust caching at all, so every release recompiled
# the whole ostp-jni dependency graph from scratch — the main reason these
# were among the slowest jobs in the matrix.
- name: Cache cargo
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: |
~/.cargo/registry/index/
~/.cargo/registry/cache/
~/.cargo/git/db/
target/
key: cargo-android-${{ matrix.arch }}-${{ hashFiles('**/Cargo.lock') }}
restore-keys: |
cargo-android-${{ matrix.arch }}-
# cargo-ndk was built from source on every run. Cache the binary the same
# way the cross-compilation jobs already cache `cross`.
- name: Restore cargo-ndk binary cache
id: cargo-ndk-cache
uses: actions/cache@v4
with:
path: ~/.cargo/bin/cargo-ndk
key: cargo-ndk-bin-${{ runner.os }}-v1
- name: Install cargo-ndk (if not cached)
if: steps.cargo-ndk-cache.outputs.cache-hit != 'true'
run: cargo install cargo-ndk --locked
- name: Install cargo-ndk
run: cargo install cargo-ndk
- name: Build Android APK
shell: bash
working-directory: ostp-flutter
env:
OSTP_KEYSTORE_B64: ${{ secrets.ANDROID_KEYSTORE_BASE64 }}
OSTP_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.ANDROID_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD }}
OSTP_KEY_ALIAS: ${{ secrets.ANDROID_KEY_ALIAS }}
OSTP_KEY_PASSWORD: ${{ secrets.ANDROID_KEY_PASSWORD }}
run: |
set -euo pipefail
# 1. Materialise the upload keystore from secrets. Android keys an app
# by applicationId + signing key and refuses to update across a key
# change, so every published build MUST use this one key. Releases
# used to fall through to the per-machine debug keystore, which on
# ephemeral CI runners meant a different random key every build -
# hence "App not installed" on upgrade.
if [ -z "${OSTP_KEYSTORE_B64:-}" ]; then
echo "::error::ANDROID_KEYSTORE_BASE64 secret is not set. Refusing to publish a"
echo "::error::debug-signed APK: users could not update over it and the key is"
echo "::error::not reproducible. See docs for the one-time keystore setup."
exit 1
fi
export OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH="$RUNNER_TEMP/ostp-upload.jks"
# Strip any stray CR/LF before decoding: the secret is pasted from a
# shell whose line endings we don't control, and a single trailing \r
# is enough to corrupt the decode.
printf '%s' "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_B64" | tr -d '\r\n' | base64 -d > "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH"
# Verify the keystore opens BEFORE spending four minutes on Gradle only
# to fail at the packaging step. The size/SHA-256 are safe to print (a
# hash reveals nothing) and let the operator compare against the local
# file to tell a transport problem apart from a wrong password.
echo "keystore: $(stat -c%s "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH") bytes, sha256 $(sha256sum "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH" | cut -d' ' -f1)"
if ! keytool -list -keystore "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH" \
-storepass "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "::error::The keystore did not open with ANDROID_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD."
echo "::error::If the SHA-256 above matches your local ostp-upload.jks, the file"
echo "::error::arrived intact and the password secret itself is wrong - note that"
echo "::error::PowerShell expands \$ inside double quotes, so a password containing"
echo "::error::one gets mangled unless it was set with single quotes."
exit 1
fi
if ! keytool -list -keystore "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH" \
-storepass "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD" -alias "$OSTP_KEY_ALIAS" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "::error::Keystore opened, but it has no key under ANDROID_KEY_ALIAS."
echo "::error::Aliases present in the keystore:"
keytool -list -keystore "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH" -storepass "$OSTP_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD" \
| grep -i "PrivateKeyEntry" || true
exit 1
fi
# 2. Compile JNI
# 1. Compile JNI
mkdir -p android/app/src/main/jniLibs/${{ matrix.arch }}
cd ../ostp-jni
cargo ndk -t ${{ matrix.arch }} -o "../ostp-flutter/android/app/src/main/jniLibs" build --release
cd ../ostp-flutter
# 3. Build Flutter APK
flutter build apk --release --target-platform ${{ matrix.flutter_target }}
# 4. Fail loudly if the APK somehow still came out debug-signed, rather
# than shipping another un-updatable build.
APK=build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk
if "$ANDROID_HOME"/build-tools/*/apksigner verify --print-certs "$APK" 2>/dev/null \
| grep -qi "CN=Android Debug"; then
echo "::error::APK is signed with the Android debug certificate - aborting."
exit 1
fi
# 5. Copy to output
cp "$APK" ostp-android-${{ matrix.arch }}.apk
# 4. Copy to output
cp build/app/outputs/flutter-apk/app-release.apk ostp-android-${{ matrix.arch }}.apk
- name: Upload to GitHub Release
if: ${{ startsWith(github.ref, 'refs/tags/') }}
uses: softprops/action-gh-release@v2
with:
# Computed once in resolve-channel so every platform/job in this run
# lands on the exact same tag: "{version}-alpha" / "{version}-beta"
# for rolling channel pushes, or the pushed "vX.Y.Z" tag as-is for a
# real stable release.
tag_name: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.tag_name }}
prerelease: ${{ needs.resolve-channel.outputs.prerelease }}
files: ostp-flutter/ostp-android-${{ matrix.arch }}.apk
env:
GITHUB_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

21
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -5,7 +5,6 @@
**/*.rs.bk
.idea/
.vscode/
**/node_modules/
# Binaries & libraries
*.exe
@ -26,17 +25,6 @@ test_route.ps1
config.json
wintun.dll
# Android signing keys. The upload keystore is the ONE key every published APK
# must be signed with (Android refuses to update an app across a key change),
# so losing or leaking it is unrecoverable — it can never be committed.
*.jks
*.keystore
key.properties
# Server runtime cache (public IP autodetect) — must never be committed,
# it's regenerated locally and leaks whatever host it ran on last.
.ostp_public_ip
# Logs
*.log
@ -46,14 +34,5 @@ turn-harvesting-idea.md
# Private tooling (closed-source)
ostp-prober/
ostp-lab/
ostp-brain/
# Management panel built assets (built separately; dummy dist created for rust-embed build)
ostp-control/
.agents/
netstack-smoltcp/
dnstt/
ostp-web/

1
.ostp_public_ip Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
127.0.0.1

View File

@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
{
"target_version": "0.4.4",
"branch": "master",
"alpha_iteration": 0,
"beta_iteration": 0
}

View File

@ -10,12 +10,10 @@ By contributing to this project, you agree to abide by our code of conduct and l
1. [Development Setup](#development-setup)
2. [Project Structure](#project-structure)
3. [Branch Strategy](#branch-strategy)
4. [Development Workflow](#development-workflow)
5. [Commit Message Conventions](#commit-message-conventions)
6. [Coding Guidelines](#coding-guidelines)
7. [Submitting Pull Requests](#submitting-pull-requests)
8. [Security Vulnerabilities](#security-vulnerabilities)
3. [Development Workflow](#development-workflow)
4. [Coding Guidelines](#coding-guidelines)
5. [Submitting Pull Requests](#submitting-pull-requests)
6. [Security Vulnerabilities](#security-vulnerabilities)
---
@ -35,19 +33,20 @@ To build and test OSTP locally, you will need:
cd ostp
```
2. **Build the entire Cargo workspace**:
2. **Build the control panel frontend**:
```bash
cd ostp-control
npm install
npm run build
cd ..
```
3. **Build the entire Cargo workspace**:
```bash
cargo build
```
`ostp-control` (the web panel) is only needed if you're working on it
specifically - the server build embeds a dummy `dist/` via `rust-embed`
otherwise, so this step is not required for day-to-day core/client/server
work. If you *are* touching the panel:
```bash
cd ostp-control && npm install && npm run build && cd ..
```
3. **Run tests**:
4. **Run tests**:
```bash
cargo test --workspace
```
@ -59,7 +58,7 @@ To build and test OSTP locally, you will need:
The repository is organized as a Cargo workspace containing the following crates:
* [`ostp-core/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-core): Core protocol logic, including packet formatting, serialization, selective ACK/NACK (ARQ) state machine, and the Noise protocol (`Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s`) handshake.
* [`ostp-client/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-client): Client implementations, including SOCKS5/HTTP local proxies, the native OSTP TUN interface routing, and split-tunneling bypass mechanisms.
* [`ostp-client/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-client): Client implementations, including SOCKS5/HTTP local proxies, `tun2socks` integration, native TUN interface routing, and split-tunneling bypass mechanisms.
* [`ostp-server/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-server): Server logic, session dispatcher, anti-probing fallback server proxying, access key database, and the REST API for control panel communication.
* [`ostp-control/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-control): A modern web dashboard for server administration (user management, real-time metrics, bandwidth limits).
* [`ostp-gui/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-gui): Tauri-based desktop GUI application for Windows and Linux.
@ -67,28 +66,11 @@ The repository is organized as a Cargo workspace containing the following crates
---
## Branch Strategy
The repository runs three long-lived branches, in increasing order of stability:
| Branch | Role |
|---|---|
| `alpha` | Active development. All feature work and fixes land here first. |
| `beta` | Periodically fast-forwarded from `alpha` once it's had some soak time. Ships as the `{version}-beta` release channel. |
| `master` | Fast-forwarded from `beta` when it's proven stable. Real, tagged releases (`vX.Y.Z`) are cut from here. |
`beta` and `master` are **never** committed to directly - they only ever move forward by fast-forwarding from the branch below them. This means promotion is always a plain `git merge` with zero conflicts by construction: don't `git merge`/rebase feature work directly onto `beta` or `master`.
**Contributor PRs target `alpha`**, not `master`.
---
## Development Workflow
1. **Check for existing issues** or open a new one to discuss proposed changes before starting work.
2. **Fork the repository** and create a new branch from `alpha`:
2. **Fork the repository** and create a new branch from `master`:
```bash
git checkout alpha
git checkout -b feat/your-feature-name
```
3. **Implement your changes**, ensuring you write appropriate unit or integration tests.
@ -107,32 +89,6 @@ The repository runs three long-lived branches, in increasing order of stability:
---
## Commit Message Conventions
```
<type>(<scope>): <short, imperative summary>
<optional body - explain WHY, not what; the diff already shows what changed>
```
- **Type** - one of: `feat` (new capability), `fix` (bug fix), `docs`, `refactor` (no behavior change), `perf`, `test`, `chore` (deps/tooling/version bumps), `ci`, `security`.
- **Scope** (optional) - the crate or area touched: `client`, `server`, `core`, `gui`, `flutter`, `ci`, `docs`, etc. e.g. `fix(client): ...`.
- **Summary** - imperative mood ("add", not "added"/"adds"), no trailing period, ideally under ~70 characters.
- **Body** - only when the *why* isn't obvious from the diff: a prior bug this fixes, a constraint that shaped the approach, a tradeoff you made. Don't restate what the diff already shows. Wrap at ~72 columns.
```
fix(server): drop junk frames by per-key marker instead of a global one
A fixed 4-byte marker on every junk packet is itself a DPI signature any
observer can filter on across every OSTP deployment. Derive the marker
from the access key (HKDF, same scheme as obfuscation_key/psk) so it's
per-user and indistinguishable from the packet's own random payload.
```
Multiple unrelated changes belong in separate commits, not one bundled commit - it keeps `git bisect` and review useful. Squash-merge is fine for a PR with a few "fix typo" / "address review" commits, but don't squash logically distinct changes together.
---
## Coding Guidelines
* **Safety**: Avoid using `unsafe` blocks unless absolutely necessary for low-level system bindings (e.g., FFI configurations like `setsockopt`). When using `unsafe`, add safety doc comments explaining why it is safe.
@ -148,7 +104,7 @@ Multiple unrelated changes belong in separate commits, not one bundled commit -
```bash
git push origin feat/your-feature-name
```
2. Open a Pull Request (PR) targeting the `alpha` branch (see [Branch Strategy](#branch-strategy) - `master` only receives fast-forwards from `beta`, never direct PRs).
2. Open a Pull Request (PR) targeting the `master` branch.
3. In your PR description, explain the rationale behind your changes, what was fixed/added, and how it was tested.
4. Verify that GitHub Actions CI runs successfully on your PR.

View File

@ -10,12 +10,10 @@
1. [Подготовка окружения](#подготовка-окружения)
2. [Структура проекта](#структура-проекта)
3. [Стратегия веток](#стратегия-веток)
4. [Процесс разработки](#процесс-разработки)
5. [Оформление коммитов](#оформление-коммитов)
6. [Правила оформления кода](#правила-оформления-кода)
7. [Создание Pull Request](#создание-pull-request)
8. [Уязвимости безопасности](#уязвимости-безопасности)
3. [Процесс разработки](#процесс-разработки)
4. [Правила оформления кода](#правила-оформления-кода)
5. [Создание Pull Request](#создание-pull-request)
6. [Уязвимости безопасности](#уязвимости-безопасности)
---
@ -35,19 +33,20 @@
cd ostp
```
2. **Соберите весь Cargo-workspace**:
2. **Соберите веб-интерфейс панели управления**:
```bash
cd ostp-control
npm install
npm run build
cd ..
```
3. **Соберите весь Cargo-workspace**:
```bash
cargo build
```
`ostp-control` (веб-панель) нужна только если вы работаете конкретно над
ней - в остальных случаях сервер собирается с пустым `dist/` через
`rust-embed`, и этот шаг не нужен для повседневной работы над
core/client/server. Если вы всё же трогаете панель:
```bash
cd ostp-control && npm install && npm run build && cd ..
```
3. **Запустите тесты**:
4. **Запустите тесты**:
```bash
cargo test --workspace
```
@ -59,7 +58,7 @@
Репозиторий представляет собой единый Cargo-workspace со следующими компонентами:
* [`ostp-core/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-core): Базовая логика протокола: форматирование пакетов, сериализация, конечный автомат выборочного подтверждения (ARQ/ACK/NACK) и рукопожатие Noise (`Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s`).
* [`ostp-client/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-client): Клиентская часть: локальные SOCKS5/HTTP прокси-серверы, нативный OSTP TUN-интерфейс (через драйвер `wintun`) и реализация раздельного туннелирования для прямого обхода трафика.
* [`ostp-client/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-client): Клиентская часть: локальные SOCKS5/HTTP прокси-серверы, интеграция с драйвером `wintun` / `tun2socks` и реализация раздельного туннелирования для прямого обхода трафика.
* [`ostp-server/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-server): Серверная часть: диспетчеризация сессий, маскировка под классические веб-серверы при активном сканировании, база данных ключей доступа и REST API панели управления.
* [`ostp-control/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-control): Панель администратора (пользователи, статистика трафика в реальном времени, лимиты скорости и объема данных).
* [`ostp-gui/`](file:///d:/ospab-projects/ostp/ostp-gui): Настольное приложение-клиент для Windows и Linux на платформе Tauri.
@ -67,28 +66,11 @@
---
## Стратегия веток
В репозитории три долгоживущие ветки, по возрастанию стабильности:
| Ветка | Роль |
|---|---|
| `alpha` | Активная разработка. Вся новая работа и фиксы попадают сюда первыми. |
| `beta` | Периодически перематывается вперёд (fast-forward) от `alpha`, когда та немного «отлежалась». Собирается в канал релиза `{версия}-beta`. |
| `master` | Перематывается вперёд от `beta`, когда та доказала стабильность. Настоящие тегированные релизы (`vX.Y.Z`) режутся отсюда. |
В `beta` и `master` **никогда** не коммитят напрямую - они только перематываются вперёд от ветки уровнем ниже. Это значит, что промоушен - всегда обычный `git merge` без единого конфликта по построению: не мержите/не ребейзьте свою фичу прямо в `beta` или `master`.
**PR от контрибьюторов нацелены на `alpha`**, не на `master`.
---
## Процесс разработки
1. **Проверьте существующие задачи** или откройте новую тему (Issue) для обсуждения предлагаемых изменений.
2. **Сделайте fork репозитория** и создайте новую ветку от `alpha`:
2. **Сделайте fork репозитория** и создайте новую ветку от `master`:
```bash
git checkout alpha
git checkout -b feat/имя-вашей-фичи
```
3. **Внесите необходимые изменения** и добавьте соответствующие модульные или интеграционные тесты.
@ -107,33 +89,6 @@
---
## Оформление коммитов
```
<тип>(<область>): <краткое описание в повелительном наклонении>
<опционально: тело - объясняет ПОЧЕМУ, а не что; диф и так показывает что изменилось>
```
- **Тип** - один из: `feat` (новая функциональность), `fix` (исправление бага), `docs`, `refactor` (без изменения поведения), `perf`, `test`, `chore` (зависимости/тулинг/версии), `ci`, `security`.
- **Область** (опционально) - крейт или часть проекта: `client`, `server`, `core`, `gui`, `flutter`, `ci`, `docs` и т.д., например `fix(client): ...`.
- **Краткое описание** - повелительное наклонение ("добавь", а не "добавил"/"добавляет"), без точки в конце, желательно до ~70 символов.
- **Тело** - только когда причина не очевидна из дифа: какой баг это чинит, какое ограничение определило подход, на какой trade-off вы пошли. Не пересказывайте то, что и так видно в дифе. Перенос строк на ~72 символах.
```
fix(server): отбрасывать junk-фреймы по маркеру для каждого ключа, а не глобальному
Фиксированный 4-байтовый маркер на каждом junk-пакете сам по себе - сигнатура
DPI, по которой можно фильтровать любого наблюдателя во всех деплойментах OSTP
сразу. Выводим маркер из access_key (HKDF, та же схема что у
obfuscation_key/psk), чтобы он был индивидуальным для ключа и неотличимым от
случайной полезной нагрузки пакета.
```
Несколько несвязанных изменений - это несколько отдельных коммитов, а не один сборный. Это сохраняет пользу от `git bisect` и код-ревью. Squash-merge подходит для PR с парой коммитов вроде "fix typo" / "address review", но не сквошьте вместе логически разные изменения.
---
## Правила оформления кода
* **Безопасность (Safety)**: Избегайте использования блоков `unsafe` везде, где это возможно. Допускается их использование только для низкоуровневых системных вызовов (например, FFI-настройки сокетов `setsockopt`). Любой блок `unsafe` должен сопровождаться комментарием `// SAFETY: ...`.
@ -149,7 +104,7 @@ obfuscation_key/psk), чтобы он был индивидуальным для
```bash
git push origin feat/имя-вашей-фичи
```
2. Создайте Pull Request (PR) в ветку `alpha` основного репозитория (см. [Стратегия веток](#стратегия-веток) - `master` получает только fast-forward от `beta`, PR туда не принимаются напрямую).
2. Создайте Pull Request (PR) в ветку `master` основного репозитория.
3. Подробно опишите внесенные изменения: какая проблема решается, как проводилось тестирование и на каких платформах проверялась сборка.
4. Убедитесь, что автоматическое тестирование (GitHub Actions CI) завершилось успешно.

31
Cargo.lock generated
View File

@ -1316,9 +1316,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "netstack-smoltcp"
version = "0.2.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "4c38f66cdd673ff0e760752f27c6d34a7e3a140f0b1eea9efae3c46d8867c83d"
version = "0.2.2"
dependencies = [
"etherparse",
"futures",
@ -1386,7 +1384,7 @@ checksum = "c08d65885ee38876c4f86fa503fb49d7b507c2b62552df7c70b2fce627e06381"
[[package]]
name = "ostp"
version = "0.4.4"
version = "0.2.89"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"base64",
@ -1397,10 +1395,8 @@ dependencies = [
"ostp-core",
"ostp-server",
"rand 0.8.5",
"rlimit",
"serde",
"serde_json",
"sha2",
"tokio",
"tracing",
"tracing-subscriber",
@ -1409,14 +1405,16 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ostp-client"
version = "0.4.4"
version = "0.2.89"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"base64",
"bytes",
"chacha20poly1305",
"chrono",
"futures",
"futures-util",
"hex",
"hmac",
"json_comments",
"libc",
@ -1436,11 +1434,12 @@ dependencies = [
"tun",
"webpki-roots 0.26.11",
"winapi",
"x25519-dalek",
]
[[package]]
name = "ostp-core"
version = "0.4.4"
version = "0.2.89"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"bytes",
@ -1474,7 +1473,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ostp-server"
version = "0.4.4"
version = "0.2.89"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"axum",
@ -1497,7 +1496,6 @@ dependencies = [
"sha2",
"simple-dns",
"socket2",
"subtle",
"tokio",
"tower-http",
"tracing",
@ -1507,7 +1505,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ostp-tun"
version = "0.4.4"
version = "0.2.89"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"libc",
@ -1519,7 +1517,7 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "ostp-tun-helper"
version = "0.4.4"
version = "0.2.89"
dependencies = [
"anyhow",
"chrono",
@ -1858,15 +1856,6 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.52.0",
]
[[package]]
name = "rlimit"
version = "0.11.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f35ee2729c56bb610f6dba436bf78135f728b7373bdffae2ec815b2d3eb98cc3"
dependencies = [
"libc",
]
[[package]]
name = "rust-embed"
version = "8.11.0"

View File

@ -11,18 +11,21 @@ resolver = "2"
[workspace.package]
edition = "2021"
license = "AGPL-3.0"
version = "0.4.4"
license = "BSL 1.1"
version = "0.2.89"
[workspace.dependencies]
anyhow = "1.0"
bytes = "1.6"
chacha20poly1305 = "0.10"
rand = "0.8"
snow = { version = "0.9", features = ["risky-raw-split"] }
snow = "0.9"
thiserror = "1.0"
tokio = { version = "1.37", features = ["rt-multi-thread", "macros", "net", "time", "io-util", "sync", "signal"] }
tracing = "0.1"
sha2 = "0.10"
hmac = "0.12"
portable-atomic = "1.10"
[patch.crates-io]
netstack-smoltcp = { path = "netstack-smoltcp" }

735
LICENSE
View File

@ -1,661 +1,74 @@
GNU AFFERO GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
Version 3, 19 November 2007
Copyright (C) 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <https://fsf.org/>
Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble
The GNU Affero General Public License is a free, copyleft license for
software and other kinds of works, specifically designed to ensure
cooperation with the community in the case of network server software.
The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed
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our General Public Licenses are intended to guarantee your freedom to
share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free
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When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
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have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you
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Business Source License 1.1
Parameters
Licensor: Ospab Foundation (represented by Syralev Georgiy)
Licensed Work: The Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol (OSTP) and all
associated workspace crates, utilities, and documents.
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modify, create derivative works, redistribute, and
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Licensed Work. You are also permitted to use the
Licensed Work in production for personal, private
utility and non-profit organizations.
Change Date: May 14, 2030
Change License: MIT License (as defined below)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terms
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Copyright (c) 2026 Syralev Georgiy (Ospab Foundation)
Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
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SOFTWARE.

145
README.md
View File

@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
# OSTP - Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol
# OSTP Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol
[Русский язык](README.ru.md) · [Wiki](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki) · [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.md) · [Releases](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/releases)
![GitHub Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/ospab/ostp?style=for-the-badge&color=blue)
![License: AGPL v3](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-AGPL%20v3-blue.svg?style=for-the-badge)
![License: BSL 1.1](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-BSL%201.1-orange.svg?style=for-the-badge)
![Platform: Windows | Linux | macOS | Android](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-Windows%20%7C%20Linux%20%7C%20macOS%20%7C%20Android-green.svg?style=for-the-badge)
![Crypto](https://img.shields.io/badge/Crypto-Noise__NNpsk0-blueviolet?style=for-the-badge)
![Transport](https://img.shields.io/badge/Transport-UDP%20ARQ-informational?style=for-the-badge)
> A fast, custom encrypted transport protocol written in Rust.
**OSTP** (Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol) is a high-performance transport protocol. It implements a custom ARQ transport over UDP, as well as a UoT (UDP-over-TCP) mode. Every byte on the wire - including packet headers - is cryptographically indistinguishable from random noise, making it highly resistant to Deep Packet Inspection (DPI).
**OSTP** (Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol) is a high-performance, censorship-resistant transport protocol designed to tunnel TCP traffic over UDP with full traffic obfuscation. Every byte on the wire — including packet headers — is cryptographically indistinguishable from random noise. Resistant to Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), active probing, and statistical traffic analysis.
---
@ -35,17 +33,17 @@ Download pre-built binaries for your platform from [GitHub Releases](https://git
| Feature | Description |
|---------|-------------|
| **Full Traffic Obfuscation** | Every packet - including headers - is indistinguishable from random noise. Session IDs and nonces are masked with per-packet HMAC-derived keys. |
| **Noise Protocol Handshake** | `Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s` - PSK-authenticated, forward-secret key exchange with no static identity exposure. |
| **Full Traffic Obfuscation** | Every packet — including headers — is indistinguishable from random noise. Session IDs and nonces are masked with per-packet HMAC-derived keys. |
| **Noise Protocol Handshake** | `Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s` PSK-authenticated, forward-secret key exchange with no static identity exposure. |
| **Reliable UDP (ARQ)** | Selective ACK/NACK with rate-limited retransmission, configurable reorder buffer, and exponential backoff. |
| **Multiplexed Streams** | Multiple logical TCP streams over a single encrypted UDP session with per-stream flow control. |
| **Seamless Roaming** | Clients can switch networks (WiFi ↔ LTE) without session interruption - tracked by session-ID, not IP. |
| **Seamless Roaming** | Clients can switch networks (WiFi ↔ LTE) without session interruption tracked by session-ID, not IP. |
| **Management API** | Built-in REST API for third-party panels (3x-ui, custom dashboards). Per-user stats, traffic limits, key CRUD. |
| **Fallback Server** | TCP fallback proxy to a web server - makes OSTP indistinguishable from nginx during active probing. |
| **Fallback Server** | TCP fallback proxy to a web server makes OSTP indistinguishable from nginx during active probing. |
| **Multi-Listener** | Bind to multiple addresses simultaneously (dual-stack IPv4/IPv6, multi-port). |
| **TUN Mode** | Full-system VPN via native `smoltcp` network stack without external dependencies. All traffic transparently routed through the tunnel. |
| **UoT (UDP-over-TCP)** | Bare UDP-over-TCP tunnel, no protocol mimicry. Since all data is fully encrypted and length-prefixed, it bypasses DPI filters that block unknown UDP traffic by riding over a plain TCP connection. |
| **Mobile & Web Apps** | Beautiful cross-platform mobile client (Flutter) and a modern Web Control Panel (React/Vite) for effortless server and client management. |
| **TUN Mode** | Full-system VPN via `tun2socks` integration. All traffic transparently routed through the tunnel. |
| **xHTTP Stealth (UoT)** | UDP-over-TCP tunnel disguised as standard HTTP/1.1 or TLS traffic to bypass Level 1 Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) whitelists. |
| **XTLS-Reality** | Custom, dependency-free implementation of the Reality protocol using ChaCha20Poly1305 and X25519 for perfect TLS 1.3 impersonation. |
| **TURN Relay** | RFC 5766 TURN support for environments where direct UDP is blocked. |
| **Hot-Reload** | Runtime config reload without restart (access keys, exclusions, mux settings). |
| **Structured Logging** | `tracing`-based logging with `RUST_LOG` filtering. JSON/file/syslog output support. |
@ -56,42 +54,35 @@ Download pre-built binaries for your platform from [GitHub Releases](https://git
## Architecture
```mermaid
flowchart LR
%% Styles
classDef userApp fill:#e1f5fe,stroke:#01579b,stroke-width:2px,color:#01579b
classDef ostpCore fill:#e8f5e9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,color:#2e7d32
classDef network fill:#fff3e0,stroke:#e65100,stroke-width:2px,color:#e65100,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
classDef external fill:#f3e5f5,stroke:#4a148c,stroke-width:2px,color:#4a148c
classDef fallback fill:#ffebee,stroke:#c62828,stroke-width:2px,color:#c62828
subgraph Local["💻 Client Device"]
Apps["Web Browser / Apps"]:::userApp
Socks["SOCKS5 / HTTP Proxy"]:::ostpCore
Tun["Global TUN (VPN)"]:::ostpCore
Client["OSTP Client Protocol Engine\n(Noise + ChaCha20 + ARQ)"]:::ostpCore
Apps -->|TCP/UDP| Socks
Apps -->|IP Packets| Tun
Socks --> Client
Tun --> Client
graph TD
subgraph Client ["Client"]
A[Browser / Apps] -->|SOCKS5 / HTTP| B(Bridge Multiplexer)
TUN[TUN Interface] -->|IP Packets| B
subgraph OSTPCoreClient ["OSTP Core Protocol"]
B --> C{Protocol Machine}
C -->|Noise Handshake| D[ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD]
D -->|Obfuscated UDP Payload| E((UDP Socket))
end
end
subgraph Internet["🌐 Hostile Network (DPI/Firewall)"]
Tunnel{"Fully Obfuscated\nEncrypted UDP\n(Looks like noise)"}:::network
E <==>|Encrypted & Obfuscated UDP Tunnel| F
subgraph Server ["Server"]
F((UDP Socket)) --> G{Dispatcher}
subgraph OSTPCoreServer ["OSTP Core Backend"]
G -->|Auth & Decrypt| H[Session & State Guard]
H -->|TCP Stream| I[Relay Loop]
end
G -->|Active Probing / Unauth| FB[TCP Fallback Proxy]
FB -->|Forward| NGINX[nginx / Caddy]
H -->|Stats & Traffic| API[Management API]
I -->|Outbound| WWW((Internet))
end
subgraph Remote["🖥️ Remote VPS (Server)"]
Server["OSTP Server Protocol Engine\n(Authentication & Decryption)"]:::ostpCore
Relay["Connection Multiplexer"]:::ostpCore
Fallback["Fake Website\n(Nginx/Caddy)"]:::fallback
Target["Open Internet\n(YouTube, Google, etc)"]:::external
Server -->|Decrypted Traffic| Relay
Server -->|Active Probe / Scanner| Fallback
Relay -->|Clear Traffic| Target
end
Client <==> Tunnel <==> Server
```
---
@ -102,15 +93,15 @@ flowchart LR
```bash
# On your VPS (server):
./ostp init server
./ostp --init server
# On your machine (client):
./ostp init client
./ostp --init client
```
### 2. Edit config
**Server** - set your access keys:
**Server** set your access keys:
```jsonc
{
"mode": "server",
@ -121,14 +112,14 @@ flowchart LR
}
```
**Client** - point to your server:
**Client** point to your server:
```jsonc
{
"mode": "client",
"server": "YOUR_SERVER_IP:50000",
"access_key": "YOUR_SECRET_KEY",
"socks5_bind": "127.0.0.1:1088",
"transport": { "mode": "udp" },
"transport": { "mode": "udp", "stealth_sni": "vk.com" },
"tun": { "enable": false, "dns": "1.1.1.1" }
}
```
@ -136,16 +127,16 @@ flowchart LR
### 3. Run
```bash
./ostp # Uses config.json in current directory
./ostp --config /path/to.json # Custom config path
./ostp check # Validate config without running
./ostp gk # Generate a new access key
./ostp links # Print client share links
./ostp # Uses config.json in current directory
./ostp --config /path/to.json # Custom config path
./ostp --check # Validate config without running
./ostp --generate-key # Generate a new access key
./ostp --links # Print client share links
```
### 4. Connect via share link (one-liner)
```bash
./ostp connect "ostp://ACCESS_KEY@server.com:50000?..."
./ostp "ostp://ACCESS_KEY@server.com:50000?..."
```
> [!WARNING]
@ -178,32 +169,20 @@ Full API reference: [Management API](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki/Manageme
## CLI Reference
```
ostp [--config <PATH>] [COMMAND]
ostp [OPTIONS] [URL]
Commands:
run Run the daemon using the config file (default when no command is given)
connect <URL> Connect once using a share link: ostp://KEY@HOST:PORT
setup Interactive setup wizard
init <MODE> Generate a template config (server/client/relay)
check Validate the configuration file and exit
gk Generate a secure access key (alias: generate-key)
--format <FMT> Key format: hex, base64 (default: hex)
-n, --count <N> Number of keys to generate (default: 1)
links Print client share links from the server config
import <URL> Import a share link into the config file
update Update OSTP to the latest release
-b, --branch <NAME> Release channel: stable, beta, alpha (default: stable)
-v, --version <VER> Update to an exact version instead of the channel's latest
migrate Force-migrate the configuration file to the current format
proxy-env Print shell export commands for the local SOCKS proxy
proxy-env-clear Print shell export commands to unset it
uninstall Stop the service and remove the binary and config
Global options:
Options:
--config <PATH> Config file path (default: config.json)
```
--init <MODE> Generate template config (server/client)
--check Validate configuration and exit
-g, --generate-key Generate a secure access key
-c, --count <N> Number of keys to generate (default: 1)
--format <FMT> Key format: hex, base64 (default: hex)
--links Print client share links from server config
Every subcommand also accepts `-h`/`--help` for its own option list.
Arguments:
[URL] Connect via share link: ostp://KEY@HOST:PORT
```
---
@ -211,7 +190,8 @@ Every subcommand also accepts `-h`/`--help` for its own option list.
| Layer | Mechanism |
|-------|-----------|
| Key Exchange | Noise NNpsk0 (X25519 + ChaChaPoly + BLAKE2s) zero-RTT |
| XTLS-Reality | Spoofed TLS 1.3 ClientHello, X25519 Key Exchange, ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD |
| Key Exchange | Noise NNpsk0 (X25519 + ChaChaPoly + BLAKE2s) |
| Encryption | ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD per-packet |
| Header Obfuscation | HMAC-SHA256 derived per-packet mask |
| Reliability | Selective ACK with cumulative + SACK ranges |
@ -237,7 +217,7 @@ cargo test -p ostp-core -p ostp-server
## Documentation
- **[Wiki](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki)** - Full documentation
- **[Wiki](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki)** Full documentation
- [Installation](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki/Installation)
- [Configuration Reference](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki/Configuration)
- [Management API](https://github.com/ospab/ostp/wiki/Management-API)
@ -249,7 +229,8 @@ cargo test -p ostp-core -p ostp-server
## License
GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 (AGPL-3.0). See [LICENSE](LICENSE) for the full text.
Business Source License 1.1. Free for personal and non-commercial use.
Converts to MIT License on May 14, 2030.
---

View File

@ -1,16 +1,14 @@
# OSTP - Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol
# OSTP Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol
[English](README.md) · [Contributing](CONTRIBUTING.ru.md)
![GitHub Release](https://img.shields.io/github/v/release/ospab/ostp?style=for-the-badge&color=blue)
![License: AGPL v3](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-AGPL%20v3-blue.svg?style=for-the-badge)
![License: BSL 1.1](https://img.shields.io/badge/License-BSL%201.1-orange.svg?style=for-the-badge)
![Platform: Windows | Linux | macOS | Android](https://img.shields.io/badge/Platform-Windows%20%7C%20Linux%20%7C%20macOS%20%7C%20Android-green.svg?style=for-the-badge)
![Crypto](https://img.shields.io/badge/Crypto-Noise__NNpsk0-blueviolet?style=for-the-badge)
![Transport](https://img.shields.io/badge/Transport-UDP%20ARQ-informational?style=for-the-badge)
> Быстрый кастомный зашифрованный транспортный протокол на Rust.
**OSTP** (Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol) - кастомный транспортный протокол. Реализует собственный ARQ-транспорт поверх UDP, а также режим UoT (UDP-over-TCP). Каждый байт, включая заголовки пакетов, криптографически неотличим от случайного шума, что делает его устойчивым к системам глубокого анализа трафика (DPI).
**OSTP** (Ospab Stealth Transport Protocol) — высокопроизводительный транспортный протокол, устойчивый к цензуре. Туннелирует TCP-трафик поверх UDP с полной обфускацией. Устойчив к Deep Packet Inspection (DPI), активному зондированию и статистическому анализу трафика.
---
@ -19,13 +17,13 @@
| Возможность | Описание |
|-------------|----------|
| **Обфускация трафика** | Каждый пакет, включая заголовки, неотличим от случайного шума. Session ID и nonce маскируются HMAC-ключами, уникальными для каждого пакета. |
| **Noise Protocol** | `Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s` - аутентификация через PSK, forward secrecy, без раскрытия идентичности. |
| **Noise Protocol** | `Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s` аутентификация через PSK, forward secrecy, без раскрытия идентичности. |
| **Reliable UDP (ARQ)** | Selective ACK/NACK с rate-limited ретрансмиссией, настраиваемым reorder-буфером и exponential backoff. Разработан для 10 Гбит/с. |
| **Мультиплексирование** | Несколько логических TCP-потоков поверх одной зашифрованной UDP-сессии с per-stream flow control. |
| **Бесшовный роуминг** | Клиент может менять сети (WiFi ↔ 4G) без разрыва сессии - сервер отслеживает session-ID, а не IP-адрес. |
| **TUN-режим** | Полносистемный VPN без внешних зависимостей (встроенный network stack на базе `smoltcp`). |
| **UoT (UDP-over-TCP)** | Голый туннель UDP-over-TCP, без имитации протоколов. Поскольку все данные полностью зашифрованы и имеют префикс длины, он обходит DPI фильтры, блокирующие неизвестный UDP трафик, передавая всё по обычному TCP соединению. |
| **Мобильные и Web приложения** | Красивый кроссплатформенный мобильный клиент (Flutter) и современная Web панель управления (React/Vite) для удобного администрирования. |
| **Бесшовный роуминг** | Клиент может менять сети (WiFi ↔ 4G) без разрыва сессии сервер отслеживает session-ID, а не IP-адрес. |
| **TUN-режим** | Полносистемный VPN через интеграцию с `tun2socks` на Windows и Linux. |
| **xHTTP Стелс (UoT)** | Туннель UDP-over-TCP, замаскированный под обычный HTTP/1.1 или TLS трафик для обхода белых списков ТСПУ (DPI). |
| **XTLS-Reality** | Собственная реализация протокола Reality (без зависимостей) с использованием ChaCha20Poly1305 и X25519 для идеальной маскировки под TLS 1.3. |
| **TURN Relay** | RFC 5766 TURN для окружений, где прямой UDP заблокирован. |
| **Hot-Reload** | Перезагрузка конфига в рантайме без перезапуска (ключи, исключения, mux, TURN). |
| **Кросс-платформа** | Windows, Linux, macOS, Android. Один бинарник, без зависимостей. |
@ -35,42 +33,33 @@
## Архитектура
```mermaid
flowchart LR
%% Styles
classDef userApp fill:#e1f5fe,stroke:#01579b,stroke-width:2px,color:#01579b
classDef ostpCore fill:#e8f5e9,stroke:#2e7d32,stroke-width:2px,color:#2e7d32
classDef network fill:#fff3e0,stroke:#e65100,stroke-width:2px,color:#e65100,stroke-dasharray: 5 5
classDef external fill:#f3e5f5,stroke:#4a148c,stroke-width:2px,color:#4a148c
classDef fallback fill:#ffebee,stroke:#c62828,stroke-width:2px,color:#c62828
subgraph Local["💻 Устройство клиента"]
Apps["Браузер / Приложения"]:::userApp
Socks["SOCKS5 / HTTP Прокси"]:::ostpCore
Tun["Global TUN (VPN)"]:::ostpCore
Client["OSTP Клиент\n(Noise + ChaCha20 + ARQ)"]:::ostpCore
Apps -->|TCP/UDP| Socks
Apps -->|IP Пакеты| Tun
Socks --> Client
Tun --> Client
graph TD
subgraph Client ["Клиент"]
A[Браузер / Прил.] -->|SOCKS5 / HTTP| B(Bridge Multiplexer)
TUN[TUN Интерфейс] -->|IP Пакеты| B
subgraph OSTPCoreClient ["OSTP Core Протокол"]
B --> C{Protocol Machine}
C -->|Noise Handshake| D[ChaCha20Poly1305 AEAD]
D -->|Обфусцированный UDP| E((UDP Сокет))
end
end
subgraph Internet["🌐 Сеть с цензурой (DPI)"]
Tunnel{"Зашифрованный UDP\n(Выглядит как белый шум)"}:::network
E <==>|Зашифрованный UDP Туннель| F
subgraph Server ["Сервер"]
F((UDP Сокет)) --> G{Dispatcher}
subgraph OSTPCoreServer ["OSTP Core Backend"]
G -->|Auth & Decrypt| H[Session & State Guard]
H -->|TCP Поток| I[Relay Loop]
end
G -->|Active Probing / Unauth| FB[TCP Fallback Proxy]
FB -->|Перенаправление| NGINX[nginx / Caddy]
I -->|Outbound| WWW((Интернет))
end
subgraph Remote["🖥️ Удаленный сервер (VPS)"]
Server["OSTP Сервер\n(Аутентификация)"]:::ostpCore
Relay["Мультиплексор соединений"]:::ostpCore
Fallback["Фейковый сайт\n(Nginx/Caddy)"]:::fallback
Target["Свободный интернет\n(YouTube, Google и т.д.)"]:::external
Server -->|Расшифрованный трафик| Relay
Server -->|Сканеры цензоров| Fallback
Relay -->|Чистый трафик| Target
end
Client <==> Tunnel <==> Server
```
---
@ -93,8 +82,8 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ospab/ostp/master/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
Создать конфиг по умолчанию:
```bash
./ostp init server # VPS
./ostp init client # Локальная машина
./ostp --init server # VPS
./ostp --init client # Локальная машина
```
### Сервер (`config.json`)
@ -125,7 +114,8 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ospab/ostp/master/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
"debug": false,
// Настройки транспорта (udp или uot)
"transport": {
"mode": "udp"
"mode": "udp",
"stealth_sni": "vk.com"
},
// TUN-режим (полносистемный VPN)
"tun": {
@ -164,41 +154,11 @@ irm https://raw.githubusercontent.com/ospab/ostp/master/scripts/install.ps1 | ie
./ostp
```
### Справка по командам
```
ostp [--config <PATH>] [КОМАНДА]
Команды:
run Запустить демон по конфигу (по умолчанию, если команда не указана)
connect <URL> Подключиться по share-ссылке: ostp://KEY@HOST:PORT
setup Интерактивный мастер настройки
init <MODE> Сгенерировать шаблон конфига (server/client/relay)
check Проверить конфиг и выйти
gk Сгенерировать access-key (алиас: generate-key)
--format <FMT> Формат ключа: hex, base64 (по умолчанию hex)
-n, --count <N> Количество ключей (по умолчанию 1)
links Вывести client-share-ссылки из серверного конфига
import <URL> Импортировать share-ссылку в конфиг
update Обновить OSTP до актуального релиза
-b, --branch <NAME> Канал релиза: stable, beta, alpha (по умолчанию stable)
-v, --version <VER> Обновиться на точную версию вместо последней в канале
migrate Принудительно мигрировать конфиг к текущему формату
proxy-env Вывести shell-команды для локального SOCKS-прокси
proxy-env-clear Вывести shell-команды для их отмены
uninstall Остановить сервис и удалить бинарник с конфигом
Глобальные опции:
--config <PATH> Путь к конфигу (по умолчанию config.json)
```
У каждой подкоманды есть своя справка через `-h`/`--help`.
### TUN-режим (Windows)
Использует встроенный сетевой стек `smoltcp` и виртуальный адаптер `wintun` (необходима `wintun.dll`). Требует запуска с правами Администратора.
Требуется `tun2socks.exe` в той же директории. Автоматически запрашивает права Администратора.
### TUN-режим (Linux)
Использует встроенный сетевой стек `smoltcp` и `/dev/net/tun`. Требует запуска от имени `root` (или наличия `CAP_NET_ADMIN`).
Требуется root. Нужен бинарник `tun2socks` (рядом или в `$PATH`).
---
@ -206,7 +166,8 @@ ostp [--config <PATH>] [КОМАНДА]
| Уровень | Механизм |
|---------|----------|
| Обмен ключами | Noise NNpsk0 (X25519 + ChaChaPoly + BLAKE2s) zero-RTT |
| XTLS-Reality | Поддельный TLS 1.3 ClientHello, X25519 обмен ключами, ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD |
| Обмен ключами | Noise NNpsk0 (X25519 + ChaChaPoly + BLAKE2s) |
| Шифрование | ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD на каждый пакет |
| Обфускация заголовков | HMAC-SHA256 маска session_id + nonce, уникальная для каждого пакета |
| Надёжность | Selective ACK с cumulative + SACK диапазонами |
@ -242,4 +203,5 @@ cross build --release --target x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
## Лицензия
GNU Affero General Public License v3.0 (AGPL-3.0). Полный текст - в файле [LICENSE](LICENSE).
Business Source License 1.1. Бесплатно для личного и некоммерческого использования.
Переходит в MIT License 14 мая 2030 года.

View File

@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
# Чистая переборка на базе v0.2.98
База: `v0.2.98` (commit `31d0020`) — последняя версия, которая **стабильно работает**.
Ветка: `clean-rebuild`. Всё, что появилось после (0.3.1 … 0.3.21), переносим
**выборочно и с чистой головой**, а не копируем рефактор целиком.
Принцип: 0.3.1 принёс «модульный multi-server рефактор» + лавину фич — и вместе с
ними нестабильность. Берём только проверенное и нужное.
---
## Решения (зафиксировано пользователем)
- **Junk-пакеты + TCP-фрагментация — ОСТАВЛЯЕМ** (нравятся). НО починить вредную
часть: junk по UDP не должен выглядеть для сервера как `Unauthorized probe`
(rate-limit/гейт на сервере), иначе флуд лога и риск самобана клиента. Фича
остаётся — чиним поведение, а не выпиливаем. Тонкая настройка — §E.
- **Версия переборки — 0.4.0** (решено; 0.3.x сожжены в pre-release).
- **WSS и Reality (TLS-мимикрия) — ВЫКИНУТЬ.** Путь проекта — **zapret-like**:
обфускация/DPI-evasion на уровне пакетов (junk, фрагментация, обфускация), а НЕ
мимикрия под TLS. Reality с нуля тяжела и не вписывается.
- **Multi-server — НЕ НУЖЕН.** Режем до одного сервера → уходит urltest-группа и
половина сложности 0.3.1.
- **Конфиг — ПЛОСКИЙ по сути, но оформлен красиво/секционно как сейчас** (решено).
Сохраняем читаемую секционную структуру (server / transport / tun / dns / exclude
и т.п.), но **выпиливаем модульную машинерию**: массивы `inbounds[]`/`outbounds[]`,
`routing.rules[]` с тегами, `default_outbound`, urltest, мульти-сервер. Один сервер
на конфиг. Исключения = плоский список внутри секции `exclude`.
- **Профили — ОСТАВЛЯЕМ, single-select, в UI-слое** (решено). Профиль = сохранённый
конфиг одного сервера; активен ровно один (radio). Список/выбор/share живут во
фронте (prefs GUI / Flutter); **ядро о профилях не знает** — на «Подключить» из
выбранного профиля генерится плоский конфиг на один сервер. Никаких чекбоксов/
мульти-актив/urltest.
- **Derived-secrets — ОСТАВЛЯЕМ, но ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬНО проверить, что он РЕАЛЬНО работает:**
старый клиент НЕ должен подключаться к новому серверу. В прошлой реализации это
НЕ соблюдалось (старый клиент → новый сервер подключался) — значит сервер всё ещё
принимал старый формат handshake / obfuscation-key. Это **баг**, закрыть в первую
очередь: сервер обязан отвергать всё, что не прошло derived-secrets.
- **Лицензия — AGPLv3.**
- **Брендинг — ОСТАВЛЯЕМ**: тёмная тема + орёл на фоне (watermark/логотип).
- **Стелс-философия (north-star): zapret-like** — «нет узнаваемого заголовка +
манипуляции пакетами» (обфускация, junk, фрагментация, DNS/UoT-транспорты), а НЕ
«притворись известным протоколом» (Reality/WSS — выкинуты).
---
## 0. Корневая причина нестабильности 0.3.x
**Модульный multi-server рефактор (0.3.1)** — `580faf6`, `8ed66f9`, `67f9c06`.
Сменил формат конфига (inbounds/outbounds/routing/urltest), session-модель,
hot-reload. Источник большинства багов (мёртвые маршруты, фейк-коннект,
рассинхрон конфига). **НЕ копировать целиком.** Если multi-server реально нужен —
добавлять минимально и поверх рабочей одно-серверной модели 0.2.98.
---
## A. ВЫКИНУТЬ / не переносить
1. **WSS-фрейминг и Reality (TLS-мимикрия)**оба выкинуть. Путь zapret-like, а не
маскировка под TLS-сайт; Reality (`reality.rs`) к тому же сложно сделать корректно
с нуля. Удалить из базы 0.2.98 целиком.
2. **Multi-server / urltest-группа** — не нужен. Один сервер на конфиг.
3. Остатки **tun2socks** на Android (`libtun2socks.so`, `tun2socks-arm64`,
`tun_child`, `t2sBinPath`) — давно мёртвый код, только раздувает APK. Не тащить.
> ⚠️ Junk-пакеты и TCP-фрагментация **ОСТАЮТСЯ** (см. Решения и §E) — это уже не
> «мусор». Но junk по UDP нужно сделать так, чтобы сервер его не считал
> `Unauthorized probe` (rate-limit/гейт), иначе лог-флуд и риск самобана.
---
## B. ОБЯЗАТЕЛЬНО перенести (фиксы стабильности)
- **fd limits / EMFILE**`922cf0b`.
- **Lifecycle хелпера**: принудительный `std::process::exit` после остановки, чтобы
не оставался зомби-процесс, держащий адаптер `ostp_tun` и дефолтный маршрут — `b6e78c1`.
- **Bypass-маршрут сервера через `route.exe` по шлюзу** (а не legacy
`CreateIpForwardEntry`, который падал с err 160 из-за рассинхрона индексов
интерфейсов) — `b6e78c1`.
- **IPC хелпера** (ChaCha20Poly1305 + hex) + **единый формат логов**`ee38b15`.
- **Closing-state fix** + `sent_history` на `BTreeMap` (O(log n) NACK) — `47d44fa`.
- **Handshake timeout fixes**`d65af35`, `6eb7b36` (ждать ответ до отправки данных).
- **Buffer / UDP handler**`b5e830a`.
- **Логи**: UoT и unauthorized-probe → debug; rate-limit probe-лога — `1151726`, `fc339b3`.
---
## C. Протокол / крипто — решить и перенести
- **Derived secrets handshake**`f8f27d3`. PSK и obfuscation-key выводятся из
access-key через HKDF; handshake-payload = `[timestamp][session_id][access_key]`;
параметры паддинга деривируются; timestamp anti-replay (±300с).
⚠️ **Ломает совместимость с 0.2.98 wire** (старый клиент не подключится).
Безопаснее старого (raw-PSK + нулевой obfuscation-key). **РЕШЕНИЕ:** переносим ли
(тогда нужен ребилд всех клиентов) — ДА, скорее всего, но осознанно.
- **l4_protocol** для server outbound — `2997bfd`, `ad3a8cb`, `aae9d22`.
---
## D. Транспорты — перенести аккуратно (большие куски)
- **DNS transport (dnstt)** как fallback — `3f1adbc`, `3ced4a1`, `d031b15`,
`10c1772`, `b31da29`. Полезно против блокировок, но объёмно и со своей
фрагментацией/reassembly. Переносить отдельным изолированным модулем.
- UoT (UDP-over-TCP) — уже есть в 0.2.98, проверить что не сломан.
---
## E. Тонкая настройка junk/фрагментации (как в AmneziaWG)
Junk и фрагментацию **оставляем** (Решения), а это — их параметризация. Главное
условие: **координация клиент↔сервер**, иначе junk превращается в probe-флуд.
- `Jc` — кол-во junk-пакетов, `Jmin`/`Jmax` — размеры; **сервер знает и молча отбрасывает**.
- `S1`/`S2` — размеры init/response подгоняются.
- Магические заголовки/сигнатуры пакетов (`H1..H4`).
Реализовать как явные настраиваемые поля (не хардкод). Сервер ОБЯЗАН их понимать.
Сам факт junk/frag — в базе; это «желание» — сделать их настраиваемыми. Можно потом.
---
## F. GUI (desktop) — перенести нужное, без хаоса
- Профили на странице **настроек** (пусто + «Create a new profile» + «+» когда нет
профиля; «+» → меню «из ссылки / вручную»). Главный экран не усложнять.
- **Share** профиля: QR (генерить локально, ключ наружу не отдавать — крейт `qrcode`)
+ копируемая `ostp://` ссылка.
- **Метрики**: байты считать в TUN-инбаунде; rtt брать из round-trip handshake
(а не отдельным TCP-probe).
- **Health/состояние**: «connected» по реальной достижимости сервера на ПРАВИЛЬНОМ
порту (не хардкод :443), а не по факту «процесс запустился».
- **routing**: всегда задавать `default_outbound: "proxy"`; ключи правил —
`domain_suffix` / `ip_cidr` / `process_name` (не `domains/ips/processes`).
- Смена сервера = полный **stop+start**, а не hot-reload (иначе остаётся старый сервер).
- Никаких непрогарженных `addEventListener` на удалённые элементы (краш init).
---
## G. Мобилка (Flutter + JNI) — перенести нужное
- **routing**: тот же `default_outbound` + правильные ключи правил
(без них трафик шёл мимо туннеля — реальный IP).
- **Байты на Android**: считать в обеих задачах fd-пути (read=upload, write=download).
- **rtt**: из handshake (health-probe сокет на Android не protected → до сервера не доходит).
- **Смена сети (WiFi↔LTE)**: реальный reconnect (сейчас `notifyNetworkChanged` — no-op).
- **fd ownership**: НЕ двойное закрытие (Rust `OwnedFd` + Kotlin `close()`) → `detachFd()`.
- **Share** профиля: QR (`qr_flutter`) + ссылка.
- Выкинуть tun2socks (см. §A.3).
---
## H. Инфра / лицензия / брендинг
- Лицензия: **AGPLv3** ✅ (зафиксировано). В 0.2.98 был BSL 1.1 → заменить (`9ce9e6d`).
- **Брендинг — ОСТАВЛЯЕМ** ✅: тёмная тема + орёл на фоне (watermark/логотип) в GUI.
Перенести из текущего `ostp-gui` (assets/logo.svg, тёмная палитра) в чистую переборку.
- Панель/license-check: open-source без license-check — `5782107`, `99ff76d` (если нужно).
- Версионирование/CI build-script — `774d926` и пр.
---
## Инвентаризация базы 0.2.98 (что уже есть / что портировать)
- **Есть в 0.2.98**: WSS (→ удалить), Reality/`reality.rs` (→ удалить),
инфра derived-secrets (`derive_all_secrets`, `obfuscation_key`) — но клиент юзал
dummy-ключи до `f8f27d3`.
- **Нет в 0.2.98 — портировать из пост-0.2.98 кода**: junk-пакеты, TCP-фрагментация,
DNS-transport (dnstt), фикс derived-secrets `f8f27d3`, все фиксы §B, GUI/мобилка §F/§G.
## Что легко упустить (решить до старта)
1. **Версия переборки — 0.4.0** (решено). Сожжённые 0.3.x не переиспользуем.
2. **Серверный конфиг — тоже плоский** и согласован с клиентским. Сервер обязан
поддерживать всё оставленное: derived-secrets (и **отвергать** старый формат),
корректную обработку junk (не probe-флуд), UoT, DNS-transport, management API.
3. **Версия/магический байт протокола ДО крипто-слоя.** Сейчас нельзя отличить старый
handshake от нового — отсюда баг «старый клиент → новый сервер подключился».
Добавить версию в wire → будущие изменения управляемы, сервер чётко режет
несовместимое. Это системный фикс проблемы derived-secrets.
4. **Клиент и сервер обновляются ВМЕСТЕ** — derived-secrets ломает совместимость,
смешивать старое и новое нельзя. Координировать выкладку.
5. **Reality — выкинуть** (решено; в базе 0.2.98 есть `reality.rs` → удалить целиком).
6. **Verify-loop = критерий «готово».** Каждая фича проверяется реальным тестом, не
«на словах»: connect → `curl` показывает IP **сервера**; старый клиент к новому
серверу **не** подключается; смена сети на мобилке восстанавливает туннель.
## Порядок переборки (предложение, 1 сессия)
1. §B (фиксы стабильности) — на чистый 0.2.98.
2. §C (derived-secrets) — и СРАЗУ проверить: старый клиент к новому серверу НЕ
подключается (в прошлый раз был баг — подключался).
3. **Junk + TCP-фрагментация** — перенести (оставляем), но junk по UDP не должен
читаться сервером как `Unauthorized probe` (rate-limit/гейт на сервере).
4. §F/§G по минимуму (routing, метрики, состояние, share) **+ брендинг** (тёмная
тема, орёл на фоне).
5. §D (DNS transport) — если нужно.
6. ВЫКИНУТЬ: **WSS, multi-server, tun2socks** (§A). §E (тюнинг junk) — позже.
7. Конфиг: плоский по сути, секционно-оформленный, один сервер (РЕШЕНО — без
inbounds/outbounds/routing-движка).

View File

@ -5,38 +5,40 @@ Traditional tunneling protocols (such as TLS, OpenVPN, and WireGuard) exhibit di
---
## Secret Derivation
## Obfuscation Key Derivation
Every protocol secret — the obfuscation key, the Noise PSK, the handshake padding range, and the per-key junk marker (see below) — is derived from the shared `access_key` via a single HKDF-SHA256 pass, domain-separated by a trailing info byte per output:
To dynamically mask protocol data, an 8-byte obfuscation key is statically derived from the shared `access_key` configured on both the client and the server:
```
PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt = SHA-256(access_key)[0..16], IKM = access_key || PROTOCOL_VERSION)
obfuscation_key = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x01, 8 bytes)
psk = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x02, 32 bytes)
handshake_pad = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x03, 2 bytes)
junk_marker = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x04, 4 bytes)
```
$$\text{Key} = \text{SHA-256}(\text{access\_key})[0..8]$$
The wire protocol version is mixed into the IKM, not sent as a plaintext byte: peers on a different protocol version derive an entirely different `obfuscation_key`, so they simply cannot deobfuscate each other's packets and are rejected as unauthorized — a hard version gate with no recognizable marker ever appearing on the wire. No secret is ever transmitted; both sides derive the same values independently from the shared access key.
This key is established pre-session and is never transmitted across the wire in any capacity.
---
## Dynamic In-Place Masking Algorithm
OSTP datagrams are masked "in-place" immediately prior to transmission and right after arrival. The mask itself is **derived from the packet's own ciphertext**, not from a fixed keystream or a counter, so it changes with every packet automatically:
```
mask = HMAC-SHA256(key = obfuscation_key, message = ciphertext[0..min(32, len)])
```
OSTP datagrams are processed "in-place" immediately prior to transmission and right after arrival. Two distinct mathematical modes are utilized based on the current handshake phase:
### 1. Handshake Phase Mode (`is_handshake = true`)
The wire packet is `[4-byte session_id][2-byte noise_len][Noise payload]`. The mask is computed over the Noise payload (`raw[6..]`), and its first 6 bytes are XORed onto `session_id || noise_len`.
During connection initiation (Noise Handshake), the wire packet consists of a 4-byte `session_id` prefixed to the Noise payload. To mask the fixed session ID:
* **Masking**: The first 4 bytes are XORed with the first 4 bytes of the derived obfuscation key:
$$\text{raw}[i] = \text{raw}[i] \oplus \text{Key}[i \pmod 8], \quad i \in [0..3]$$
* **De-masking**: A repeated XOR with the identical key bytes recovers the original `session_id`.
### 2. Data Transmission Mode (`is_handshake = false`)
The wire packet is `[4-byte session_id][8-byte nonce][AEAD ciphertext]`. The mask is computed over the AEAD ciphertext, and its first 12 bytes are XORed onto `session_id || nonce`.
Post-handshake, the wire layout contains:
`[4-byte session_id]` + `[8-byte nonce]` + `[AEAD Ciphertext]`
#### Impact of the Scheme
Because the mask is keyed on both the shared secret and the packet's own ciphertext, no two packets — even consecutive ones from the same session — share a keystream, without needing an explicit counter-based scheme. This breaks all packet header correlations and eliminates repeating byte patterns, rendering statistical fingerprinting futile.
To completely randomize metadata, a two-tiered dynamic XOR masking process is applied:
1. **Nonce Masking**: The 8-byte `nonce` (sequence counter) is XORed with the full 8-byte static key:
$$\text{nonce\_bytes}[i] = \text{nonce\_bytes}[i] \oplus \text{Key}[i], \quad i \in [0..7]$$
2. **Session ID Masking**: The 4-byte `session_id` is masked using high dynamic entropy — the lower 32 bits of the **original (unmasked)** `nonce` value:
$$\text{session\_id\_bytes}[i] = \text{session\_id\_bytes}[i] \oplus \text{real\_nonce\_low32\_bytes}[i], \quad i \in [0..3]$$
#### Impact of the Scheme:
Because the `nonce` increments strictly with each outgoing datagram, the session ID's masking keystream continuously changes. This breaks all packet header correlations and eliminates repeating byte patterns, rendering statistical fingerprinting futile.
---
@ -48,13 +50,6 @@ The `AdaptivePadder` calculates dynamic dummy byte quantities to append to the p
- **Dynamic Distributions**: The padding algorithms emulate length profiles commonly seen in whitelisted HTTPS or real-time video streams.
- **Encrypted Overheads**: The appended padding resides within the AEAD cipher scope. Consequently, passive observers cannot distinguish padding bytes from useful application payload, hiding the true message boundary lengths.
---
## XTLS-Reality Impersonation
## Junk Packets & TCP Fragmentation
OSTP does not try to impersonate a known protocol (TLS, HTTP, or otherwise) — a fingerprint-matching filter can always be updated to catch an impersonation attempt. Instead it follows a **zapret-like** approach: no recognizable header at all, plus active manipulation of packet boundaries, so there is nothing distinctive to fingerprint in the first place.
- **Junk packets**: before the handshake, the client sends a configurable number (`junk_pc`) of random-size (`junk_ps`) filler datagrams. Each carries a 4-byte marker **derived from the access key** (the `junk_marker` above) rather than a fixed constant — a fixed marker would itself be a universal signature any observer could filter on across every OSTP deployment. The server derives the same per-key marker while trying candidate keys and drops matching junk silently, before it ever reaches the "unauthorized probe" logging path.
- **TCP fragmentation** (UoT/TCP transport only): the first packet (the handshake) is split into small chunks (`frag_chunk` bytes) with short delays (`frag_sleep` ms) between writes, so DPI that inspects only the first TCP segment never sees a complete handshake to fingerprint.
Both are configurable per-profile; neither is sent over plain UDP transport, where a standalone junk datagram would look exactly like a random one-off probe to the server.
OSTP provides a custom, dependency-free implementation of the XTLS-Reality protocol. It fully simulates a TLS 1.3 handshake (with realistic ClientHello profiles) to bypass advanced DPI filters. Post-handshake, it utilizes ChaCha20Poly1305 to seamlessly encrypt and tunnel the inner HTTP/WSS connections.

View File

@ -90,22 +90,11 @@ Because the `Nonce` is unique per packet, the mask is cryptographically independ
OSTP executes a Noise Protocol Framework exchange utilizing the `Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s` pattern.
1. The Registration Key (`access_key`) is converted to a 32-octet strong pre-shared key (PSK) via HKDF-SHA-256.
1. The Registration Key (`access_key`) is converted to a 32-octet strong pre-shared key (PSK) via SHA-256.
2. The PSK is integrated into the state at pattern position zero, authorizing and encrypting the very first handshaking datagram.
3. Ephemeral Curve25519 key exchange (`ee`) is evaluated, and the two directional transport keys are taken from Noise's `Split()` over the final chaining key `ck`.
3. Ephemeral Curve25519 key exchange is evaluated to synthesize autonomous symmetric keys for subsequent read/write channels.
> **Forward secrecy.** The transport keys are derived from the chaining key
> `ck`, which absorbs the ephemeral `ee` Diffie-Hellman result. They are **not**
> derived from the Noise handshake hash `h``h` only ever absorbs public
> transcript data (ephemeral public keys and on-wire ciphertexts) and never the
> DH secret, so keys derived from it would give an access-key holder the ability
> to decrypt any recorded session. Deriving from `ck` binds each session to its
> ephemeral private keys, which are discarded after the handshake: an adversary
> who later compromises the PSK still cannot decrypt past traffic. This is a
> wire-breaking property gated by the internal protocol version (currently 5);
> peers on an older version derive different keys and cannot interoperate.
The initial handshake payload includes a Unix timestamp to mitigate replay attacks. The server enforces a ±300-second (5-minute) synchronization window and additionally records accepted handshakes in an anti-replay set for that window.
The initial handshake payload includes a Unix timestamp to mitigate replay attacks. The server enforces a strict ±30-second synchronization window.
---
@ -137,5 +126,4 @@ The server supports seamless network handoffs (e.g., transitioning from Wi-Fi to
* **Nonce Exhaustion:** The Nonce field is 64 bits. Implementations MUST terminate and re-key a session before the Nonce overflows to prevent AEAD keystream reuse.
* **Session Exhaustion (DoS):** Servers MUST enforce a strict cap on concurrent sessions (e.g., 1024) and silently drop handshake attempts exceeding this limit to prevent memory exhaustion attacks.
* **Handshake-trial CPU DoS:** Because there is no cleartext key identifier on the wire (a deliberate stealth property), a datagram from an unknown source must be trial-decrypted against every registered key. Servers MUST bound this work: OSTP caches each key's derived secrets and time-windowed junk markers (so a trial is a cheap comparison plus one AEAD attempt per key, not a fresh HKDF/HMAC), and gates the trial path behind a global token bucket (default 100/s) so a spoofed-source flood cannot force unbounded per-packet crypto. The established-session fast path and IP-roaming path are not subject to this bucket.
* **Header Authentication:** The header obfuscation mechanism provides privacy, not integrity. Header integrity is mathematically guaranteed by the Poly1305 Authentication Tag, which covers the entire 12-byte header as Additional Authenticated Data (AAD).

View File

@ -20,15 +20,9 @@
// Адрес следующего узла в цепочке UDP
"upstream_udp": "TARGET_SERVER_IP:50000",
// URL API конечного (целевого) сервера для синхронизации access_keys.
// Должен быть доступен с этого relay-сервера (можно через SSH-туннель).
//
// ВАЖНО: URL обязан включать секретный путь панели (api.webpath целевого
// сервера). Management API смонтирован ВНУТРИ этого пути именно он скрывает
// панель от сканеров, поэтому голый host:port попадает в несуществующий
// маршрут, и синхронизация падает с 404 ещё до проверки токена.
// Это тот же адрес, по которому вы открываете веб-панель.
"upstream_api_url": "http://TARGET_SERVER_IP:9090/TARGET_SERVER_WEBPATH",
// URL API конечного (целевого) сервера для синхронизации access_keys
// Должен быть доступен с этого relay-сервера (можно через SSH-туннель)
"upstream_api_url": "http://TARGET_SERVER_IP:9090",
// Bearer-токен для доступа к API целевого сервера
// Должен совпадать с api.token в конфиге target-сервера

View File

@ -1,60 +1,55 @@
# Обфускация трафика OSTP
# Маскирование энтропии сигналов OSTP
## Философия
## Философия структуры канала
Классические туннельные протоколы (TLS, OpenVPN, WireGuard) имеют узнаваемые сигнатуры в хэндшейке или статичные заголовки пакетов. Механизм обфускации OSTP спроектирован так, чтобы **начиная с первого байта** трафик был максимально похож на случайный шум — и для DPI-систем был неотличим от него.
Традиционные сетевые протоколы промышленного сбора данных могут обладать фиксированными заголовками, что при анализе статистического распределения байт ведет к предвзятости выборок и искажению телеметрического профиля. Задача механизмов энтропийного маскирования OSTP — достижение **равномерного вероятностного распределения значений байт**, начиная с самого первого пакета. Это делает сигналы шины данных абсолютно однородными и устойчивыми к корреляционному анализу и структурному мониторингу сетевых контроллеров.
---
## Деривация секретов
## Производная сигнатурная матрица (Keystream Initialization Vector)
Все секреты протокола — ключ обфускации, PSK Noise-хэндшейка, диапазон паддинга хэндшейка и маркер junk-пакетов (см. ниже) — выводятся из общего `access_key` одним проходом HKDF-SHA256, с разделением по доменам через последний байт `info`:
Для стабилизации битового распределения используется 8-байтовый вектор, вычисляемый на базе глобального идентификатора регистрации узла (`access_key`):
```
PRK = HKDF-Extract(salt = SHA-256(access_key)[0..16], IKM = access_key || PROTOCOL_VERSION)
obfuscation_key = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x01, 8 байт)
psk = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x02, 32 байта)
handshake_pad = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x03, 2 байта)
junk_marker = HKDF-Expand(PRK, info = SHA-256(access_key)[16..] || 0x04, 4 байта)
```
$$\text{Key} = \text{SHA-256}(\text{access\_key})[0..8]$$
Версия протокола подмешивается в IKM, а не передаётся открытым байтом на проводе: пиры с разной версией протокола выведут разный `obfuscation_key` и просто не смогут деобфусцировать пакеты друг друга — жёсткий version gate без единого узнаваемого маркера на проводе. Ни один секрет никогда не передаётся — обе стороны независимо выводят одинаковые значения из общего access_key.
Данная последовательность фиксируется на передающем и принимающем узлах и не передается через внешние сетевые шлюзы.
---
## Алгоритм динамического маскирования
## Алгоритм динамического маскирования пакетов (In-place Masking)
Датаграммы OSTP маскируются "на месте" прямо перед отправкой и сразу после получения. Сама маска **выводится из шифротекста самого пакета**, а не из статичного потока ключа или счётчика — поэтому она меняется от пакета к пакету автоматически:
Пакетные структуры OSTP проходят низкоуровневую предобработку непосредственно перед выдачей в канальный уровень (Layer 3) и при получении. В зависимости от фазы жизненного цикла сессии связи выделяют две модели:
```
mask = HMAC-SHA256(key = obfuscation_key, message = ciphertext[0..min(32, len)])
```
### 1. Этап начального согласования среды (`is_handshake = true`)
В период инициализации канала передачи пакет структурирован как 4-байтовое поле логического адреса порта `session_id` и криптографический блок согласования среды. Для подавления статических компонент ID порта применяется процедура обратимого битового сложения:
### 1. Фаза хэндшейка (`is_handshake = true`)
Пакет на проводе — `[4 байта session_id][2 байта noise_len][Noise-полезная нагрузка]`. Маска считается по Noise-полезной нагрузке (`raw[6..]`), и её первые 6 байт накладываются XOR'ом на `session_id || noise_len`.
* **Обработка**: Первые 4 байта вектора пакета проходят побитовую операцию XOR с первыми 4 байтами сигнатурной матрицы:
$$\text{raw}[i] = \text{raw}[i] \oplus \text{Key}[i \pmod 8], \quad i \in [0..3]$$
* **Восстановление**: Обратное наложение сигнатурной матрицы возвращает корректное значение логического идентификатора.
### 2. Фаза передачи данных (`is_handshake = false`)
Пакет на проводе — `[4 байта session_id][8 байт nonce][AEAD-шифротекст]`. Маска считается по шифротексту, и её первые 12 байт накладываются XOR'ом на `session_id || nonce`.
### 2. Этап высокоскоростного переноса данных (`is_handshake = false`)
После перевода сессии в состояние активности кадр передачи принимает следующий вид:
`[4 байта session_id]` + `[8 байт nonce]` + `[Полезная нагрузка блока]`
#### Эффект схемы
Поскольку маска зависит одновременно от общего секрета и от содержимого шифротекста конкретного пакета, никакие два пакета — даже два подряд идущих в одной сессии — не используют одинаковый ключевой поток, и для этого не нужна явная схема на основе счётчика. Это полностью убирает корреляции между заголовками пакетов и повторяющиеся байтовые паттерны, делая статистический фингерпринтинг бесполезным.
Для максимизации дифференциальной энтропии применяется двухступенчатое динамическое взвешивание:
1. **Коррекция счетчика цикла (Nonce Correction)**: 8-байтовое значение инкрементного счетчика пакета подвергается побитовому сложению с вектором матрицы:
$$\text{nonce\_bytes}[i] = \text{nonce\_bytes}[i] \oplus \text{Key}[i], \quad i \in [0..7]$$
2. **Маскирование ID сессии**: 4-байтовое поле логического адреса маскируется с помощью переменной высокочастотной энтропии — младших 32 бит **исходного** показателя системного счетчика пакетов:
$$\text{session\_id\_bytes}[i] = \text{session\_id\_bytes}[i] \oplus \text{real\_nonce\_low32\_bytes}[i], \quad i \in [0..3]$$
#### Статистическая устойчивость:
Благодаря инкрементации счетчика на каждом цикле отправки, маскирующий поток (keystream) для поля `session_id` постоянно видоизменяется. Это полностью нивелирует фиксированные битовые паттерны во всем спектре UDP-датаграмм и исключает появление повторяющихся префиксов.
---
## Статистический паддинг
## Выравнивание блоков по границам регистров (Adaptive Alignment)
Помимо маскирования заголовков, OSTP защищается от анализа длин пакетов (Traffic Length Analysis). `AdaptivePadder` вычисляет случайный размер мусорных байт, добавляемых к полезной нагрузке ещё до шифрования:
Дополнительно к маскировке заголовков, протокол OSTP исключает возможность анализа поведения системы на основе длин пакетов данных. Модуль адаптивного заполнения (`AdaptivePadder`) рассчитывает оптимальный размер буфера выравнивания (`padding`), интегрируемый в структуру пакета до момента активации шифрующего каскада:
- **Динамическое распределение**: длины паддинга подобраны так, чтобы напоминать профили длин обычного HTTPS-трафика или видеопотоков.
- **Внутри шифротекста**: добавленный паддинг находится внутри области AEAD-шифрования — пассивный наблюдатель не может отличить паддинг от полезной нагрузки и не видит настоящую границу сообщения.
- **Стратегия заполнения буферов**: Механизм анализирует текущую длину выборки телеметрии и производит масштабирование до типичных кратных длин промышленных сетей передачи данных и буферов потоковых агрегаторов.
- **Изоляция выравнивания**: Данные заполнения помещаются внутрь защищенной области кадра. Внешние анализаторы топологии сети не способны определить внутренние границы между телеметрической нагрузкой и служебными полями выравнивания, видя только монолитный блок данных.
---
## XTLS-Reality (Имитация TLS 1.3)
## Junk-пакеты и TCP-фрагментация
OSTP не пытается притворяться известным протоколом (TLS, HTTP и т.п.) — фильтр по сигнатуре всегда можно обновить под конкретную имитацию. Вместо этого используется подход **в духе zapret**: никакого узнаваемого заголовка вообще, плюс активная манипуляция границами пакетов — фингерпринтить попросту нечего.
- **Junk-пакеты**: перед хэндшейком клиент отправляет настраиваемое количество (`junk_pc`) мусорных датаграмм случайного размера (`junk_ps`). Каждая несёт 4-байтовый маркер, **выведенный из access_key** (тот самый `junk_marker` выше), а не фиксированную константу — константный маркер сам по себе стал бы универсальной сигнатурой для любого наблюдателя сразу по всем серверам OSTP. Сервер, перебирая кандидатов-ключей, выводит тот же маркер и тихо отбрасывает junk, не доходя до логирования «unauthorized probe».
- **TCP-фрагментация** (только для транспорта UoT/TCP): первый пакет (хэндшейк) режется на мелкие куски (`frag_chunk` байт) с небольшими задержками (`frag_sleep` мс) между записями — DPI, анализирующий только первый TCP-сегмент, никогда не видит цельный хэндшейк для фингерпринтинга.
Обе фичи настраиваются per-профиль; ни одна не применяется поверх обычного UDP-транспорта, где отдельная junk-датаграмма выглядела бы для сервера точь-в-точь как случайный одиночный проб.
OSTP предоставляет собственную реализацию протокола XTLS-Reality без сторонних зависимостей. Протокол полностью имитирует рукопожатие TLS 1.3 (с реалистичным профилем ClientHello) для обхода продвинутых DPI фильтров. После успешного рукопожатия применяется ChaCha20Poly1305 для бесшовного шифрования и туннелирования внутренних HTTP/WSS соединений.

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@ -90,23 +90,11 @@ OSTP поддерживает **внутреннее криптографиче
OSTP использует Noise Protocol Framework с паттерном `Noise_NNpsk0_25519_ChaChaPoly_BLAKE2s`.
1. Регистрационный ключ доступа (`access_key`) преобразуется в 32-байтный строгий предварительно распределенный ключ (PSK) через HKDF-SHA-256.
2. PSK применяется на нулевой позиции паттерна, обеспечивая авторизацию и шифрование самой первой датаграммы рукопожатия.
3. Выполняется эфемерный обмен ключами Curve25519 (`ee`), и два однонаправленных транспортных ключа берутся из `Split()` протокола Noise над финальным chaining key `ck`.
1. Регистрационный ключ доступа (`access_key`) преобразуется в 32-байтный строгий предварительно распределенный ключ (PSK) через SHA-256.
2. PSK применяется на нулевой позиции паттерна, обеспечивая авторизацию и шифрование самой первой датаграммы рукопожатия (Zero-RTT авторизация).
3. Выполняется эфемерный обмен ключами Curve25519 для создания симметричных ключей передачи данных.
> **Прямая секретность (Forward Secrecy).** Транспортные ключи выводятся из
> chaining key `ck`, который вбирает результат эфемерного обмена Диффи-Хеллмана
> `ee`. Они **не** выводятся из handshake hash `h` протокола Noise: `h` вбирает
> только публичные данные транскрипта (эфемерные публичные ключи и шифртексты с
> провода) и никогда — сам DH-секрет, поэтому ключи, выведенные из `h`, дали бы
> держателю PSK возможность расшифровать любую записанную сессию. Вывод из `ck`
> привязывает каждую сессию к её эфемерным приватным ключам, которые
> уничтожаются после рукопожатия: злоумышленник, скомпрометировавший PSK позже,
> всё равно не сможет расшифровать прошлый трафик. Это свойство ломает
> совместимость и защищено внутренней версией протокола (сейчас 5): узлы более
> старой версии выводят другие ключи и не могут взаимодействовать.
Первичная полезная нагрузка рукопожатия содержит Unix-отметку времени для защиты от атак повторного воспроизведения (Replay Attacks). Сервер контролирует окно синхронизации (±300 секунд, 5 минут) и дополнительно фиксирует принятые рукопожатия в множестве защиты от повтора на время этого окна.
Первичная полезная нагрузка рукопожатия содержит Unix-отметку времени для защиты от атак повторного воспроизведения (Replay Attacks). Сервер строго контролирует окно синхронизации (±30 секунд).
---
@ -131,5 +119,4 @@ OSTP обеспечивает надежную доставку поверх UDP
* **Исчерпание Nonce:** Поле Nonce имеет размер 64 бита. Реализации ОБЯЗАНЫ разрывать сессию до переполнения Nonce, чтобы предотвратить катастрофическое повторное использование гаммы AEAD-шифра.
* **DDoS и исчерпание ресурсов:** Серверы ДОЛЖНЫ применять жесткий лимит на количество одновременных сессий (например, 1024) и молча отбрасывать запросы на рукопожатие при превышении лимита, предотвращая атаки на исчерпание памяти.
* **CPU-DoS на пути перебора рукопожатия:** Поскольку на проводе нет открытого идентификатора ключа (намеренное свойство скрытности), датаграмму от неизвестного источника приходится пробно расшифровывать каждым зарегистрированным ключом. Серверы ОБЯЗАНЫ ограничивать эту работу: OSTP кэширует производные секреты каждого ключа и его junk-маркеры для текущего временно́го окна (поэтому одна попытка — это дешёвое сравнение плюс одна попытка AEAD на ключ, а не новые HKDF/HMAC), и ограничивает путь перебора глобальным token bucket (по умолчанию 100/с), так что флуд с подменённых адресов не может навязать неограниченную криптографию на пакет. Быстрый путь установленных сессий и путь IP-роуминга под этот лимит не попадают.
* **Целостность заголовка:** Механизм маскирования обеспечивает только скрытность, а не целостность. Целостность заголовков математически гарантируется 16-байтным тегом аутентификации Poly1305, который покрывает 12-байтный заголовок как присоединенные данные (AAD).

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{
"git": {
"sha1": "702f6dfe124c5e4d343cfd3ca5a3efe0446cf6f0"
},
"path_in_vcs": ""
}

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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
name: Setup Android NDK and Rust compiler ENV
description: Setup an Android_NDK_HOME environment by downloading and Rust compiler environment.
inputs:
rust-target:
description: Rust target to build
required: true
sdk-version:
description: Exact SDK version to use
default: "33"
ndk-version:
description: Exact NDK version to use
default: "25"
ndk-platform:
description: Which host platform to use
default: "linux"
runs:
using: "composite"
steps:
- name: Download Android NDK
run: curl --http1.1 -O https://dl.google.com/android/repository/android-ndk-r${{ inputs.ndk-version }}-${{ inputs.ndk-platform }}.zip
shell: bash
- name: Extract Android NDK
run: unzip -q android-ndk-r${{ inputs.ndk-version }}-${{ inputs.ndk-platform }}.zip
shell: bash
- name: Set Rust compiler ENV
run: |
ndk_home=${{ github.workspace }}/android-ndk-r${{ inputs.ndk-version }}
platform=$(ls ${ndk_home}/toolchains/llvm/prebuilt/ | head -1)
ndk_tool=${ndk_home}/toolchains/llvm/prebuilt/${platform}/bin
envvar_suffix=$(echo ${{ inputs.rust-target }} | sed "s/-/_/g")
upper_suffix=$(echo ${envvar_suffix} | tr '[:lower:]' '[:upper:]')
tool_prefix=${{ inputs.rust-target }}${{ inputs.sdk-version }}
echo "ANDROID_NDK_HOME=${ndk_home}" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "CC_${envvar_suffix}=${ndk_tool}/${tool_prefix}-clang" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "AR_${envvar_suffix}=${ndk_tool}/llvm-ar" >> $GITHUB_ENV
echo "CARGO_TARGET_${upper_suffix}_LINKER=${ndk_tool}/${tool_prefix}-clang" >> $GITHUB_ENV
shell: bash

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@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
name: CI
on:
push:
branches:
- '**'
pull_request:
branches:
- '**'
env:
CARGO_INCREMENTAL: 0
CARGO_REGISTRIES_CRATES_IO_PROTOCOL: sparse
jobs:
test:
name: Test
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
matrix:
include:
- build: linux-amd64
os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
- build: android-arm64
os: ubuntu-latest
target: aarch64-linux-android
no_run: --no-run
- build: android-amd64
os: ubuntu-latest
target: x86_64-linux-android
no_run: --no-run
- build: macos-amd64
os: macos-latest
target: x86_64-apple-darwin
- build: macos-arm64
os: macos-14
target: aarch64-apple-darwin
- build: ios-arm64
os: macos-latest
target: aarch64-apple-ios
no_run: --no-run
- build: windows-amd64
os: windows-latest
target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
- build: windows-arm64
os: windows-latest
target: aarch64-pc-windows-msvc
no_run: --no-run
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Install Rust (rustup)
run: |
set -euxo pipefail
rustup toolchain install stable --no-self-update --profile minimal --target ${{ matrix.target }}
rustup default stable
shell: bash
- uses: Swatinem/rust-cache@v2
- name: Setup android environment
if: contains(matrix.build, 'android')
uses: ./.github/actions/ndk-dev-rs
with:
rust-target: ${{ matrix.target }}
- run: cargo test ${{ matrix.no_run }} --workspace --target ${{ matrix.target }}
- run: cargo test ${{ matrix.no_run }} --workspace --target ${{ matrix.target }} --release
msrv_n_clippy:
name: MSRV & Clippy & Rustfmt
runs-on: ${{ matrix.os }}
strategy:
fail-fast: false
matrix:
os: [ubuntu-latest, macos-latest, windows-latest]
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: dtolnay/rust-toolchain@stable
- run: cargo fmt -- --check
- run: cargo clippy --all-features -- -D warnings
- run: cargo check --lib -p netstack-smoltcp
- run: cargo check --lib -p netstack-smoltcp --all-features

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on:
push:
tags:
- '*'
jobs:
publish:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- name: Publish to crates.io
run: |
cargo publish
env:
CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN: ${{ secrets.CARGO_REGISTRY_TOKEN }}

9
netstack-smoltcp/.gitignore vendored Normal file
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/target
/Cargo.lock
.idea
.VSCodeCounter/
.vscode
.DS_Store
*.iml
**/*.log

136
netstack-smoltcp/Cargo.toml Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
# THIS FILE IS AUTOMATICALLY GENERATED BY CARGO
#
# When uploading crates to the registry Cargo will automatically
# "normalize" Cargo.toml files for maximal compatibility
# with all versions of Cargo and also rewrite `path` dependencies
# to registry (e.g., crates.io) dependencies.
#
# If you are reading this file be aware that the original Cargo.toml
# will likely look very different (and much more reasonable).
# See Cargo.toml.orig for the original contents.
[package]
edition = "2021"
rust-version = "1.75.0"
name = "netstack-smoltcp"
version = "0.2.2"
authors = ["cavivie <cavivie@gmail.com>"]
build = false
autolib = false
autobins = false
autoexamples = false
autotests = false
autobenches = false
description = """
A netstack for the special purpose of turning packets from/to a TUN interface
into TCP streams and UDP packets. It uses smoltcp-rs as the backend netstack.
"""
homepage = "https://github.com/cavivie/netstack-smoltcp"
documentation = "https://docs.rs/netstack-smoltcp"
readme = "README.md"
keywords = [
"netstack",
"smoltcp",
"network",
"ip",
"tun",
]
categories = ["network-programming"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/cavivie/netstack-smoltcp"
[lib]
name = "netstack_smoltcp"
path = "src/lib.rs"
[[example]]
name = "forward"
path = "examples/forward.rs"
[[example]]
name = "forward-offload-linux"
path = "examples/forward-offload-linux.rs"
[[test]]
name = "regression"
path = "tests/regression.rs"
[dependencies.etherparse]
version = "0.16"
[dependencies.futures]
version = "0.3"
[dependencies.rand]
version = "0.8"
[dependencies.smoltcp]
version = "0.12"
features = [
"std",
"log",
"medium-ip",
"proto-ipv4",
"proto-ipv6",
"socket-icmp",
"socket-udp",
"socket-tcp",
]
default-features = false
[dependencies.spin]
version = "0.9"
[dependencies.tokio]
version = "1"
features = [
"sync",
"time",
"rt",
"macros",
]
[dependencies.tokio-util]
version = "0.7.10"
[dependencies.tracing]
version = "0.1"
features = ["std"]
default-features = false
[dev-dependencies.socket2]
version = "0.5.6"
[dev-dependencies.socket2-ext]
version = "0.1"
[dev-dependencies.structopt]
version = "0.3"
[dev-dependencies.tokio]
version = "1"
features = [
"rt",
"macros",
"rt-multi-thread",
"io-util",
]
[dev-dependencies.tracing]
version = "0.1"
features = ["std"]
default-features = false
[dev-dependencies.tracing-subscriber]
version = "0.3.18"
[dev-dependencies.tun-rs]
version = "2"
features = [
"async",
"async_framed",
]
[dev-dependencies.tun2]
version = "3"
features = ["async"]

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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
[package]
name = "netstack-smoltcp"
version = "0.2.2"
edition = "2021"
authors = ["cavivie <cavivie@gmail.com>"]
license = "MIT OR Apache-2.0"
repository = "https://github.com/cavivie/netstack-smoltcp"
homepage = "https://github.com/cavivie/netstack-smoltcp"
documentation = "https://docs.rs/netstack-smoltcp"
keywords = ["netstack", "smoltcp", "network", "ip", "tun"]
categories = ["network-programming"]
description = """
A netstack for the special purpose of turning packets from/to a TUN interface
into TCP streams and UDP packets. It uses smoltcp-rs as the backend netstack.
"""
rust-version = "1.75.0"
[dependencies]
tracing = { version = "0.1", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
tokio = { version = "1", features = ["sync", "time", "rt", "macros"] }
tokio-util = "0.7.10"
etherparse = "0.16"
futures = "0.3"
rand = "0.8"
spin = "0.9"
smoltcp = { version = "0.12", default-features = false, features = [
"std",
"log",
"medium-ip",
"proto-ipv4",
"proto-ipv6",
"socket-icmp",
"socket-udp",
"socket-tcp",
] }
[dev-dependencies]
tun2 = { version = "3", features = ["async"] }
# has better performance on linux than tun2
tun-rs = { version = "2", features = ["async", "async_framed"] }
tokio = { version = "1", features = [
"rt",
"macros",
"rt-multi-thread",
"io-util",
] }
tracing = { version = "0.1", default-features = false, features = ["std"] }
tracing-subscriber = "0.3.18"
structopt = "0.3"
socket2 = "0.5.6"
socket2-ext = { version = "0.1" }

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@ -0,0 +1,201 @@
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Copyright (c) 2024 cavivie and netstack-smoltcp Contributors
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136
netstack-smoltcp/README.md Normal file
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# Netstack Smoltcp
A netstack for the special purpose of turning packets from/to a TUN interface into TCP streams and UDP packets. It uses smoltcp-rs as the backend netstack.
[![Crates.io][crates-badge]][crates-url]
[![MIT licensed][mit-badge]][mit-url]
[![Apache licensed, Version 2.0][apache-badge]][apache-url]
[![Build Status][actions-badge]][actions-url]
[crates-badge]: https://img.shields.io/crates/v/netstack-smoltcp.svg
[crates-url]: https://crates.io/crates/netstack-smoltcp
[mit-badge]: https://img.shields.io/badge/license-MIT-blue.svg
[mit-url]: https://github.com/automesh-network/netstack-smoltcp/blob/master/LICENSE-MIT
[apache-badge]: https://img.shields.io/badge/license-APACHE2.0-blue.svg
[apache-url]: https://github.com/automesh-network/netstack-smoltcp/blob/master/LICENSE-APACHE
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[actions-url]: https://github.com/automesh-network/netstack-smoltcp/actions?query=workflow%3ACI+branch%3Amain
## Features
- Supports Future Send and non-Send, mostly pepole use Send.
- Supports ICMP protocol drive by TCP runner to use ICMP ping.
- Supports filtering packets by source and destination IP addresses.
- Can read IP packets from netstack, write IP packets to netstack.
- Can receive TcpStream from TcpListener exposed from netstack.
- Can receive UDP datagram from UdpSocket exposed from netstack.
- Implements popular future streaming traits and asynchronous IO traits:
* TcpListener implements futures Stream/Sink trait
* TcpStream implements tokio AsyncRead/AsyncWrite trait
* UdpSocket(ReadHalf/WriteHalf) implements futures Stream/Sink trait.
## Platforms
This crate provides lightweight netstack support for Linux, iOS, macOS, Android and Windows.
Currently, it works on most targets, but mainly tested the popular platforms which includes:
- linux-amd64: x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu
- android-arm64: aarch64-linux-android
- android-amd64: x86_64-linux-android
- macos-amd64: x86_64-apple-darwin
- macos-arm64: aarch64-apple-darwin
- ios-arm64: aarch64-apple-ios
- windows-amd64: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
- windows-arm64: aarch64-pc-windows-msvc
## Example
```rust
// let device = tun2::create_as_async(&cfg)?;
// let framed = device.into_framed();
let (stack, runner, udp_socket, tcp_listener) = netstack_smoltcp::StackBuilder::default()
.stack_buffer_size(512)
.tcp_buffer_size(4096)
.enable_udp(true)
.enable_tcp(true)
.enable_icmp(true)
.mtu(9000) // virtual device usually benefits from larger MTU
.build()
.unwrap();
let mut udp_socket = udp_socket.unwrap(); // udp enabled
let mut tcp_listener = tcp_listener.unwrap(); // tcp/icmp enabled
if let Some(runner) = runner {
tokio::spawn(runner);
}
let (mut stack_sink, mut stack_stream) = stack.split();
let (mut tun_sink, mut tun_stream) = framed.split();
// Reads packet from stack and sends to TUN.
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(pkt) = stack_stream.next().await {
if let Ok(pkt) = pkt {
tun_sink.send(pkt).await.unwrap();
}
}
});
// Reads packet from TUN and sends to stack.
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(pkt) = tun_stream.next().await {
if let Ok(pkt) = pkt {
stack_sink.send(pkt).await.unwrap();
}
}
});
// Extracts TCP connections from stack and sends them to the dispatcher.
tokio::spawn(async move {
handle_inbound_stream(tcp_listener).await;
});
// Receive and send UDP packets between netstack and NAT manager. The NAT
// manager would maintain UDP sessions and send them to the dispatcher.
tokio::spawn(async move {
handle_inbound_datagram(udp_socket).await;
});
```
## Performance
Typically, `netstack-smoltcp` will be used with an tun device, so a careful choice of TUN crate matters.
[tun-rs](https://github.com/tun-rs/tun-rs) have better performance on **Linux** than [rust-tun](https://github.com/meh/rust-tun/) due to GSO/GRO which allow you to process the packets in batches.
`bash scripts/bench-offload.sh` could tell that `tun-rs` boosts the performance by 4x. Try it out on your Linux machine!
The example for using `tun-rs` with `netstack-smoltcp` could be found at [forward-offload-linux.rs](examples/forward-offload-linux.rs)
For further tuning, refer to `tun-rs`'s detailed [README](https://github.com/tun-rs/tun-rs/blob/main/README.md)
## License
This project is licensed under either of
* Apache License, Version 2.0, ([LICENSE-APACHE](LICENSE-APACHE) or
https://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0)
* MIT license ([LICENSE-MIT](LICENSE-MIT) or
https://opensource.org/licenses/MIT)
at your option.
### Contribution
Unless you explicitly state otherwise, any contribution intentionally submitted
for inclusion in netstack-smoltcp by you, as defined in the Apache-2.0 license,
shall be dual licensed as above, without any additional terms or conditions.
## Inspired By
Special thanks to these amazing projects that inspired netstack-smoltcp (in no particular order):
- [shadowsocks-rust](https://github.com/shadowsocks/shadowsocks-rust/)
- [netstack-lwip](https://github.com/eycorsican/netstack-lwip/)
- [rust-tun-active](https://github.com/tun2proxy/rust-tun)
- [rust-tun](https://github.com/meh/rust-tun/)
- [tun-rs](https://github.com/tun-rs/tun-rs)
- [smoltcp](https://github.com/smoltcp-rs/smoltcp)

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#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
mod inner {
use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
use netstack_smoltcp::{StackBuilder, TcpListener, UdpSocket};
use std::{net::SocketAddr, sync::Arc};
use structopt::StructOpt;
use tokio::net::{TcpSocket, TcpStream};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
use tun_rs::{DeviceBuilder, IDEAL_BATCH_SIZE, VIRTIO_NET_HDR_LEN};
// Patched forward example: tun2 → tun-rs with Linux GRO/GSO offload.
// For further reading, check out https://blog.cloudflare.com/virtual-networking-101-understanding-tap
//
// Key changes vs forward.rs:
// 1. Use tun-rs DeviceBuilder with .offload(true) on Linux (enables
// IFF_VNET_HDR + TUN_F_CSUM/TSO4/TSO6/USO4/USO6).
// 2. TX (stack → TUN): prepend 10-byte zero virtio_net_hdr (GSO_NONE)
// so the kernel accepts the write when IFF_VNET_HDR is set.
// 3. RX (TUN → stack): use recv_multiple() for batch GSO splitting;
// buffers sized to 1600 to fit smoltcp's 1504-byte MTU segments.
#[derive(Debug, StructOpt)]
#[structopt(name = "forward", about = "Simply forward tun tcp/udp traffic.")]
struct Opt {
/// Outbound interface to bind forwarded connections to.
#[structopt(short = "i", long = "interface")]
interface: String,
/// Name of the TUN device.
#[structopt(short = "n", long = "name", default_value = "utun8")]
name: String,
/// Tracing log level.
#[structopt(long = "log-level", default_value = "debug")]
log_level: tracing::Level,
/// Use current-thread Tokio runtime (default: multi-thread).
#[structopt(long = "current-thread")]
current_thread: bool,
/// Use spawn_local instead of spawn.
#[structopt(long = "local-task")]
local_task: bool,
}
pub(super) fn main() {
let opt = Opt::from_args();
let rt = if opt.current_thread {
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
} else {
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
}
.enable_all()
.build()
.unwrap();
rt.block_on(main_exec(opt));
}
async fn main_exec(opt: Opt) {
macro_rules! tokio_spawn {
($fut:expr) => {
if opt.local_task {
tokio::task::spawn_local($fut)
} else {
tokio::task::spawn($fut)
}
};
}
tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(
tracing_subscriber::FmtSubscriber::builder()
.with_max_level(opt.log_level)
.finish(),
)
.unwrap();
// Build TUN device with GRO/GSO offload on Linux.
let builder = DeviceBuilder::new()
.name(opt.name)
.ipv4("10.10.10.2", 24, Some("10.10.10.1"))
.mtu(9000);
let builder = builder.offload(true);
let dev = Arc::new(builder.build_async().unwrap());
let (stack, runner, udp_socket, tcp_listener) = StackBuilder::default()
.enable_tcp(true)
.enable_udp(true)
.enable_icmp(true)
.build()
.unwrap();
let udp_socket = udp_socket.unwrap();
let tcp_listener = tcp_listener.unwrap();
if let Some(runner) = runner {
tokio_spawn!(runner);
}
let (mut stack_sink, mut stack_stream) = stack.split();
let mut futs = vec![];
// stack → TUN
// With IFF_VNET_HDR every write must start with a virtio_net_hdr.
// We use all-zero (gso_type = GSO_NONE, flags = 0): plain packet,
// checksum already valid (smoltcp always computes checksums itself).
let dev1 = dev.clone();
futs.push(tokio_spawn!(async move {
while let Some(pkt) = stack_stream.next().await {
if let Ok(pkt) = pkt {
let result = {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; VIRTIO_NET_HDR_LEN + pkt.len()];
buf[VIRTIO_NET_HDR_LEN..].copy_from_slice(&pkt);
dev1.send(&buf).await
};
if let Err(e) = result {
warn!("failed to send packet to TUN: {:?}", e);
}
}
}
}));
// TUN → stack
// recv_multiple() does one read() syscall and returns N individual IP
// packets after splitting any incoming GRO super-packet.
// Buffer size 1600 > smoltcp MTU (1504) to avoid an out-of-bounds panic
// when the kernel segments at MSS=1464 with 40-byte IP+TCP headers.
futs.push(tokio_spawn!(async move {
let mut orig = vec![0u8; VIRTIO_NET_HDR_LEN + 65535];
let mut bufs = vec![vec![0u8; 1600]; IDEAL_BATCH_SIZE];
let mut sizes = vec![0usize; IDEAL_BATCH_SIZE];
while let Ok(n) = dev.recv_multiple(&mut orig, &mut bufs, &mut sizes, 0).await {
for i in 0..n {
let pkt = &bufs[i][..sizes[i]];
if let Err(e) = stack_sink.send(pkt.to_vec()).await {
warn!("failed to send packet to stack: {:?}", e);
}
}
}
}));
futs.push(tokio_spawn!({
let iface = opt.interface.clone();
async move {
handle_inbound_stream(tcp_listener, iface).await;
}
}));
futs.push(tokio_spawn!(async move {
handle_inbound_datagram(udp_socket, opt.interface).await;
}));
futures::future::join_all(futs).await.iter().for_each(|r| {
if let Err(e) = r {
error!("{:?}", e);
}
});
}
async fn handle_inbound_stream(mut tcp_listener: TcpListener, interface: String) {
while let Some((mut stream, local, remote)) = tcp_listener.next().await {
let interface = interface.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
info!("tcp: {:?} => {:?}", local, remote);
match new_tcp_stream(remote, &interface).await {
Ok(mut r) => {
if let Err(e) = tokio::io::copy_bidirectional(&mut stream, &mut r).await {
warn!(
"failed to copy tcp stream {:?}=>{:?}: {:?}",
local, remote, e
);
}
}
Err(e) => warn!(
"failed to open tcp stream {:?}=>{:?}: {:?}",
local, remote, e
),
}
});
}
}
async fn handle_inbound_datagram(udp_socket: UdpSocket, interface: String) {
let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (mut read_half, mut write_half) = udp_socket.split();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some((data, local, remote)) = rx.recv().await {
let _ = write_half.send((data, remote, local)).await;
}
});
while let Some((data, local, remote)) = read_half.next().await {
let tx = tx.clone();
let interface = interface.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
match new_udp_packet(remote, &interface).await {
Ok(sock) => {
let _ = sock.send(&data).await;
loop {
let mut buf = vec![0; 1024];
match sock.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
Ok((n, _)) => {
let _ = tx.send((buf[..n].to_vec(), local, remote));
}
Err(e) => {
warn!("udp recv {:?}: {:?}", remote, e);
break;
}
}
}
}
Err(e) => warn!("failed to open udp socket {:?}: {:?}", remote, e),
}
});
}
}
async fn new_tcp_stream(addr: SocketAddr, iface: &str) -> std::io::Result<TcpStream> {
use socket2_ext::{AddressBinding, BindDeviceOption};
let s = socket2::Socket::new(socket2::Domain::IPV4, socket2::Type::STREAM, None)?;
s.bind_to_device(BindDeviceOption::v4(iface))?;
s.set_keepalive(true)?;
s.set_nodelay(true)?;
s.set_nonblocking(true)?;
Ok(TcpSocket::from_std_stream(s.into()).connect(addr).await?)
}
async fn new_udp_packet(
addr: SocketAddr,
iface: &str,
) -> std::io::Result<tokio::net::UdpSocket> {
use socket2_ext::{AddressBinding, BindDeviceOption};
let s = socket2::Socket::new(socket2::Domain::IPV4, socket2::Type::DGRAM, None)?;
s.bind_to_device(BindDeviceOption::v4(iface))?;
s.set_nonblocking(true)?;
let sock = tokio::net::UdpSocket::from_std(s.into())?;
sock.connect(addr).await?;
Ok(sock)
}
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
mod inner {
pub(super) fn main() {}
}
fn main() {
inner::main();
}

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use std::net::{IpAddr, SocketAddr};
use futures::{SinkExt, StreamExt};
use netstack_smoltcp::{StackBuilder, TcpListener, UdpSocket};
use structopt::StructOpt;
use tokio::net::{TcpSocket, TcpStream};
use tracing::{error, info, warn};
// to run this example, you should set the policy routing **after the start of the main program**
//
// linux:
// with bind device:
// `curl 1.1.1.1 --interface utun8`
// with default route:
// `bash scripts/route-linux.sh add`
// `curl 1.1.1.1`
// with single route:
// `ip rule add to 1.1.1.1 table 200`
// `ip route add default dev utun8 table 200`
// `curl 1.1.1.1`
//
// macos:
// with default route:
// `bash scripts/route-macos.sh add`
// `curl 1.1.1.1`
//
// windows:
// with default route:
// tun2 set default route automatically, won't set agian
// # `powershell.exe scripts/route-windows.ps1 add`
// `curl 1.1.1.1`
//
// currently, the example only supports the TCP stream, and the UDP packet will be dropped.
#[derive(Debug, StructOpt)]
#[structopt(name = "forward", about = "Simply forward tun tcp/udp traffic.")]
struct Opt {
/// Default binding interface, default by guessed.
/// Specify but doesn't exist, no device is bound.
#[structopt(short = "i", long = "interface")]
interface: String,
/// name of the tun device, default to rtun8.
#[structopt(short = "n", long = "name", default_value = "utun8")]
name: String,
/// Tracing subscriber log level.
#[structopt(long = "log-level", default_value = "debug")]
log_level: tracing::Level,
/// Tokio current-thread runtime, default to multi-thread.
#[structopt(long = "current-thread")]
current_thread: bool,
/// Tokio task spawn_local, default to spwan.
#[structopt(long = "local-task")]
local_task: bool,
}
fn main() {
let opt = Opt::from_args();
let rt = if opt.current_thread {
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_current_thread()
} else {
tokio::runtime::Builder::new_multi_thread()
}
.enable_all()
.build()
.unwrap();
rt.block_on(main_exec(opt));
}
async fn main_exec(opt: Opt) {
macro_rules! tokio_spawn {
($fut: expr) => {
if opt.local_task {
tokio::task::spawn_local($fut)
} else {
tokio::task::spawn($fut)
}
};
}
tracing::subscriber::set_global_default(
tracing_subscriber::FmtSubscriber::builder()
.with_max_level(opt.log_level)
.finish(),
)
.unwrap();
let mut cfg = tun2::Configuration::default();
cfg.layer(tun2::Layer::L3);
let fd = -1;
if fd >= 0 {
cfg.raw_fd(fd);
} else {
cfg.tun_name(&opt.name)
.address("10.10.10.2")
.destination("10.10.10.1")
.mtu(tun2::DEFAULT_MTU);
#[cfg(not(any(target_arch = "mips", target_arch = "mips64",)))]
{
cfg.netmask("255.255.255.0");
}
cfg.up();
}
let device = tun2::create_as_async(&cfg).unwrap();
let mut builder = StackBuilder::default()
.enable_tcp(true)
.enable_udp(true)
.enable_icmp(true)
.mtu(9000);
if let Some(device_broadcast) = get_device_broadcast(&device) {
builder = builder
// .add_ip_filter(Box::new(move |src, dst| *src != device_broadcast && *dst != device_broadcast));
.add_ip_filter_fn(move |src, dst| *src != device_broadcast && *dst != device_broadcast);
}
let (stack, runner, udp_socket, tcp_listener) = builder.build().unwrap();
let udp_socket = udp_socket.unwrap(); // udp enabled
let tcp_listener = tcp_listener.unwrap(); // tcp enabled or icmp enabled
if let Some(runner) = runner {
tokio_spawn!(runner);
}
let framed = device.into_framed();
let (mut tun_sink, mut tun_stream) = framed.split();
let (mut stack_sink, mut stack_stream) = stack.split();
let mut futs = vec![];
// Reads packet from stack and sends to TUN.
futs.push(tokio_spawn!(async move {
while let Some(pkt) = stack_stream.next().await {
if let Ok(pkt) = pkt {
match tun_sink.send(pkt).await {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => warn!("failed to send packet to TUN, err: {:?}", e),
}
}
}
}));
// Reads packet from TUN and sends to stack.
futs.push(tokio_spawn!(async move {
while let Some(pkt) = tun_stream.next().await {
if let Ok(pkt) = pkt {
match stack_sink.send(pkt).await {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => warn!("failed to send packet to stack, err: {:?}", e),
};
}
}
}));
// Extracts TCP connections from stack and sends them to the dispatcher.
futs.push(tokio_spawn!({
let interface = opt.interface.clone();
async move {
handle_inbound_stream(tcp_listener, interface).await;
}
}));
// Receive and send UDP packets between netstack and NAT manager. The NAT
// manager would maintain UDP sessions and send them to the dispatcher.
futs.push(tokio_spawn!(async move {
handle_inbound_datagram(udp_socket, opt.interface).await;
}));
futures::future::join_all(futs)
.await
.iter()
.for_each(|res| {
if let Err(e) = res {
error!("error: {:?}", e);
}
});
}
/// simply forward tcp stream
async fn handle_inbound_stream(mut tcp_listener: TcpListener, interface: String) {
while let Some((mut stream, local, remote)) = tcp_listener.next().await {
let interface = interface.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
info!("new tcp connection: {:?} => {:?}", local, remote);
match new_tcp_stream(remote, &interface).await {
Ok(mut remote_stream) => {
// pipe between two tcp stream
match tokio::io::copy_bidirectional(&mut stream, &mut remote_stream).await {
Ok(_) => {}
Err(e) => warn!(
"failed to copy tcp stream {:?}=>{:?}, err: {:?}",
local, remote, e
),
}
}
Err(e) => warn!(
"failed to new tcp stream {:?}=>{:?}, err: {:?}",
local, remote, e
),
}
});
}
}
/// simply forward udp datagram
async fn handle_inbound_datagram(udp_socket: UdpSocket, interface: String) {
let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::unbounded_channel();
let (mut read_half, mut write_half) = udp_socket.split();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some((data, local, remote)) = rx.recv().await {
let _ = write_half.send((data, remote, local)).await;
}
});
while let Some((data, local, remote)) = read_half.next().await {
let tx = tx.clone();
let interface = interface.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
info!("new udp datagram: {:?} => {:?}", local, remote);
match new_udp_packet(remote, &interface).await {
Ok(remote_socket) => {
// pipe between two udp sockets
let _ = remote_socket.send(&data).await;
loop {
let mut buf = vec![0; 1024];
match remote_socket.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
Ok((len, _)) => {
let _ = tx.send((buf[..len].to_vec(), local, remote));
}
Err(e) => {
warn!(
"failed to recv udp datagram {:?}<->{:?}: {:?}",
local, remote, e
);
break;
}
}
}
}
Err(e) => warn!(
"failed to new udp socket {:?}=>{:?}, err: {:?}",
local, remote, e
),
}
});
}
}
async fn new_tcp_stream<'a>(addr: SocketAddr, iface: &str) -> std::io::Result<TcpStream> {
use socket2_ext::{AddressBinding, BindDeviceOption};
let socket = socket2::Socket::new(socket2::Domain::IPV4, socket2::Type::STREAM, None)?;
socket.bind_to_device(BindDeviceOption::v4(iface))?;
socket.set_keepalive(true)?;
socket.set_nodelay(true)?;
socket.set_nonblocking(true)?;
let stream = TcpSocket::from_std_stream(socket.into())
.connect(addr)
.await?;
Ok(stream)
}
async fn new_udp_packet(addr: SocketAddr, iface: &str) -> std::io::Result<tokio::net::UdpSocket> {
use socket2_ext::{AddressBinding, BindDeviceOption};
let socket = socket2::Socket::new(socket2::Domain::IPV4, socket2::Type::DGRAM, None)?;
socket.bind_to_device(BindDeviceOption::v4(iface))?;
socket.set_nonblocking(true)?;
let socket = tokio::net::UdpSocket::from_std(socket.into());
if let Ok(ref socket) = socket {
socket.connect(addr).await?;
}
socket
}
fn get_device_broadcast(device: &tun2::AsyncDevice) -> Option<std::net::Ipv4Addr> {
use tun2::AbstractDevice;
let mtu = device.mtu().unwrap_or(tun2::DEFAULT_MTU);
let address = match device.address() {
Ok(a) => match a {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4,
IpAddr::V6(_) => return None,
},
Err(_) => return None,
};
let netmask = match device.netmask() {
Ok(n) => match n {
IpAddr::V4(v4) => v4,
IpAddr::V6(_) => return None,
},
Err(_) => return None,
};
match smoltcp::wire::Ipv4Cidr::from_netmask(address, netmask) {
Ok(address_net) => match address_net.broadcast() {
Some(broadcast) => {
info!(
"tun device network: {} (address: {}, netmask: {}, broadcast: {}, mtu: {})",
address_net, address, netmask, broadcast, mtu,
);
Some(broadcast)
}
None => {
error!("invalid tun address {}, netmask {}", address, netmask);
None
}
},
Err(err) => {
error!(
"invalid tun address {}, netmask {}, error: {}",
address, netmask, err
);
None
}
}
}

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#!/usr/bin/env bash
# bench-offload.sh
#
# Benchmarks netstack-smoltcp's forward examples with 2-stream iperf3.
# Compares:
# - examples/forward (tun2, no GRO/GSO offload)
# - examples/forward-offload-linux (tun-rs, Linux GRO/GSO offload via IFF_VNET_HDR)
#
# Setup: creates a veth pair + network namespace; iperf3 server runs inside
# the namespace, the forward proxy bridges traffic through a TUN device.
#
# Requirements: cargo, iperf3, ip (iproute2), root/CAP_NET_ADMIN
#
# Usage:
# sudo bash scripts/bench-offload.sh
#
# Run from the root of the netstack-smoltcp repository.
set -euo pipefail
# ── config ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
REPO_DIR="$(cd "$(dirname "${BASH_SOURCE[0]}")/.." && pwd)"
NS=bench
VETH_HOST=veth-host
VETH_NS=veth-bench
HOST_IP=172.19.0.1
NS_IP=172.19.0.2
PREFIX=24
TUN_NAME=utun8
TUN_IP=10.10.10.2
IPERF_PORT=5201
DURATION=15
STREAMS=2
# ── helpers ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
die() { echo "ERROR: $*" >&2; exit 1; }
require() { command -v "$1" &>/dev/null || die "'$1' not found"; }
cleanup() {
pkill -f "forward-" 2>/dev/null || true
ip netns exec "$NS" pkill iperf3 2>/dev/null || true
ip route del "${NS_IP}/32" dev "$TUN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
ip tuntap del dev "$TUN_NAME" mode tun 2>/dev/null || true
ip link del "$VETH_HOST" 2>/dev/null || true
ip netns del "$NS" 2>/dev/null || true
}
trap cleanup EXIT
# ── preflight ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
require cargo
require iperf3
require ip
[[ $EUID -eq 0 ]] || die "run as root (needs CAP_NET_ADMIN for TUN + netns)"
[[ -f "$REPO_DIR/Cargo.toml" ]] || die "run from the netstack-smoltcp repo root"
grep -q 'name = "netstack-smoltcp"' "$REPO_DIR/Cargo.toml" \
|| die "Cargo.toml does not look like netstack-smoltcp"
# ── network setup ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo "[net] setting up namespace '$NS' and veth pair..."
cleanup 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 0.5
ip netns add "$NS"
ip link add "$VETH_HOST" type veth peer name "$VETH_NS"
ip link set "$VETH_NS" netns "$NS"
ip addr add "${HOST_IP}/${PREFIX}" dev "$VETH_HOST"
ip link set "$VETH_HOST" up
ip netns exec "$NS" ip addr add "${NS_IP}/${PREFIX}" dev "$VETH_NS"
ip netns exec "$NS" ip link set "$VETH_NS" up
ip netns exec "$NS" ip link set lo up
echo "[net] ${HOST_IP} <──veth──> ${NS_IP} (ns:${NS})"
# ── build: forward (tun2, no offload) ────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "[build] examples/forward (tun2, no GRO/GSO offload)..."
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
cargo build --example forward --release --quiet
cp target/release/examples/forward /tmp/forward-tun2
)
echo "[build] done → /tmp/forward-tun2"
# ── build: forward-offload-linux (tun-rs, GRO/GSO offload) ───────────────────
echo ""
echo "[build] examples/forward-offload-linux (tun-rs, GRO/GSO offload)..."
(
cd "$REPO_DIR"
cargo build --example forward-offload-linux --release --quiet
cp target/release/examples/forward-offload-linux /tmp/forward-tun-rs
)
echo "[build] done → /tmp/forward-tun-rs"
# ── benchmark runner ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
run_bench() {
local label="$1" binary="$2"
# clean any leftover state
pkill -f "forward-" 2>/dev/null || true
ip netns exec "$NS" pkill iperf3 2>/dev/null || true
ip route del "${NS_IP}/32" dev "$TUN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
ip tuntap del dev "$TUN_NAME" mode tun 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 0.8
# start iperf3 server inside namespace
ip netns exec "$NS" iperf3 -s -p "$IPERF_PORT" -D \
--logfile /tmp/iperf3-bench-server.log
# start proxy
"$binary" -i "$VETH_HOST" -n "$TUN_NAME" --log-level warn &
sleep 2
ip link show "$TUN_NAME" &>/dev/null \
|| { echo " [!] TUN not up, skipping"; return 1; }
# route iperf3 traffic through TUN (more-specific /32 overrides /24 via veth)
ip route add "${NS_IP}/32" dev "$TUN_NAME"
echo " running iperf3: ${STREAMS} streams × ${DURATION}s …"
local out
out=$(iperf3 -c "$NS_IP" -p "$IPERF_PORT" \
-t "$DURATION" -P "$STREAMS" 2>&1)
local sender receiver
sender=$(echo "$out" | grep "SUM.*sender" | awk '{print $6, $7}')
receiver=$(echo "$out" | grep "SUM.*receiver" | awk '{print $6, $7}')
if [[ -z "$sender" ]]; then
echo " result: FAILED"
echo "$out" | tail -5 | sed 's/^/ /'
else
printf " sender: %s\n" "$sender"
printf " receiver: %s\n" "$receiver"
fi
pkill -f "forward-" 2>/dev/null || true
ip netns exec "$NS" pkill iperf3 2>/dev/null || true
ip route del "${NS_IP}/32" dev "$TUN_NAME" 2>/dev/null || true
ip tuntap del dev "$TUN_NAME" mode tun 2>/dev/null || true
sleep 0.8
}
# ── direct baseline ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo " BASELINE: direct veth (no TUN, no proxy)"
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
ip netns exec "$NS" pkill iperf3 2>/dev/null || true; sleep 0.3
ip netns exec "$NS" iperf3 -s -p "$IPERF_PORT" -D \
--logfile /tmp/iperf3-bench-server.log; sleep 0.3
echo " running iperf3: ${STREAMS} streams × ${DURATION}s …"
baseline_out=$(iperf3 -c "$NS_IP" -p "$IPERF_PORT" \
-t "$DURATION" -P "$STREAMS" 2>&1)
echo "$baseline_out" | grep "SUM.*sender" | awk '{printf " sender: %s %s\n", $6, $7}'
echo "$baseline_out" | grep "SUM.*receiver" | awk '{printf " receiver: %s %s\n", $6, $7}'
ip netns exec "$NS" pkill iperf3 2>/dev/null || true; sleep 0.5
# ── tun2 ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo " tun2 (main branch — no GRO/GSO offload)"
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
run_bench "tun2" /tmp/forward-tun2
# ── tun-rs + offload ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
echo ""
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo " tun-rs (patched — GRO/GSO offload via IFF_VNET_HDR)"
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
run_bench "tun-rs+offload" /tmp/forward-tun-rs
echo ""
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"
echo " done."
echo "━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━"

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#!/bin/bash
#__author__: cavivie
DEFAULT_TUN_NAME="utun8"
function do_route() {
local route_op="${1}"
local tun_name="${2:-$DEFAULT_TUN_NAME}"
ip route ${route_op} 0.0.0.0/1 dev ${tun_name}
ip route ${route_op} 128.0.0.0/1 dev ${tun_name}
}
function usage(){
echo "Usage:
route add add tun routes to system route table
route del delete routes from system route table
route help display all usages of the shell script"
}
# START MAIN-OPTIONS
case $1 in
add) do_route add $2;;
del) do_route delete $2;;
*) usage ;;
esac
# END MAIN-OPTIONS

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#!/bin/bash
#__author__: cavivie
DEFAULT_TUN_ADDR="10.10.10.2/24"
DEFAULT_TUN_DEST="10.10.10.1"
function do_route() {
local route_op="${1}"
local tun_addr="${2:-$DEFAULT_TUN_ADDR}"
local tun_dest="${3:-$DEFAULT_TUN_DEST}"
sudo route ${route_op} -net 1.0.0.0/8 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 2.0.0.0/7 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 4.0.0.0/6 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 8.0.0.0/5 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 16.0.0.0/4 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 32.0.0.0/3 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 64.0.0.0/2 ${tun_dest}
sudo route ${route_op} -net 128.0.0.0/1 ${tun_dest}
# tun2 do like this automatically
sudo route ${route_op} -net ${tun_addr} ${tun_dest}
}
function usage(){
echo "Usage:
route add add tun routes to system route table
route del delete routes from system route table
route help display all usages of the shell script"
}
# START MAIN-OPTIONS
case $1 in
add) do_route add $2 $3;;
del) do_route delete $2 $3;;
*) usage ;;
esac
# END MAIN-OPTIONS

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#__author__: cavivie
param(
[string]$Cmd = "help",
[string]$TunName = "utun8",
[string]$TunGateway = "10.10.10.1"
)
$ErrorActionPreference = "Stop"
# START MAIN-OPTIONS
switch ($Cmd) {
"add" {
# tun2 do like this automatically
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix "0.0.0.0/1" -InterfaceAlias $TunName -NextHop "$TunGateway"
New-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix "128.0.0.0/1" -InterfaceAlias $TunName -NextHop "$TunGateway"
}
"del" {
# tun2 do like this automatically
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix "0.0.0.0/1" -InterfaceAlias $TunName | Remove-NetRoute
Get-NetRoute -DestinationPrefix "128.0.0.0/1" -InterfaceAlias $TunName | Remove-NetRoute
}
default {
Write-Host "Usage:
route add add tun routes to system route table
route del delete routes from system route table
route help display all usages of the shell script"
}
}
# END MAIN-OPTIONS

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use std::sync::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
Arc,
};
use smoltcp::{
phy::{Device, DeviceCapabilities, Medium, RxToken, TxToken},
time::Instant,
};
use tokio::sync::mpsc::{unbounded_channel, Permit, Sender, UnboundedReceiver, UnboundedSender};
use crate::packet::AnyIpPktFrame;
pub(super) struct VirtualDevice {
in_buf_avail: Arc<AtomicBool>,
in_buf: UnboundedReceiver<Vec<u8>>,
out_buf: Sender<AnyIpPktFrame>,
mtu: usize,
cached_packet: Option<Vec<u8>>,
}
impl VirtualDevice {
pub(super) fn new(
iface_egress_tx: Sender<AnyIpPktFrame>,
mtu: usize,
) -> (Self, UnboundedSender<Vec<u8>>, Arc<AtomicBool>) {
let iface_ingress_tx_avail = Arc::new(AtomicBool::new(false));
let (iface_ingress_tx, iface_ingress_rx) = unbounded_channel();
(
Self {
in_buf_avail: iface_ingress_tx_avail.clone(),
in_buf: iface_ingress_rx,
out_buf: iface_egress_tx,
mtu,
cached_packet: None,
},
iface_ingress_tx,
iface_ingress_tx_avail,
)
}
}
impl Device for VirtualDevice {
type RxToken<'a> = VirtualRxToken;
type TxToken<'a> = VirtualTxToken<'a>;
fn receive(&mut self, _timestamp: Instant) -> Option<(Self::RxToken<'_>, Self::TxToken<'_>)> {
let buffer = if let Some(buf) = self.cached_packet.take() {
buf
} else {
let Ok(buf) = self.in_buf.try_recv() else {
self.in_buf_avail.store(false, Ordering::Release);
return None;
};
buf
};
let Ok(permit) = self.out_buf.try_reserve() else {
self.cached_packet = Some(buffer);
self.in_buf_avail.store(false, Ordering::Release);
return None;
};
Some((Self::RxToken { buffer }, Self::TxToken { permit }))
}
fn transmit(&mut self, _timestamp: Instant) -> Option<Self::TxToken<'_>> {
match self.out_buf.try_reserve() {
Ok(permit) => Some(Self::TxToken { permit }),
Err(_) => None,
}
}
fn capabilities(&self) -> DeviceCapabilities {
let mut capabilities = DeviceCapabilities::default();
capabilities.medium = Medium::Ip;
capabilities.max_transmission_unit = self.mtu;
capabilities
}
}
pub(super) struct VirtualRxToken {
buffer: Vec<u8>,
}
impl RxToken for VirtualRxToken {
fn consume<R, F>(self, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce(&[u8]) -> R,
{
f(&self.buffer[..])
}
}
pub(super) struct VirtualTxToken<'a> {
permit: Permit<'a, Vec<u8>>,
}
impl<'a> TxToken for VirtualTxToken<'a> {
fn consume<R, F>(self, len: usize, f: F) -> R
where
F: FnOnce(&mut [u8]) -> R,
{
let mut buffer = vec![0u8; len];
let result = f(&mut buffer);
self.permit.send(buffer);
result
}
}

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use std::net::IpAddr;
pub type IpFilter<'a> = Box<dyn Fn(&IpAddr, &IpAddr) -> bool + Send + Sync + 'a>;
pub struct IpFilters<'a> {
filters: Vec<IpFilter<'a>>,
}
impl<'a> Default for IpFilters<'a> {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
impl<'a> IpFilters<'a> {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
filters: Default::default(),
}
}
pub fn with_non_broadcast() -> Self {
macro_rules! non_broadcast {
($addr:ident) => {
match $addr {
IpAddr::V4(a) => !(a.is_broadcast() || a.is_multicast() || a.is_unspecified()),
IpAddr::V6(a) => !(a.is_multicast() || a.is_unspecified()),
}
};
}
Self {
filters: vec![Box::new(|src, dst| {
non_broadcast!(src) && non_broadcast!(dst)
})],
}
}
pub fn add(&mut self, filter: IpFilter<'a>) {
self.filters.push(filter);
}
pub fn add_fn<F>(&mut self, filter: F)
where
F: Fn(&IpAddr, &IpAddr) -> bool + Send + Sync + 'a,
{
self.filters.push(Box::new(filter));
}
pub fn add_all<I: IntoIterator<Item = IpFilter<'a>>>(&mut self, filters: I) {
self.filters.extend(filters);
}
pub fn is_allowed(&self, src: &IpAddr, dst: &IpAddr) -> bool {
self.filters.iter().all(|filter| filter(src, dst))
}
}

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mod device;
mod runner;
pub use runner::Runner;
mod packet;
pub use packet::AnyIpPktFrame;
mod filter;
pub use filter::{IpFilter, IpFilters};
pub mod udp;
pub use udp::UdpSocket;
pub mod tcp;
pub use tcp::{TcpListener, TcpStream};
pub mod stack;
pub use stack::{Stack, StackBuilder};
/// Re-export
pub use smoltcp;

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use std::net::IpAddr;
use smoltcp::wire::{IpProtocol, IpVersion, Ipv4Packet, Ipv6Packet};
pub type AnyIpPktFrame = Vec<u8>;
#[derive(Debug)]
pub(super) enum IpPacket<T: AsRef<[u8]>> {
Ipv4(Ipv4Packet<T>),
Ipv6(Ipv6Packet<T>),
}
impl<T: AsRef<[u8]> + Copy> IpPacket<T> {
pub fn new_checked(packet: T) -> smoltcp::wire::Result<IpPacket<T>> {
let buffer = packet.as_ref();
match IpVersion::of_packet(buffer)? {
IpVersion::Ipv4 => Ok(IpPacket::Ipv4(Ipv4Packet::new_checked(packet)?)),
IpVersion::Ipv6 => Ok(IpPacket::Ipv6(Ipv6Packet::new_checked(packet)?)),
}
}
pub fn src_addr(&self) -> IpAddr {
match *self {
IpPacket::Ipv4(ref packet) => IpAddr::from(packet.src_addr()),
IpPacket::Ipv6(ref packet) => IpAddr::from(packet.src_addr()),
}
}
pub fn dst_addr(&self) -> IpAddr {
match *self {
IpPacket::Ipv4(ref packet) => IpAddr::from(packet.dst_addr()),
IpPacket::Ipv6(ref packet) => IpAddr::from(packet.dst_addr()),
}
}
pub fn protocol(&self) -> IpProtocol {
match *self {
IpPacket::Ipv4(ref packet) => packet.next_header(),
IpPacket::Ipv6(ref packet) => packet.next_header(),
}
}
}
impl<'a, T: AsRef<[u8]> + ?Sized> IpPacket<&'a T> {
/// Return a pointer to the payload.
#[inline]
pub fn payload(&self) -> &'a [u8] {
match *self {
IpPacket::Ipv4(ref packet) => packet.payload(),
IpPacket::Ipv6(ref packet) => packet.payload(),
}
}
}

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use std::{
future::{Future, IntoFuture},
pin::Pin,
task::{Context, Poll},
};
/// BoxFuture acts the same as the [BoxFuture in crate futures utils],
/// which is an owned dynamically typed Future for use in cases where you
/// cant statically type your result or need to add some indirection.
/// But the difference of this structure is that it will conditionally
/// implement Send according to the properties of type T, which does not
/// require two sets of API interfaces in single-threaded and multi-threaded.
///
/// [BoxFuture in crate futures utils]: https://docs.rs/futures-util/latest/futures_util/future/type.BoxFuture.html
pub struct BoxFuture<'a, T>(Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = T> + Send + 'a>>);
impl<'a, T> BoxFuture<'a, T> {
pub fn new<F>(f: F) -> BoxFuture<'a, T>
where
F: IntoFuture<Output = T> + Send + 'a,
F::IntoFuture: Send + 'a,
{
BoxFuture(Box::pin(f.into_future()))
}
#[allow(unused)]
pub fn wrap(f: Pin<Box<dyn Future<Output = T> + Send + 'a>>) -> BoxFuture<'a, T> {
BoxFuture(f)
}
}
impl<T> Future for BoxFuture<'_, T> {
type Output = T;
fn poll(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, context: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Self::Output> {
self.0.as_mut().poll(context)
}
}
pub type Runner = BoxFuture<'static, std::io::Result<()>>;

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use std::{
net::IpAddr,
pin::Pin,
task::{ready, Context, Poll},
};
use futures::{Sink, Stream};
use smoltcp::wire::IpProtocol;
use tokio::sync::mpsc::{channel, Receiver};
use tokio_util::sync::PollSender;
use tracing::{debug, trace};
use crate::{
filter::{IpFilter, IpFilters},
packet::{AnyIpPktFrame, IpPacket},
runner::Runner,
tcp::TcpListener,
udp::UdpSocket,
};
pub struct StackBuilder {
enable_udp: bool,
enable_tcp: bool,
enable_icmp: bool,
stack_buffer_size: usize,
udp_buffer_size: usize,
tcp_buffer_size: usize,
mtu: usize,
ip_filters: IpFilters<'static>,
}
impl Default for StackBuilder {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
enable_udp: false,
enable_tcp: false,
enable_icmp: false,
stack_buffer_size: 1024,
udp_buffer_size: 512,
tcp_buffer_size: 512,
mtu: 1504, // 1500 for Ethernet + 4 for VLAN
ip_filters: IpFilters::with_non_broadcast(),
}
}
}
#[allow(unused)]
impl StackBuilder {
pub fn enable_udp(mut self, enable: bool) -> Self {
self.enable_udp = enable;
self
}
pub fn enable_tcp(mut self, enable: bool) -> Self {
self.enable_tcp = enable;
self
}
pub fn enable_icmp(mut self, enable: bool) -> Self {
self.enable_icmp = enable;
self
}
pub fn stack_buffer_size(mut self, size: usize) -> Self {
self.stack_buffer_size = size;
self
}
pub fn udp_buffer_size(mut self, size: usize) -> Self {
self.udp_buffer_size = size;
self
}
pub fn tcp_buffer_size(mut self, size: usize) -> Self {
self.tcp_buffer_size = size;
self
}
pub fn set_ip_filters(mut self, filters: IpFilters<'static>) -> Self {
self.ip_filters = filters;
self
}
pub fn add_ip_filter(mut self, filter: IpFilter<'static>) -> Self {
self.ip_filters.add(filter);
self
}
pub fn add_ip_filter_fn<F>(mut self, filter: F) -> Self
where
F: Fn(&IpAddr, &IpAddr) -> bool + Send + Sync + 'static,
{
self.ip_filters.add_fn(filter);
self
}
pub fn mtu(mut self, mtu: usize) -> Self {
self.mtu = mtu;
self
}
#[allow(clippy::type_complexity)]
pub fn build(
self,
) -> std::io::Result<(
Stack,
Option<Runner>,
Option<UdpSocket>,
Option<TcpListener>,
)> {
let (stack_tx, stack_rx) = channel(self.stack_buffer_size);
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = if self.enable_udp {
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = channel(self.udp_buffer_size);
(Some(PollSender::new(udp_tx)), Some(udp_rx))
} else {
(None, None)
};
let (tcp_tx, tcp_rx) = if self.enable_tcp {
let (tcp_tx, tcp_rx) = channel(self.tcp_buffer_size);
(Some(PollSender::new(tcp_tx)), Some(tcp_rx))
} else {
(None, None)
};
// ICMP is handled by TCP's Interface.
// smoltcp's interface will always send replies to EchoRequest
if self.enable_icmp && !self.enable_tcp {
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind::InvalidInput};
return Err(Error::new(InvalidInput, "ICMP requires TCP"));
}
let icmp_tx = if self.enable_icmp {
tcp_tx.clone()
} else {
None
};
let udp_socket = udp_rx.map(|udp_rx| UdpSocket::new(udp_rx, stack_tx.clone()));
let (tcp_runner, tcp_listener) = if let Some(tcp_rx) = tcp_rx {
let (tcp_runner, tcp_listener) = TcpListener::new(tcp_rx, stack_tx, self.mtu)?;
(Some(tcp_runner), Some(tcp_listener))
} else {
(None, None)
};
let stack = Stack {
ip_filters: self.ip_filters,
stack_rx,
sink_buf: None,
udp_tx,
tcp_tx,
icmp_tx,
};
Ok((stack, tcp_runner, udp_socket, tcp_listener))
}
}
pub struct Stack {
ip_filters: IpFilters<'static>,
sink_buf: Option<(AnyIpPktFrame, IpProtocol)>,
udp_tx: Option<PollSender<AnyIpPktFrame>>,
tcp_tx: Option<PollSender<AnyIpPktFrame>>,
icmp_tx: Option<PollSender<AnyIpPktFrame>>,
stack_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>,
}
impl Stack {
fn poll_send(&mut self, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), std::io::Error>> {
let (item, proto) = match self.sink_buf.take() {
Some(val) => val,
None => return Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
};
let tx = match proto {
IpProtocol::Tcp => self.tcp_tx.as_mut(),
IpProtocol::Udp => self.udp_tx.as_mut(),
IpProtocol::Icmp | IpProtocol::Icmpv6 => self.icmp_tx.as_mut(),
_ => unreachable!(),
};
let Some(tx) = tx else {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
};
match tx.poll_reserve(cx) {
Poll::Pending => {
self.sink_buf = Some((item, proto));
Poll::Pending
}
Poll::Ready(Err(_)) => Poll::Ready(Err(channel_closed_err("channel is closed"))),
Poll::Ready(Ok(_)) => match tx.send_item(item) {
Ok(()) => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
Err(_) => Poll::Ready(Err(channel_closed_err("channel is closed"))),
},
}
}
}
// Recv from stack.
impl Stream for Stack {
type Item = std::io::Result<AnyIpPktFrame>;
fn poll_next(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Option<Self::Item>> {
match self.stack_rx.poll_recv(cx) {
Poll::Ready(Some(pkt)) => Poll::Ready(Some(Ok(pkt))),
Poll::Ready(None) => Poll::Ready(None),
Poll::Pending => Poll::Pending,
}
}
}
// Send to stack.
impl Sink<AnyIpPktFrame> for Stack {
type Error = std::io::Error;
fn poll_ready(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
// If a buffered item exists, try to flush it first. This also properly
// registers the waker via poll_reserve so we get woken when the channel
// has capacity. Without this, returning Pending here with _cx unused
// means the task never gets rescheduled.
if self.sink_buf.is_some() {
ready!(self.poll_send(cx))?;
}
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
fn start_send(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, item: AnyIpPktFrame) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
if item.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind::InvalidInput};
let packet = IpPacket::new_checked(item.as_slice())
.map_err(|err| Error::new(InvalidInput, format!("invalid IP packet: {err}")))?;
let src_ip = packet.src_addr();
let dst_ip = packet.dst_addr();
let addr_allowed = self.ip_filters.is_allowed(&src_ip, &dst_ip);
if !addr_allowed {
trace!("IP packet {src_ip} -> {dst_ip} (allowed? {addr_allowed}) throwing away",);
return Ok(());
}
let protocol = packet.protocol();
if matches!(
protocol,
IpProtocol::Tcp | IpProtocol::Udp | IpProtocol::Icmp | IpProtocol::Icmpv6
) {
self.sink_buf.replace((item, protocol));
} else {
debug!("tun IP packet ignored (protocol: {:?})", protocol);
}
Ok(())
}
fn poll_flush(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
self.poll_send(cx)
}
fn poll_close(
mut self: Pin<&mut Self>,
_cx: &mut Context<'_>,
) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
self.stack_rx.close();
Poll::Ready(Ok(()))
}
}
fn channel_closed_err<E>(err: E) -> std::io::Error
where
E: Into<Box<dyn std::error::Error + Send + Sync>>,
{
std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe, err)
}

564
netstack-smoltcp/src/tcp.rs Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,564 @@
use std::{
collections::HashMap,
net::SocketAddr,
pin::Pin,
sync::{
atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering},
Arc,
},
task::{Context, Poll, Waker},
};
use futures::Stream;
use smoltcp::{
iface::{Config as InterfaceConfig, Interface, SocketHandle, SocketSet},
phy::Device,
socket::tcp::{Socket as TcpSocket, SocketBuffer as TcpSocketBuffer, State as TcpState},
storage::RingBuffer,
time::{Duration, Instant},
wire::{HardwareAddress, IpAddress, IpCidr, IpProtocol, Ipv4Address, Ipv6Address, TcpPacket},
};
use spin::Mutex as SpinMutex;
use tokio::{
io::{AsyncRead, AsyncWrite, ReadBuf},
sync::{
mpsc::{channel, unbounded_channel, Receiver, Sender, UnboundedReceiver, UnboundedSender},
Notify,
},
};
use tracing::{error, trace};
use crate::{
device::VirtualDevice,
packet::{AnyIpPktFrame, IpPacket},
Runner,
};
// NOTE: Default buffer could contain 20 AEAD packets
const DEFAULT_TCP_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE: u32 = 0x3FFF * 20;
const DEFAULT_TCP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE: u32 = 0x3FFF * 20;
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Eq, PartialEq)]
enum TcpSocketState {
Normal,
Close,
Closing,
Closed,
}
struct TcpSocketControl {
send_buffer: RingBuffer<'static, u8>,
send_waker: Option<Waker>,
recv_buffer: RingBuffer<'static, u8>,
recv_waker: Option<Waker>,
recv_state: TcpSocketState,
send_state: TcpSocketState,
}
struct TcpSocketCreation {
control: SharedControl,
socket: TcpSocket<'static>,
}
type SharedNotify = Arc<Notify>;
type SharedControl = Arc<SpinMutex<TcpSocketControl>>;
struct TcpListenerRunner;
impl TcpListenerRunner {
fn create(
device: VirtualDevice,
iface: Interface,
iface_ingress_tx: UnboundedSender<Vec<u8>>,
iface_ingress_tx_avail: Arc<AtomicBool>,
tcp_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>,
stream_tx: Sender<TcpStream>,
sockets: HashMap<SocketHandle, SharedControl>,
) -> Runner {
Runner::new(async move {
let notify = Arc::new(Notify::new());
let (socket_tx, socket_rx) = channel::<TcpSocketCreation>(1024);
let res = tokio::select! {
v = Self::handle_packet(notify.clone(), iface_ingress_tx, iface_ingress_tx_avail.clone(), tcp_rx, stream_tx, socket_tx) => v,
v = Self::handle_socket(notify, device, iface, iface_ingress_tx_avail, sockets, socket_rx) => v,
};
res?;
trace!("VirtDevice::poll thread exited");
Ok(())
})
}
async fn handle_packet(
notify: SharedNotify,
iface_ingress_tx: UnboundedSender<Vec<u8>>,
iface_ingress_tx_avail: Arc<AtomicBool>,
mut tcp_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>,
stream_tx: Sender<TcpStream>,
socket_tx: Sender<TcpSocketCreation>,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
while let Some(frame) = tcp_rx.recv().await {
let packet = match IpPacket::new_checked(frame.as_slice()) {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(err) => {
error!("invalid TCP IP packet: {:?}", err,);
continue;
}
};
// Specially handle icmp packet by TCP interface.
if matches!(packet.protocol(), IpProtocol::Icmp | IpProtocol::Icmpv6) {
iface_ingress_tx
.send(frame)
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe, e))?;
iface_ingress_tx_avail.store(true, Ordering::Release);
notify.notify_one();
continue;
}
let src_ip = packet.src_addr();
let dst_ip = packet.dst_addr();
let payload = packet.payload();
let packet = match TcpPacket::new_checked(payload) {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(err) => {
error!("invalid TCP err: {err}, src_ip: {src_ip}, dst_ip: {dst_ip}, payload: {payload:?}");
continue;
}
};
let src_port = packet.src_port();
let dst_port = packet.dst_port();
let src_addr = SocketAddr::new(src_ip, src_port);
let dst_addr = SocketAddr::new(dst_ip, dst_port);
// TCP first handshake packet, create a new Connection
if packet.syn() && !packet.ack() {
let mut socket = TcpSocket::new(
TcpSocketBuffer::new(vec![0u8; DEFAULT_TCP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE as usize]),
TcpSocketBuffer::new(vec![0u8; DEFAULT_TCP_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE as usize]),
);
socket.set_keep_alive(Some(Duration::from_secs(28)));
// FIXME: It should follow system's setting. 7200 is Linux's default.
socket.set_timeout(Some(Duration::from_secs(7200)));
// NO ACK delay
// socket.set_ack_delay(None);
if let Err(err) = socket.listen(dst_addr) {
error!("listen error: {:?}", err);
continue;
}
trace!("created TCP connection for {} <-> {}", src_addr, dst_addr);
let control = Arc::new(SpinMutex::new(TcpSocketControl {
send_buffer: RingBuffer::new(vec![0u8; DEFAULT_TCP_SEND_BUFFER_SIZE as usize]),
send_waker: None,
recv_buffer: RingBuffer::new(vec![0u8; DEFAULT_TCP_RECV_BUFFER_SIZE as usize]),
recv_waker: None,
recv_state: TcpSocketState::Normal,
send_state: TcpSocketState::Normal,
}));
if let Err(_) = stream_tx.try_send(TcpStream {
src_addr,
dst_addr,
notify: notify.clone(),
control: control.clone(),
}) {
error!("stream_tx full or dropped, dropping SYN from {}", src_addr);
continue;
}
if let Err(_) = socket_tx.try_send(TcpSocketCreation { control, socket }) {
error!("socket_tx full or dropped, dropping SYN from {}", src_addr);
continue;
}
}
// Pipeline tcp stream packet
iface_ingress_tx
.send(frame)
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe, e))?;
iface_ingress_tx_avail.store(true, Ordering::Release);
notify.notify_one();
}
Ok(())
}
async fn handle_socket(
notify: SharedNotify,
mut device: VirtualDevice,
mut iface: Interface,
iface_ingress_tx_avail: Arc<AtomicBool>,
mut sockets: HashMap<SocketHandle, SharedControl>,
mut socket_rx: Receiver<TcpSocketCreation>,
) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let mut socket_set = SocketSet::new(vec![]);
loop {
while let Ok(TcpSocketCreation { control, socket }) = socket_rx.try_recv() {
let handle = socket_set.add(socket);
sockets.insert(handle, control);
}
let before_poll = Instant::now();
let updated_sockets = iface.poll(before_poll, &mut device, &mut socket_set);
if matches!(
updated_sockets,
smoltcp::iface::PollResult::SocketStateChanged
) {
trace!("VirtDevice::poll costed {}", Instant::now() - before_poll);
}
// Check all the sockets' status
let mut sockets_to_remove = Vec::new();
for (socket_handle, control) in sockets.iter() {
let socket_handle = *socket_handle;
let socket = socket_set.get_mut::<TcpSocket>(socket_handle);
let mut control = control.lock();
// Remove the socket only when it is in the closed state.
if socket.state() == TcpState::Closed {
sockets_to_remove.push(socket_handle);
control.send_state = TcpSocketState::Closed;
control.recv_state = TcpSocketState::Closed;
if let Some(waker) = control.send_waker.take() {
waker.wake();
}
if let Some(waker) = control.recv_waker.take() {
waker.wake();
}
trace!("closed TCP connection");
continue;
}
// SHUT_WR — only close once the send_buffer has been fully
// drained into the smoltcp socket. Closing earlier transitions
// the socket to FIN_WAIT_1, making can_send() return false, so
// the send loop below never runs and the remaining data is lost.
if matches!(control.send_state, TcpSocketState::Close)
&& control.send_buffer.is_empty()
{
trace!("closing TCP Write Half, {:?}", socket.state());
socket.close();
control.send_state = TcpSocketState::Closing;
}
// Check if readable
let mut wake_receiver = false;
while socket.can_recv() && !control.recv_buffer.is_full() {
let result = socket.recv(|buffer| {
let n = control.recv_buffer.enqueue_slice(buffer);
(n, ())
});
match result {
Ok(..) => wake_receiver = true,
Err(err) => {
error!("socket recv error: {:?}, {:?}", err, socket.state());
// Don't know why. Abort the connection.
socket.abort();
if matches!(control.recv_state, TcpSocketState::Normal) {
control.recv_state = TcpSocketState::Closed;
}
wake_receiver = true;
// The socket will be recycled in the next poll.
break;
}
}
}
// If socket is not in ESTABLISH, FIN-WAIT-1, FIN-WAIT-2,
// the local client have closed our receiver.
let states = [
TcpState::Listen,
TcpState::SynReceived,
TcpState::Established,
TcpState::FinWait1,
TcpState::FinWait2,
];
if matches!(control.recv_state, TcpSocketState::Normal)
&& !socket.may_recv()
&& !states.contains(&socket.state())
{
trace!("closed TCP Read Half, {:?}", socket.state());
// Let TcpStream::poll_read returns EOF.
control.recv_state = TcpSocketState::Closed;
wake_receiver = true;
}
if wake_receiver && control.recv_waker.is_some() {
if let Some(waker) = control.recv_waker.take() {
waker.wake();
}
}
// Check if writable
let mut wake_sender = false;
while socket.can_send() && !control.send_buffer.is_empty() {
let result = socket.send(|buffer| {
let n = control.send_buffer.dequeue_slice(buffer);
(n, ())
});
match result {
Ok(..) => wake_sender = true,
Err(err) => {
error!("socket send error: {:?}, {:?}", err, socket.state());
// Don't know why. Abort the connection.
socket.abort();
if matches!(control.send_state, TcpSocketState::Normal) {
control.send_state = TcpSocketState::Closed;
}
wake_sender = true;
// The socket will be recycled in the next poll.
break;
}
}
}
if wake_sender && control.send_waker.is_some() {
if let Some(waker) = control.send_waker.take() {
waker.wake();
}
}
}
for socket_handle in sockets_to_remove {
sockets.remove(&socket_handle);
socket_set.remove(socket_handle);
}
if !iface_ingress_tx_avail.load(Ordering::Acquire) {
let next_duration = iface
.poll_delay(before_poll, &socket_set)
.unwrap_or(Duration::from_millis(5));
if next_duration != Duration::ZERO {
let _ = tokio::time::timeout(
tokio::time::Duration::from(next_duration),
notify.notified(),
)
.await;
}
}
}
}
}
pub struct TcpListener {
stream_rx: Receiver<TcpStream>,
}
impl TcpListener {
pub(super) fn new(
tcp_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>,
stack_tx: Sender<AnyIpPktFrame>,
mtu: usize,
) -> std::io::Result<(Runner, Self)> {
let (mut device, iface_ingress_tx, iface_ingress_tx_avail) =
VirtualDevice::new(stack_tx, mtu);
let iface = Self::create_interface(&mut device)?;
let (stream_tx, stream_rx) = channel(1024);
let runner = TcpListenerRunner::create(
device,
iface,
iface_ingress_tx,
iface_ingress_tx_avail,
tcp_rx,
stream_tx,
HashMap::new(),
);
Ok((runner, Self { stream_rx }))
}
fn create_interface<D>(device: &mut D) -> std::io::Result<Interface>
where
D: Device + ?Sized,
{
let mut iface_config = InterfaceConfig::new(HardwareAddress::Ip);
iface_config.random_seed = rand::random();
let mut iface = Interface::new(iface_config, device, Instant::now());
iface.update_ip_addrs(|ip_addrs| {
ip_addrs
.push(IpCidr::new(IpAddress::v4(0, 0, 0, 1), 0))
.expect("iface IPv4");
ip_addrs
.push(IpCidr::new(IpAddress::v6(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), 0))
.expect("iface IPv6");
});
iface
.routes_mut()
.add_default_ipv4_route(Ipv4Address::new(0, 0, 0, 1))
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::AddrNotAvailable, e))?;
iface
.routes_mut()
.add_default_ipv6_route(Ipv6Address::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1))
.map_err(|e| std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::AddrNotAvailable, e))?;
iface.set_any_ip(true);
Ok(iface)
}
}
impl Stream for TcpListener {
type Item = (TcpStream, SocketAddr, SocketAddr);
fn poll_next(
mut self: std::pin::Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut std::task::Context<'_>,
) -> std::task::Poll<Option<Self::Item>> {
self.stream_rx.poll_recv(cx).map(|stream| {
stream.map(|stream| {
let local_addr = *stream.local_addr();
let remote_addr: SocketAddr = *stream.remote_addr();
(stream, local_addr, remote_addr)
})
})
}
}
pub struct TcpStream {
src_addr: SocketAddr,
dst_addr: SocketAddr,
notify: SharedNotify,
control: SharedControl,
}
impl Drop for TcpStream {
fn drop(&mut self) {
let mut control = self.control.lock();
if matches!(control.recv_state, TcpSocketState::Normal) {
control.recv_state = TcpSocketState::Close;
}
if matches!(control.send_state, TcpSocketState::Normal) {
control.send_state = TcpSocketState::Close;
}
self.notify.notify_one();
}
}
impl TcpStream {
pub fn local_addr(&self) -> &SocketAddr {
&self.src_addr
}
pub fn remote_addr(&self) -> &SocketAddr {
&self.dst_addr
}
}
impl AsyncRead for TcpStream {
fn poll_read(
self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
buf: &mut ReadBuf<'_>,
) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
let mut control = self.control.lock();
// Read from buffer
if control.recv_buffer.is_empty() {
// If socket is already closed / half closed, just return EOF directly.
if matches!(control.recv_state, TcpSocketState::Closed) {
return Ok(()).into();
}
// Nothing could be read. Wait for notify.
if let Some(old_waker) = control.recv_waker.replace(cx.waker().clone()) {
if !old_waker.will_wake(cx.waker()) {
old_waker.wake();
}
}
return Poll::Pending;
}
let recv_buf = buf.initialize_unfilled();
let n = control.recv_buffer.dequeue_slice(recv_buf);
buf.advance(n);
if n > 0 {
self.notify.notify_one();
}
Ok(()).into()
}
}
impl AsyncWrite for TcpStream {
fn poll_write(
self: Pin<&mut Self>,
cx: &mut Context<'_>,
buf: &[u8],
) -> Poll<std::io::Result<usize>> {
let mut control = self.control.lock();
// If state == Close | Closing | Closed, the TCP stream WR half is closed.
if !matches!(control.send_state, TcpSocketState::Normal) {
return Err(std::io::ErrorKind::BrokenPipe.into()).into();
}
// Write to buffer
if control.send_buffer.is_full() {
if let Some(old_waker) = control.send_waker.replace(cx.waker().clone()) {
if !old_waker.will_wake(cx.waker()) {
old_waker.wake();
}
}
return Poll::Pending;
}
let n = control.send_buffer.enqueue_slice(buf);
if n > 0 {
self.notify.notify_one();
}
Ok(n).into()
}
fn poll_flush(self: Pin<&mut Self>, _cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
Ok(()).into()
}
fn poll_shutdown(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
let mut control = self.control.lock();
if matches!(control.send_state, TcpSocketState::Closed) {
return Ok(()).into();
}
// SHUT_WR
if matches!(control.send_state, TcpSocketState::Normal) {
control.send_state = TcpSocketState::Close;
}
if let Some(old_waker) = control.send_waker.replace(cx.waker().clone()) {
if !old_waker.will_wake(cx.waker()) {
old_waker.wake();
}
}
self.notify.notify_one();
Poll::Pending
}
}

155
netstack-smoltcp/src/udp.rs Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,155 @@
use std::{
net::SocketAddr,
pin::Pin,
task::{Context, Poll},
};
use etherparse::PacketBuilder;
use futures::{ready, Sink, SinkExt, Stream};
use smoltcp::wire::UdpPacket;
use tokio::sync::mpsc::{Receiver, Sender};
use tokio_util::sync::PollSender;
use tracing::{error, trace};
use crate::packet::{AnyIpPktFrame, IpPacket};
pub type UdpMsg = (
Vec<u8>, /* payload */
SocketAddr, /* local */
SocketAddr, /* remote */
);
pub struct UdpSocket {
udp_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>,
stack_tx: PollSender<AnyIpPktFrame>,
}
impl UdpSocket {
pub(super) fn new(udp_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>, stack_tx: Sender<AnyIpPktFrame>) -> Self {
Self {
udp_rx,
stack_tx: PollSender::new(stack_tx),
}
}
pub fn split(self) -> (ReadHalf, WriteHalf) {
(
ReadHalf {
udp_rx: self.udp_rx,
},
WriteHalf {
stack_tx: self.stack_tx,
},
)
}
}
pub struct ReadHalf {
udp_rx: Receiver<AnyIpPktFrame>,
}
pub struct WriteHalf {
stack_tx: PollSender<AnyIpPktFrame>,
}
impl Stream for ReadHalf {
type Item = UdpMsg;
fn poll_next(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context) -> Poll<Option<Self::Item>> {
loop {
match ready!(self.udp_rx.poll_recv(cx)) {
Some(frame) => {
let packet = match IpPacket::new_checked(frame.as_slice()) {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(err) => {
error!("invalid IP packet: {}", err);
continue;
}
};
let src_ip = packet.src_addr();
let dst_ip = packet.dst_addr();
let payload = packet.payload();
let packet = match UdpPacket::new_checked(payload) {
Ok(p) => p,
Err(err) => {
error!("invalid err: {err}, src_ip: {src_ip}, dst_ip: {dst_ip}, payload: {payload:?}");
continue;
}
};
let src_port = packet.src_port();
let dst_port = packet.dst_port();
let src_addr = SocketAddr::new(src_ip, src_port);
let dst_addr = SocketAddr::new(dst_ip, dst_port);
trace!("created UDP socket for {} <-> {}", src_addr, dst_addr);
return Poll::Ready(Some((packet.payload().to_vec(), src_addr, dst_addr)));
}
None => return Poll::Ready(None),
}
}
}
}
impl Sink<UdpMsg> for WriteHalf {
type Error = std::io::Error;
fn poll_ready(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
match ready!(self.stack_tx.poll_ready_unpin(cx)) {
Ok(()) => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
Err(err) => Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::other(err))),
}
}
fn start_send(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, item: UdpMsg) -> Result<(), Self::Error> {
use std::io::{Error, ErrorKind::InvalidData};
let (data, src_addr, dst_addr) = item;
if data.is_empty() {
return Ok(());
}
let builder = match (src_addr, dst_addr) {
(SocketAddr::V4(src), SocketAddr::V4(dst)) => {
PacketBuilder::ipv4(src.ip().octets(), dst.ip().octets(), 20)
.udp(src_addr.port(), dst_addr.port())
}
(SocketAddr::V6(src), SocketAddr::V6(dst)) => {
PacketBuilder::ipv6(src.ip().octets(), dst.ip().octets(), 20)
.udp(src_addr.port(), dst_addr.port())
}
_ => {
return Err(Error::new(InvalidData, "src or destination type unmatch"));
}
};
let mut ip_packet_writer = Vec::with_capacity(builder.size(data.len()));
builder
.write(&mut ip_packet_writer, &data)
.map_err(|err| Error::other(format!("PacketBuilder::write: {err}")))?;
match self.stack_tx.start_send_unpin(ip_packet_writer) {
Ok(()) => Ok(()),
Err(err) => Err(Error::other(format!("send error: {err}"))),
}
}
fn poll_flush(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
use std::io::Error;
match ready!(self.stack_tx.poll_flush_unpin(cx)) {
Ok(()) => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
Err(err) => Poll::Ready(Err(Error::other(format!("flush error: {err}")))),
}
}
fn poll_close(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut Context<'_>) -> Poll<Result<(), Self::Error>> {
use std::io::Error;
match ready!(self.stack_tx.poll_close_unpin(cx)) {
Ok(()) => Poll::Ready(Ok(())),
Err(err) => Poll::Ready(Err(Error::other(format!("close error: {err}")))),
}
}
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
//! Regression tests that reproduce the bugs found in the static analysis.
use std::time::Duration;
use etherparse::{IpNumber, Ipv4Header, UdpHeader};
use futures::SinkExt;
use tokio::time::timeout;
use netstack_smoltcp::StackBuilder;
fn make_udp_ipv4(
src_ip: [u8; 4],
src_port: u16,
dst_ip: [u8; 4],
dst_port: u16,
payload: &[u8],
) -> Vec<u8> {
let udp_hdr = UdpHeader::with_ipv4_checksum(
src_port,
dst_port,
&Ipv4Header::new(
(UdpHeader::LEN + payload.len()) as u16,
64,
IpNumber::UDP,
src_ip,
dst_ip,
)
.unwrap(),
payload,
)
.unwrap();
let ip_hdr = Ipv4Header::new(
(UdpHeader::LEN + payload.len()) as u16,
64,
IpNumber::UDP,
src_ip,
dst_ip,
)
.unwrap();
let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(Ipv4Header::MIN_LEN + UdpHeader::LEN + payload.len());
ip_hdr.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
udp_hdr.write(&mut buf).unwrap();
buf.extend_from_slice(payload);
buf
}
/// before(include) a15e0b72bfc72cb032e67138070da01e325d66f8
/// sink_buf is used in `Stack` to hold a slot for sending any pkt
///
/// the original assumption is that the `poll_ready` -> `start_send` -> `poll_flush`
/// are called sequentially so the slot could be reused and will never get blocked.
///
/// but once the user calls `send_all` on `Stack`, which will not immediate flush the pkt(call `poll_flush`),
/// then `sink_buf` is could be Some(pkt), then it will trigger `Poll::Pending` branch in `Stack::poll_ready`,
/// who did not register the waker correctly, so it will got hanged forever.
#[tokio::test(flavor = "current_thread")]
async fn bug1_poll_ready_waker_registered_via_send_all() {
let (mut stack, _runner, _udp_socket, _tcp) = StackBuilder::default()
.enable_udp(true)
.udp_buffer_size(64)
.stack_buffer_size(64)
.build()
.unwrap();
let pkt1 = make_udp_ipv4([1, 2, 3, 4], 1111, [5, 6, 7, 8], 9999, b"first");
let pkt2 = make_udp_ipv4([1, 2, 3, 4], 1111, [5, 6, 7, 8], 9999, b"second");
let mut stream = futures::stream::iter([Ok(pkt1), Ok(pkt2)]);
let result = timeout(Duration::from_secs(1), stack.send_all(&mut stream)).await;
// should be ok after the fix
assert!(result.is_ok());
}

View File

@ -29,4 +29,7 @@ tun = { version = "0.8.9", features = ["async"] }
netstack-smoltcp = "0.2.2"
futures = "0.3.32"
libc = "0.2.186"
x25519-dalek = "2.0.1"
chacha20poly1305.workspace = true
hex = "0.4.3"
winapi = { version = "0.3.9", features = ["iphlpapi", "tcpmib", "processthreadsapi", "psapi", "handleapi", "winerror", "minwindef", "winnt", "iptypes", "ws2def"] }

View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
fn main() {
let socket = std::net::UdpSocket::bind("0.0.0.0:0").unwrap();
let port = socket.local_addr().unwrap().port();
println!("Bound UDP to port {}", port);
if let Some(name) = ostp_client::tunnel::process_lookup::get_process_name_from_port_udp(port) {
println!("Found process for UDP port {}: {}", port, name);
} else {
println!("Process not found for UDP port {}", port);
}
let tcp_socket = std::net::TcpListener::bind("0.0.0.0:0").unwrap();
let tcp_port = tcp_socket.local_addr().unwrap().port();
println!("Bound TCP to port {}", tcp_port);
if let Some(name) = ostp_client::tunnel::process_lookup::get_process_name_from_port(tcp_port) {
println!("Found process for TCP port {}: {}", tcp_port, name);
} else {
println!("Process not found for TCP port {}", tcp_port);
}
}

View File

@ -10,25 +10,12 @@ use ostp_core::{NoiseRole, OstpEvent, PaddingStrategy, ProtocolAction, ProtocolC
use rand::Rng;
use tokio::net::UdpSocket;
use tokio::sync::{mpsc, watch};
use tokio::time::{interval, timeout, Instant, MissedTickBehavior};
use tokio::time::{interval, timeout, Instant};
use crate::app::{BridgeCommand, ConnectionStatus, UiEvent};
use crate::config::ClientConfig;
use crate::tunnel::{ProxyEvent, ProxyToClientMsg};
/// Per-address ceiling on the UoT/TCP connect attempt. Long enough that a
/// genuinely slow mobile path still completes its handshake, short enough that
/// a blackholed address (typically IPv6 advertised without a working route)
/// costs seconds instead of the kernel's full SYN-retry budget before the next
/// candidate address is tried.
const UOT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(4);
/// How long to keep retrying a resume-triggered reconnect before handing the
/// problem back to the ordinary stall path. That path is what releases the
/// system proxy, so this is really a bound on how long the machine may be left
/// with no working internet at all after waking.
const RESUME_RECONNECT_GIVE_UP: Duration = Duration::from_secs(45);
static SOCKET_PROTECTOR: std::sync::OnceLock<Box<dyn Fn(i32) -> bool + Send + Sync>> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
pub fn set_socket_protector<F>(f: F)
@ -59,56 +46,6 @@ async fn send_datagram(socket: &crate::transport::Transport, frame: &Bytes, _web
struct SessionState {
socket: crate::transport::Transport,
machine: ProtocolMachine,
/// Handle to this session's spawned receiver task. Held so the task is
/// aborted when the session is dropped (e.g. replaced on reconnect).
/// Otherwise, on a dead connection the task blocks forever in recv() while
/// keeping the old socket alive — leaking a task + socket on every
/// reconnect, which piles up across sleep/resume cycles.
rx_task: tokio::task::AbortHandle,
}
impl Drop for SessionState {
fn drop(&mut self) {
self.rx_task.abort();
}
}
/// Spawn the per-session receiver loop that reads inbound datagrams from the
/// transport and forwards them to the bridge, returning an AbortHandle so the
/// task is torn down when its `SessionState` is dropped. Consolidates the three
/// previously-duplicated inline copies (initial connect, network-change, and
/// keepalive reconnect).
fn spawn_session_receiver(
socket: crate::transport::Transport,
session_index: usize,
udp_tx: mpsc::Sender<(usize, Bytes)>,
) -> tokio::task::AbortHandle {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0_u8; 65535];
let is_uot = matches!(socket, crate::transport::Transport::Uot { .. });
loop {
match socket.recv(&mut buf).await {
Ok(n) => {
let inbound = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
if udp_tx.send((session_index, inbound)).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Err(e) => {
if is_uot {
// TCP transport is dead; exit so the bridge sees the
// channel close and reconnects.
tracing::debug!("UoT session {} disconnected: {}", session_index, e);
break;
} else {
tracing::warn!("UDP socket recv error (session {}): {}", session_index, e);
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
}
}
}
})
.abort_handle()
}
pub struct Bridge {
@ -128,11 +65,8 @@ pub struct Bridge {
pub mux_sessions: usize,
pub transport_mode: String,
pub tcp_fragmentation: bool,
pub frag_chunk: usize,
pub frag_sleep: u64,
pub junk_pc: [usize; 2],
pub junk_ps: [usize; 2],
pub stealth_sni: String,
pub wss: bool,
pub mtu: usize,
pub kill_switch: bool,
pub reload_tx: Option<watch::Sender<crate::config::ExclusionConfig>>,
@ -143,21 +77,6 @@ pub struct Bridge {
last_rtt_ms: f64,
last_sample_at: Instant,
last_valid_recv: Instant,
/// Set when a suspend/resume is detected, cleared once a reconnect actually
/// succeeds. Waking is precisely when the network is least likely to be
/// ready — Wi-Fi has not reassociated yet — so a single attempt fired
/// milliseconds after resume usually fails, and a one-shot forced reconnect
/// then fell back to the ordinary 25s stall heuristic. That heuristic keys
/// off a monotonic clock which does not advance while the machine is
/// asleep, so it could take a further 25s of real uptime to fire, or not
/// fire at all. Retrying until success removes the dependency on either.
forced_reconnect_pending: bool,
last_forced_reconnect_try: Instant,
/// Wall-clock start of the current resume-reconnect campaign, used to bound
/// it. Wall clock rather than Instant because the monotonic clock does not
/// advance across suspend on Windows, so it cannot measure anything that
/// begins at wake.
forced_reconnect_started: Option<SystemTime>,
}
impl Bridge {
@ -179,11 +98,8 @@ impl Bridge {
mux_sessions: config.multiplex.sessions.max(1),
transport_mode: config.transport.mode.clone(),
tcp_fragmentation: config.transport.tcp_fragmentation,
frag_chunk: config.transport.frag_chunk,
frag_sleep: config.transport.frag_sleep,
junk_pc: config.transport.junk_pc,
junk_ps: config.transport.junk_ps,
stealth_sni: config.transport.stealth_sni.clone(),
wss: config.transport.wss,
mtu: config.ostp.mtu,
kill_switch: config.kill_switch,
reload_tx: None,
@ -194,9 +110,6 @@ impl Bridge {
last_rtt_ms: 0.0,
last_sample_at: Instant::now(),
last_valid_recv: Instant::now(),
forced_reconnect_pending: false,
last_forced_reconnect_try: Instant::now(),
forced_reconnect_started: None,
})
}
@ -212,21 +125,6 @@ impl Bridge {
let mut metrics_tick = interval(Duration::from_millis(500));
let mut keepalive_tick = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_secs(self.keepalive_interval_sec.max(1)));
let mut retransmit_tick = tokio::time::interval(Duration::from_millis(10));
// CRITICAL for suspend/resume: the default MissedTickBehavior is `Burst`,
// which after a laptop sleep or a phone backgrounding the app fires ALL
// the ticks that "should" have happened during the gap back-to-back. For
// the 10ms retransmit tick that is tens of thousands of instant ticks on
// resume — a CPU storm that hangs the bridge and manifests as the app
// freezing or getting stuck "Connecting". Skip missed ticks instead.
metrics_tick.set_missed_tick_behavior(MissedTickBehavior::Skip);
keepalive_tick.set_missed_tick_behavior(MissedTickBehavior::Skip);
retransmit_tick.set_missed_tick_behavior(MissedTickBehavior::Skip);
// Wall-clock anchor for suspend/resume detection. tokio's timers run on a
// monotonic clock; comparing it against wall-clock lets us notice that
// the machine slept (or the app was frozen in the background) and force
// one clean reconnect instead of trying to resume a long-dead session.
let mut last_wall_check = SystemTime::now();
let init_msg = if self.mode == "tun" {
"Bridge initialized (TUN mode)".to_string()
} else {
@ -246,8 +144,7 @@ impl Bridge {
if *shutdown.borrow() {
self.running = false;
self.metrics.connection_state.store(0, Ordering::Relaxed);
#[allow(unused_assignments)]
{ proxy_guard = None; }
proxy_guard = None;
stream_map.clear();
self.reset_proxy_streams(&tx, &proxy_tx, "manual stop");
break;
@ -262,89 +159,18 @@ impl Bridge {
self.handle_inbound_udp(udp_msg, &mut sessions_opt, &mut udp_rx_opt, &mut proxy_guard, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx).await;
}
cmd = bridge_rx.recv() => {
if !self.handle_bridge_cmd(cmd, &mut bridge_rx, &mut sessions_opt, &mut udp_rx_opt, &mut proxy_guard, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx).await {
if !self.handle_bridge_cmd(cmd, &mut sessions_opt, &mut udp_rx_opt, &mut proxy_guard, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx).await {
break;
}
}
_ = metrics_tick.tick() => {
// Suspend/resume detection: the wall clock jumps forward on
// wake even when the monotonic timer clock does not, so a
// large gap here means the machine slept / the app was frozen.
// The session is almost certainly dead (the server evicts
// idle sessions after 10 min), so force one clean reconnect
// rather than waiting on stale-session heuristics.
let wall_gap = last_wall_check.elapsed().unwrap_or_default();
last_wall_check = SystemTime::now();
if self.running && wall_gap > Duration::from_secs(15) {
let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log(format!(
"Resumed after ~{}s suspend — forcing clean reconnect", wall_gap.as_secs()
))).await;
self.forced_reconnect_pending = true;
self.forced_reconnect_started = Some(SystemTime::now());
self.last_forced_reconnect_try = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(60);
}
// Give up if resume reconnects keep failing. Retrying forever
// looks harmless but is not: the system proxy stays pointed at
// our local listener the whole time, so the machine has NO
// working internet — not merely no tunnel — while the UI sits
// on "connecting". Handing the retry to the ordinary keepalive
// path restores the proxy through its hard-timeout branch,
// which force=true deliberately skips.
//
// Measured on the wall clock: Instant does not advance across
// suspend on Windows (QPC stops), so a monotonic deadline can
// not bound anything that starts at wake.
if self.forced_reconnect_pending {
let pending_for = self
.forced_reconnect_started
.and_then(|t| t.elapsed().ok())
.unwrap_or_default();
if pending_for > RESUME_RECONNECT_GIVE_UP {
self.forced_reconnect_pending = false;
self.forced_reconnect_started = None;
let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log(format!(
"Reconnect after suspend failed for {}s — releasing the system \
proxy so normal traffic works; will keep retrying in the \
background",
pending_for.as_secs()
))).await;
// Make the ordinary stall path fire on the next
// keepalive tick: it is the one that tears the proxy
// back down (or, with kill switch on, deliberately
// keeps blocking).
self.last_valid_recv = Instant::now()
.checked_sub(Duration::from_secs(3600))
.unwrap_or_else(Instant::now);
}
}
// Keep retrying a resume-triggered reconnect until one lands.
// The first attempt fires within half a second of waking, when
// the NIC is typically still reassociating, so treating it as
// one-shot left the tunnel dead until some other timer noticed.
if self.running
&& self.forced_reconnect_pending
&& self.last_forced_reconnect_try.elapsed() >= Duration::from_secs(3)
{
self.last_forced_reconnect_try = Instant::now();
self.handle_keepalive(true, &mut sessions_opt, &mut udp_rx_opt, &mut proxy_guard, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx, &mut proxy_rx).await;
// handle_keepalive refreshes last_valid_recv only when a
// session was actually established, so this is a real
// success check rather than "we tried".
if self.last_valid_recv.elapsed() < Duration::from_secs(3) {
self.forced_reconnect_pending = false;
self.forced_reconnect_started = None;
let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log("Reconnected after suspend".into())).await;
}
}
if self.running {
self.emit_metrics(&tx).await;
}
}
_ = keepalive_tick.tick() => {
if self.running {
self.handle_keepalive(false, &mut sessions_opt, &mut udp_rx_opt, &mut proxy_guard, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx, &mut proxy_rx).await;
self.handle_keepalive(&mut sessions_opt, &mut udp_rx_opt, &mut proxy_guard, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx, &mut proxy_rx).await;
}
}
_ = retransmit_tick.tick() => {
@ -353,20 +179,7 @@ impl Bridge {
}
}
proxy_ev = proxy_rx.recv(), if self.running && sessions_opt.as_ref().map(|s| {
// Upper bound matches MAX_CWND_PACKETS in ostp-core's congestion
// controller. The old 16384 ceiling let ~20 MB sit in flight,
// which on a mobile uplink is minutes of buffered queue rather
// than throughput — the app kept handing over data long after
// the path had stopped draining it.
// Two independent gates. cwnd bounds how much may be in
// flight; pacing bounds how FAST it is released. Without the
// second, a full window goes out back-to-back and lands in
// the bottleneck's buffer as standing queue rather than
// throughput — the thing that produced multi-second RTT.
s.iter().any(|ses| {
ses.machine.in_flight_count() < ses.machine.cwnd_packets().clamp(16, 1024)
&& ses.machine.can_pace_packet()
})
s.iter().any(|ses| ses.machine.in_flight_count() < ses.machine.cwnd_packets().clamp(16, 16384))
}).unwrap_or(true) => {
self.handle_proxy_event(proxy_ev, &mut sessions_opt, &mut stream_map, &tx, &proxy_tx).await;
}
@ -382,15 +195,15 @@ impl Bridge {
udp_msg: Option<(usize, Bytes)>,
sessions_opt: &mut Option<Vec<SessionState>>,
udp_rx_opt: &mut Option<mpsc::Receiver<(usize, Bytes)>>,
_proxy_guard: &mut Option<crate::sysproxy::SystemProxyGuard>,
proxy_guard: &mut Option<crate::sysproxy::SystemProxyGuard>,
stream_map: &mut std::collections::HashMap<u16, usize>,
tx: &mpsc::Sender<UiEvent>,
proxy_tx: &mpsc::UnboundedSender<(u16, ProxyToClientMsg)>,
) {
match udp_msg {
Some((session_index, inbound)) => {
// Raw byte counter — every datagram that reached the socket counts.
self.metrics.bytes_recv.fetch_add(inbound.len() as u64, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_valid_recv = Instant::now();
if let Some(sessions) = sessions_opt.as_mut() {
if session_index < sessions.len() {
let session = &mut sessions[session_index];
@ -403,22 +216,6 @@ impl Bridge {
}
};
// Only NOW, after the datagram actually authenticated and
// decrypted, does it count as a sign of life. This used to
// be set above, before any validation — so a datagram that
// failed to decrypt still reset the stall detector on its
// way to the `return` above. Anything arriving at this port
// (frames from a session the server already evicted, stale
// retransmits, or plain garbage from an off-path source that
// knows the ip:port) kept the client convinced the tunnel
// was healthy: the 25s background reconnect in
// handle_keepalive never fired and the tunnel sat dead at
// 0 b/s until the user reconnected by hand. It also made
// `is_healthy` (see emit_metrics) lie in the UI, and handed
// any off-path sender a trivial way to pin a client in a
// dead session indefinitely.
self.last_valid_recv = Instant::now();
let mut actions_queue = std::collections::VecDeque::new();
actions_queue.push_back(initial_action);
@ -491,7 +288,6 @@ impl Bridge {
async fn handle_bridge_cmd(
&mut self,
cmd: Option<BridgeCommand>,
bridge_rx: &mut mpsc::Receiver<BridgeCommand>,
sessions_opt: &mut Option<Vec<SessionState>>,
udp_rx_opt: &mut Option<mpsc::Receiver<(usize, Bytes)>>,
proxy_guard: &mut Option<crate::sysproxy::SystemProxyGuard>,
@ -518,7 +314,7 @@ impl Bridge {
self.metrics.connection_state.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let session_count = if self.mux_enabled { self.mux_sessions.max(1) } else { 1 };
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = mpsc::channel(1024);
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = mpsc::channel(100000);
let mut sessions = Vec::with_capacity(session_count);
let mut rtt_sum = 0.0;
let mut successful_sessions = 0;
@ -528,9 +324,35 @@ impl Bridge {
match self.perform_handshake_with_id(&tx, session_id).await {
Ok((sock, mach, rtt)) => {
let session_index = sessions.len();
let rx_task = spawn_session_receiver(sock.clone(), session_index, udp_tx.clone());
let socket_clone = sock.clone();
let udp_tx_clone = udp_tx.clone();
sessions.push(SessionState { socket: sock, machine: mach, rx_task });
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0_u8; 65535];
let is_uot = matches!(socket_clone, crate::transport::Transport::Uot { .. });
loop {
match socket_clone.recv(&mut buf).await {
Ok(n) => {
let inbound = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
if udp_tx_clone.send((session_index, inbound)).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Err(e) => {
if is_uot {
// TCP is dead — drop sender to signal bridge via channel close
tracing::warn!("UoT session {} disconnected: {}", session_index, e);
break;
} else {
tracing::warn!("UDP socket recv error (session {}): {}", session_index, e);
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
}
}
}
});
sessions.push(SessionState { socket: sock, machine: mach });
rtt_sum += rtt;
successful_sessions += 1;
}
@ -583,39 +405,13 @@ impl Bridge {
tx.send(UiEvent::Log(format!("Obfuscation profile switched to {:?}", self.profile))).await.ok();
}
Some(BridgeCommand::NetworkChanged) => {
// A real network handoff (Wi-Fi <-> cellular) commonly fires
// onLost + onAvailable within milliseconds of each other on
// Android, queuing several NetworkChanged commands back to
// back. Each reconnect below is a full sequential handshake
// (up to ~1.2s x 4 attempts x mux_sessions) run synchronously
// in this select-loop iteration, so without coalescing, the
// first attempt often races the OS's own network switch and
// fails on the now-dead interface, then the SECOND queued
// NetworkChanged only starts its own full reconnect after
// that first one finishes - multiplying a sub-second handoff
// into many seconds of extra outage. Drain same-kind repeats
// so a burst collapses into one reconnect on the freshest
// signal; a different command found while draining is
// handled immediately rather than dropped.
while let Ok(next) = bridge_rx.try_recv() {
if !matches!(next, BridgeCommand::NetworkChanged) {
let more = Box::pin(self.handle_bridge_cmd(
Some(next), bridge_rx, sessions_opt, udp_rx_opt, proxy_guard, stream_map, tx, proxy_tx,
)).await;
if !more {
return false;
}
break;
}
}
if self.running {
let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log("Network changed — starting immediate reconnect".to_string())).await;
self.metrics.connection_state.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
self.last_valid_recv = Instant::now() - Duration::from_secs(100);
let session_count = if self.mux_enabled { self.mux_sessions.max(1) } else { 1 };
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = mpsc::channel(1024);
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = mpsc::channel(100000);
let mut new_sessions = Vec::with_capacity(session_count);
let mut successful_sessions = 0;
let mut rtt_sum = 0.0;
@ -625,8 +421,31 @@ impl Bridge {
match self.perform_handshake_with_id(&tx, session_id).await {
Ok((sock, mach, rtt)) => {
let session_index = new_sessions.len();
let rx_task = spawn_session_receiver(sock.clone(), session_index, udp_tx.clone());
new_sessions.push(SessionState { socket: sock, machine: mach, rx_task });
let socket_clone = sock.clone();
let udp_tx_clone = udp_tx.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0_u8; 65535];
let is_uot = matches!(socket_clone, crate::transport::Transport::Uot { .. });
loop {
match socket_clone.recv(&mut buf).await {
Ok(n) => {
let inbound = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
if udp_tx_clone.send((session_index, inbound)).await.is_err() { break; }
}
Err(e) => {
if is_uot {
tracing::warn!("UoT network-change session {} disconnected: {}", session_index, e);
break;
} else {
tracing::warn!("UDP recv error (network-change session {}): {}", session_index, e);
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
}
}
}
});
new_sessions.push(SessionState { socket: sock, machine: mach });
rtt_sum += rtt;
successful_sessions += 1;
}
@ -697,7 +516,6 @@ impl Bridge {
async fn handle_keepalive(
&mut self,
force: bool,
sessions_opt: &mut Option<Vec<SessionState>>,
udp_rx_opt: &mut Option<mpsc::Receiver<(usize, Bytes)>>,
proxy_guard: &mut Option<crate::sysproxy::SystemProxyGuard>,
@ -706,12 +524,9 @@ impl Bridge {
proxy_tx: &mpsc::UnboundedSender<(u16, ProxyToClientMsg)>,
proxy_rx: &mut mpsc::Receiver<ProxyEvent>,
) {
if force || self.last_valid_recv.elapsed().as_secs() > 25 {
if self.last_valid_recv.elapsed().as_secs() > 25 {
let elapsed = self.last_valid_recv.elapsed().as_secs();
// On a forced (post-resume) reconnect the monotonic clock may not
// have advanced, so `elapsed` can be small — never treat a forced
// reconnect as a hard timeout; we specifically want to re-establish.
if !force && elapsed > 180 {
if elapsed > 180 {
if self.kill_switch {
let _ = tx.send(UiEvent::Log(format!("Connection stall ({}s). Kill Switch is ON, retrying reconnect indefinitely...", elapsed))).await;
} else {
@ -732,7 +547,7 @@ impl Bridge {
self.metrics.connection_state.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
let session_count = if self.mux_enabled { self.mux_sessions.max(1) } else { 1 };
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = mpsc::channel(1024);
let (udp_tx, udp_rx) = mpsc::channel(100000);
let mut new_sessions = Vec::with_capacity(session_count);
let mut successful_sessions = 0;
let mut rtt_sum = 0.0;
@ -742,9 +557,34 @@ impl Bridge {
match self.perform_handshake_with_id(&tx, session_id).await {
Ok((sock, mach, rtt)) => {
let session_index = new_sessions.len();
let rx_task = spawn_session_receiver(sock.clone(), session_index, udp_tx.clone());
let socket_clone = sock.clone();
let udp_tx_clone = udp_tx.clone();
new_sessions.push(SessionState { socket: sock, machine: mach, rx_task });
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0_u8; 65535];
let is_uot = matches!(socket_clone, crate::transport::Transport::Uot { .. });
loop {
match socket_clone.recv(&mut buf).await {
Ok(n) => {
let inbound = Bytes::copy_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
if udp_tx_clone.send((session_index, inbound)).await.is_err() {
break;
}
}
Err(e) => {
if is_uot {
tracing::warn!("UoT reconnect session {} disconnected: {}", session_index, e);
break;
} else {
tracing::warn!("UDP socket recv error (reconnect session {}): {}", session_index, e);
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(50)).await;
}
}
}
}
});
new_sessions.push(SessionState { socket: sock, machine: mach });
rtt_sum += rtt;
successful_sessions += 1;
}
@ -1020,21 +860,7 @@ impl Bridge {
Ok(addrs) => addrs.collect(),
Err(e) => return Err(anyhow::anyhow!("failed to resolve server address {}: {}", self.server_addr, e)),
};
// IPv4 first. Addresses are tried strictly in order, each burning its
// full retry budget before the next is touched, so this ordering decides
// how long a bad family stalls the whole connect. Mobile carriers
// routinely hand out IPv6 with no working route and BLACKHOLE it rather
// than rejecting, so every IPv6 candidate costs the full timeout budget
// — with several AAAA records the working IPv4 address was not reached
// for tens of seconds. (The same ordering bug was already fixed on the
// server's outbound path and in the UoT connect.)
resolved_addrs.sort_by_key(|addr| if addr.is_ipv6() { 1 } else { 0 });
// NAT64 is a fallback for IPv6-only networks. Retrying it per failing
// address multiplied an already-long connect: each attempt re-runs a DNS
// lookup and another full round of handshake retries, for a path that
// either works for the whole network or for none of it.
let mut nat64_attempted = false;
resolved_addrs.sort_by_key(|addr| if addr.is_ipv6() { 0 } else { 1 });
let mut last_err = anyhow::anyhow!("no IP addresses resolved for {}", self.server_addr);
@ -1047,8 +873,7 @@ impl Bridge {
let socket = match self.try_connect_transport(target_ip, port).await {
Ok(sock) => sock,
Err(e) => {
if let (std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4), false) = (target_ip, nat64_attempted) {
nat64_attempted = true;
if let std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4) = target_ip {
tx.send(UiEvent::Log(format!("Direct IPv4 connection failed: {}. Trying NAT64 fallback...", e))).await.ok();
let nat64_ipv6 = synthesize_nat64(ipv4).await;
match self.try_connect_transport(std::net::IpAddr::V6(nat64_ipv6), port).await {
@ -1129,8 +954,7 @@ impl Bridge {
let (final_socket, size) = if success {
(socket, size)
} else {
if let (std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4), false) = (target_ip, nat64_attempted) {
nat64_attempted = true;
if let std::net::IpAddr::V4(ipv4) = target_ip {
tx.send(UiEvent::Log("Direct IPv4 handshake timed out. Trying NAT64 fallback...".to_string())).await.ok();
let nat64_ipv6 = synthesize_nat64(ipv4).await;
match self.try_connect_transport(std::net::IpAddr::V6(nat64_ipv6), port).await {
@ -1200,11 +1024,8 @@ impl Bridge {
self.mux_enabled = cfg.multiplex.enabled;
self.mux_sessions = cfg.multiplex.sessions.max(1);
self.transport_mode = cfg.transport.mode.clone();
self.tcp_fragmentation = cfg.transport.tcp_fragmentation;
self.frag_chunk = cfg.transport.frag_chunk.max(1);
self.frag_sleep = cfg.transport.frag_sleep;
self.junk_pc = cfg.transport.junk_pc;
self.junk_ps = cfg.transport.junk_ps;
self.stealth_sni = cfg.transport.stealth_sni.clone();
self.wss = cfg.transport.wss; // Fix: wss was not updated on hot-reload
self.mtu = cfg.ostp.mtu;
self.keepalive_interval_sec = cfg.ostp.keepalive_interval_sec;
self.kill_switch = cfg.kill_switch;
@ -1217,105 +1038,21 @@ impl Bridge {
) -> Result<crate::transport::Transport> {
let mode = self.transport_mode.to_lowercase();
if mode == "uot" || mode == "tcp" {
// Bound the TCP connect. Without this it inherits the kernel's SYN
// retry budget, which is tens of seconds (and can reach ~2 minutes).
// That is exactly what made UoT appear to hang on mobile: callers
// resolve every address for the server and try IPv6 first (see the
// sort in perform_handshake_with_id), and a mobile network that
// advertises IPv6 without a working route blackholes the SYN rather
// than rejecting it — so the client sat through the full retry
// budget before it ever reached the IPv4 address that would have
// connected immediately. UDP never showed this because connect() on
// a UDP socket only sets the default peer and returns at once.
let stream = tokio::time::timeout(
UOT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT,
tokio::net::TcpStream::connect((target_ip, port)),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| {
anyhow::anyhow!(
"TCP connect to {target_ip}:{port} timed out after {:?}",
UOT_CONNECT_TIMEOUT
)
})??;
let stream = tokio::net::TcpStream::connect((target_ip, port)).await?;
let _ = stream.set_nodelay(true);
let (mut read_half, mut write_half) = stream.into_split();
let tcp_fragmentation = self.tcp_fragmentation;
let frag_chunk = self.frag_chunk;
let frag_sleep = self.frag_sleep;
let [junk_pc_min, junk_pc_max] = self.junk_pc;
let [junk_ps_min, junk_ps_max] = self.junk_ps;
// Time-rotating per-key junk marker — NOT a global constant and NOT
// even a static per-user value: it changes every window, so junk
// carries no fixed DPI signature on the wire. All frames in this
// burst are sent within milliseconds, so one window applies to all.
let junk_marker = ostp_core::crypto::derive_junk_marker(
&self.access_key,
ostp_core::crypto::current_junk_window(),
);
{
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
// Build all junk frames up front so ThreadRng isn't held across an
// await point (keeps this future Send).
let junk_frames: Vec<Vec<u8>> = {
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
let min_c = junk_pc_min;
let max_c = junk_pc_max.max(min_c);
let num_junk = rng.gen_range(min_c..=max_c);
(0..num_junk)
.map(|_| {
let min_s = junk_ps_min.max(1);
let max_s = junk_ps_max.max(min_s);
let junk_len = rng.gen_range(min_s..=max_s);
let mut frame = Vec::with_capacity(2 + junk_len);
frame.extend_from_slice(&(junk_len as u16).to_be_bytes());
let start = frame.len();
frame.resize(start + junk_len, 0);
rng.fill(&mut frame[start..]);
// Stamp this key's derived junk marker so the server drops it silently.
if junk_len >= 4 {
frame[start..start+4].copy_from_slice(&junk_marker);
}
frame
})
.collect()
};
for frame in junk_frames {
if write_half.write_all(&frame).await.is_err() { break; }
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(5)).await;
}
}
let (tx_out, mut rx_out) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<bytes::Bytes>(1024);
let (tx_in, rx_in) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel::<bytes::Bytes>(1024);
// Writer: length-prefix each frame. With tcp_fragmentation on, split
// the FIRST real frame (the handshake — junk above was written
// directly, so it doesn't count) into tiny TCP segments with short
// gaps so DPI can't reassemble/classify the handshake from one read.
// Task to write from rx_out to tcp stream
tokio::spawn(async move {
use tokio::io::AsyncWriteExt;
let mut first_packet = true;
while let Some(data) = rx_out.recv().await {
let len_buf = (data.len() as u16).to_be_bytes();
if first_packet && tcp_fragmentation {
first_packet = false;
if write_half.write_all(&len_buf[0..1]).await.is_err() { break; }
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(5)).await;
if write_half.write_all(&len_buf[1..2]).await.is_err() { break; }
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(5)).await;
let mut broke = false;
for chunk in data.chunks(frag_chunk) {
if write_half.write_all(chunk).await.is_err() { broke = true; break; }
tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(frag_sleep)).await;
}
if broke { break; }
} else {
if write_half.write_all(&len_buf).await.is_err() { break; }
if write_half.write_all(&data).await.is_err() { break; }
}
let mut len_buf = [0u8; 2];
len_buf.copy_from_slice(&(data.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
if write_half.write_all(&len_buf).await.is_err() { break; }
if write_half.write_all(&data).await.is_err() { break; }
}
});
@ -1374,19 +1111,8 @@ fn next_profile(current: TrafficProfile) -> TrafficProfile {
}
async fn synthesize_nat64(ip: std::net::Ipv4Addr) -> std::net::Ipv6Addr {
// Well-known prefix (RFC 6052), used if discovery doesn't answer in time.
let mut prefix = [0x00, 0x64, 0xff, 0x9b, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0];
// Bound the discovery lookup. This runs on exactly the networks that are
// already misbehaving, where the resolver can hang for tens of seconds
// before giving up — unbounded, it was a large part of why connecting over
// a broken mobile network took minutes. Falling back to the well-known
// prefix is strictly better than waiting.
let discovery = tokio::time::timeout(
Duration::from_secs(2),
tokio::net::lookup_host("ipv4only.arpa:80"),
)
.await;
if let Ok(Ok(addrs)) = discovery {
if let Ok(addrs) = tokio::net::lookup_host("ipv4only.arpa:80").await {
for addr in addrs {
if let std::net::SocketAddr::V6(v6) = addr {
let octets = v6.ip().octets();

View File

@ -70,45 +70,28 @@ pub struct LocalProxyConfig {
}
/// Transport layer configuration.
/// `mode` = "udp" (default) or "uot" (UDP over TCP, no protocol mimicry —
/// zapret-like: no recognizable header at all, not a fake TLS/HTTP shell).
/// `mode` = "udp" (default) or "uot" (UDP over TCP with xHTTP stealth).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TransportConfig {
/// "udp" or "uot"
#[serde(default = "default_transport_mode")]
pub mode: String,
/// Split the first UoT/TCP packet (handshake) into tiny TCP segments to
/// break DPI that inspects the first packet. UoT/TCP only; ignored for UDP.
pub tcp_fragmentation: bool,
/// TCP chunk size (bytes)
#[serde(default = "default_frag_chunk")]
pub frag_chunk: usize,
/// TCP sleep duration between chunks (ms)
#[serde(default = "default_frag_sleep")]
pub frag_sleep: u64,
/// [min, max] junk packet count
#[serde(default = "default_junk_count")]
pub junk_pc: [usize; 2],
/// [min, max] junk packet size in bytes
#[serde(default = "default_junk_size")]
pub junk_ps: [usize; 2],
/// TLS SNI and HTTP Host for stealth routing
#[serde(default)]
pub stealth_sni: String,
/// Enable strict RFC 6455 WebSocket framing
#[serde(default)]
pub wss: bool,
}
fn default_transport_mode() -> String { "udp".to_string() }
fn default_frag_chunk() -> usize { 2 }
fn default_frag_sleep() -> u64 { 2 }
fn default_junk_count() -> [usize; 2] { [2, 5] }
fn default_junk_size() -> [usize; 2] { [100, 1000] }
impl Default for TransportConfig {
fn default() -> Self {
Self {
mode: default_transport_mode(),
tcp_fragmentation: false,
frag_chunk: default_frag_chunk(),
frag_sleep: default_frag_sleep(),
junk_pc: default_junk_count(),
junk_ps: default_junk_size(),
stealth_sni: String::new(),
wss: false,
}
}
}
@ -189,11 +172,8 @@ struct RawUnifiedConfig {
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct RawTransportSection {
mode: Option<String>,
tcp_fragmentation: Option<bool>,
frag_chunk: Option<usize>,
frag_sleep: Option<u64>,
junk_pc: Option<[usize; 2]>,
junk_ps: Option<[usize; 2]>,
stealth_sni: Option<String>,
wss: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
@ -266,11 +246,8 @@ impl ClientConfig {
},
transport: TransportConfig {
mode: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.mode.clone()).unwrap_or_else(default_transport_mode),
tcp_fragmentation: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.tcp_fragmentation).unwrap_or(false),
frag_chunk: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.frag_chunk).unwrap_or_else(default_frag_chunk),
frag_sleep: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.frag_sleep).unwrap_or_else(default_frag_sleep),
junk_pc: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.junk_pc).unwrap_or_else(default_junk_count),
junk_ps: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.junk_ps).unwrap_or_else(default_junk_size),
stealth_sni: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.stealth_sni.clone()).unwrap_or_default(),
wss: raw.transport.as_ref().and_then(|t| t.wss).unwrap_or(false),
},
exclusions: ExclusionConfig {
domains: exclusions.domains.unwrap_or_default(),
@ -288,251 +265,3 @@ impl ClientConfig {
})
}
}
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
// On-disk config.json shapes — client, server, and relay.
//
// This is the ONE place these are defined. They used to be declared locally
// inside ostp/src/main.rs (the CLI binary) with no other consumer able to
// see them, which is exactly how ostp-client::migrate ended up working
// against loosely-typed serde_json::Value instead of a real schema, and how
// the CLI, the migrator, and this crate's own hot-reload path could each
// silently drift out of sync with what a config.json actually looks like.
// main.rs now imports these instead of re-declaring them (see the `use
// ostp_client::config::{...}` at its top).
//
// These are DELIBERATELY separate from ClientConfig/OstpConfig/etc. above:
// this section is the friendly, minimal shape a user actually edits by
// hand; the types above are what the running engine needs internally
// (handshake/io timeouts, resolved addresses, ...) and are built FROM one
// of these via the mapping in ostp/src/main.rs::run_client_directly. Only
// `ClientConfig` collides by name with the runtime type above, so the
// on-disk one is `ClientFileConfig` — everything else keeps its natural name.
// ═══════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════════
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "mode", rename_all = "lowercase")]
pub enum AppMode {
Server(ServerConfig),
Client(ClientFileConfig),
Relay(RelayServerConfig),
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct UnifiedConfig {
#[serde(flatten)]
pub mode: AppMode,
pub log_level: Option<String>,
}
impl UnifiedConfig {
pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> {
match &self.mode {
AppMode::Server(cfg) => {
if cfg.access_keys.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("Server configuration must contain at least one access_key.");
}
if let Some(outbound) = &cfg.outbound {
if outbound.enabled {
let action = outbound.default_action.as_deref().unwrap_or("direct");
if action == "direct" && outbound.rules.is_empty() {
println!("\n[WARNING] Server outbound proxy is ENABLED, but default_action is 'direct' and there are no rules!");
println!(" This means ALL traffic will bypass the proxy and go out directly from the server IP.");
println!(" If you want all traffic to be proxied, change 'default_action' to 'proxy'.\n");
}
}
}
}
AppMode::Client(cfg) => {
if cfg.access_key.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("Client configuration must contain an access_key.");
}
}
AppMode::Relay(cfg) => {
if cfg.upstream_tcp.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("Relay configuration must specify upstream_tcp address.");
}
if cfg.upstream_api_url.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!("Relay configuration must specify upstream_api_url.");
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Clone)]
#[serde(untagged)]
pub enum UserConfig {
Detailed {
access_key: String,
name: Option<String>,
limit_bytes: Option<u64>,
},
KeyOnly(String),
}
impl UserConfig {
pub fn key(&self) -> String {
match self {
UserConfig::KeyOnly(k) => k.clone(),
UserConfig::Detailed { access_key, .. } => access_key.clone(),
}
}
pub fn name(&self) -> Option<String> {
match self {
UserConfig::KeyOnly(_) => None,
UserConfig::Detailed { name, .. } => name.clone(),
}
}
pub fn limit(&self) -> Option<u64> {
match self {
UserConfig::KeyOnly(_) => None,
UserConfig::Detailed { limit_bytes, .. } => *limit_bytes,
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct ServerConfig {
pub listen: ListenConfig,
pub access_keys: Vec<UserConfig>,
pub debug: Option<bool>,
pub outbound: Option<OutboundConfig>,
pub api: Option<ApiConfig>,
pub fallback: Option<FallbackCfg>,
pub transport: Option<TransportConfigRaw>,
// Left untyped: ostp-client does not (and should not) depend on
// ostp-server just to name its DnsConfig type. The CLI binary — which
// already depends on both crates — deserializes this into
// ostp_server::dns::DnsConfig right before handing it to run_server().
pub dns: Option<serde_json::Value>,
}
/// Relay-node config.json shape.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct RelayServerConfig {
/// Listen address(es) (UDP + TCP UoT)
pub listen: ListenConfig,
/// Upstream address for TCP (UoT) traffic
pub upstream_tcp: String,
/// Upstream address for UDP traffic
pub upstream_udp: String,
// ── Deprecated ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
// The relay used to authenticate clients itself and pulled the access-key
// list from the target server's management API to do it. It no longer does:
// sessions are authenticated end-to-end by the target server, and a relay
// that re-checks credentials only adds a weaker second gate plus a copy of
// the key list on a machine that does not need one. These are kept solely
// so existing relay configs still parse; they are ignored.
#[serde(default)]
pub upstream_api_url: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub upstream_api_token: String,
#[serde(default)]
pub sync_interval_secs: u64,
pub debug: Option<bool>,
}
/// Supports both a single string "0.0.0.0:50000" and an array
/// ["0.0.0.0:50000", "[::]:50000"].
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Clone)]
#[serde(untagged)]
pub enum ListenConfig {
Single(String),
Multiple(Vec<String>),
}
impl ListenConfig {
pub fn addresses(&self) -> Vec<String> {
match self {
ListenConfig::Single(s) => vec![s.clone()],
ListenConfig::Multiple(v) => v.clone(),
}
}
pub fn primary(&self) -> String {
match self {
ListenConfig::Single(s) => s.clone(),
ListenConfig::Multiple(v) => v.first().cloned().unwrap_or_default(),
}
}
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct ApiConfig {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
pub bind: Option<String>,
pub token: Option<String>,
pub webpath: Option<String>,
pub username: Option<String>,
pub password_hash: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct FallbackCfg {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
pub listen: Option<String>,
pub target: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct ClientFileConfig {
pub server: String,
pub access_key: String,
pub mtu: Option<usize>,
pub socks5_bind: Option<String>,
pub tun: Option<TunConfig>,
pub debug: Option<bool>,
pub exclude: Option<ExcludeConfig>,
pub mux: Option<MuxConfig>,
pub transport: Option<TransportConfigRaw>,
pub gui: Option<serde_json::Value>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Clone)]
pub struct TransportConfigRaw {
pub mode: Option<String>,
pub tcp_fragmentation: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize, Clone)]
pub struct TunConfig {
pub enable: bool,
pub wintun_path: Option<String>,
pub ipv4_address: Option<String>,
pub dns: Option<String>,
pub kill_switch: Option<bool>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct OutboundConfig {
pub enabled: bool,
pub protocol: String,
pub address: String,
pub port: u16,
#[serde(default)]
pub rules: Vec<OutboundRule>,
pub default_action: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct OutboundRule {
pub domain_suffix: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub ip_cidr: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub protocol: Option<String>,
pub action: Option<String>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct ExcludeConfig {
pub domains: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub ips: Option<Vec<String>>,
pub processes: Option<Vec<String>>,
}
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)]
pub struct MuxConfig {
pub enabled: Option<bool>,
pub sessions: Option<usize>,
}

View File

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
pub mod app;
pub mod bridge;
pub mod config;
pub mod migrate;
pub mod signal;
pub mod sysproxy;
pub mod transport;

View File

@ -3,53 +3,6 @@ use std::io::Write;
use std::path::PathBuf;
use tracing_subscriber::{layer::SubscriberExt, util::SubscriberInitExt, EnvFilter};
/// The single canonical log file for the whole core. Every process (CLI daemon,
/// GUI, TUN helper) and every subsystem (tracing, the core event logger, the
/// helper IPC, panics) writes here — no more per-binary / per-subsystem sprawl
/// (`ostp-cli.log` + `ostp-core.log` + `ostp-helper.log` + `ostp-crash.log`).
pub const LOG_FILE_NAME: &str = "ostp.log";
/// Absolute path to the shared log file, next to the running executable.
pub fn log_file_path() -> PathBuf {
std::env::current_exe()
.ok()
.and_then(|p| p.parent().map(|d| d.join(LOG_FILE_NAME)))
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from(LOG_FILE_NAME))
}
/// True if this invocation is the long-running daemon (a client/server run),
/// as opposed to a one-shot subcommand (`gk`, `check`, `init`, `-V`, ...).
///
/// Used to gate log truncation: only the daemon clears the log at startup, so a
/// one-shot command run while a daemon is live can never wipe the daemon's log.
/// A daemon invocation is simply one that carries none of the one-shot tokens
/// (`ostp`, `ostp run`, `ostp connect <url>` → daemon; everything else → one-shot).
pub fn invocation_is_daemon<I: IntoIterator<Item = String>>(args: I) -> bool {
const ONE_SHOT: &[&str] = &[
"gk", "generate-key", "check", "init", "setup", "links", "import",
"update", "migrate", "prober", "proxy-env", "proxy-env-clear",
"uninstall", "-V", "--version", "-h", "--help", "help",
];
!args
.into_iter()
.skip(1) // program name
.any(|a| ONE_SHOT.contains(&a.as_str()))
}
/// Append a single timestamped line to the shared log file. Used by the manual
/// writers (core event logger, TUN helper IPC) so their output lands in the same
/// `ostp.log` as the tracing subscriber instead of a separate file.
pub fn append_line(msg: &str) {
if let Ok(mut file) = OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(log_file_path()) {
let _ = writeln!(
file,
"[{}] {}",
chrono::Local::now().format("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"),
msg
);
}
}
pub fn setup_panic_hook() {
std::panic::set_hook(Box::new(|info| {
let payload = info.payload();
@ -63,7 +16,7 @@ pub fn setup_panic_hook() {
let location = info.location().unwrap_or_else(|| std::panic::Location::caller());
let backtrace = std::backtrace::Backtrace::force_capture();
let crash_msg = format!(
"[{}] PANIC at {}:{}\nMessage: {}\nBacktrace:\n{:?}",
chrono::Local::now().format("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"),
@ -76,16 +29,19 @@ pub fn setup_panic_hook() {
eprintln!("{}", crash_msg);
tracing::error!("{}", crash_msg);
// Crashes land in the same shared log file (append — a crash must never
// truncate, and the tracing worker may already be dead so we write direct).
if let Ok(mut file) = OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(log_file_path()) {
let path = std::env::current_exe()
.ok()
.and_then(|p| p.parent().map(|d| d.join("ostp-crash.log")))
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from("ostp-crash.log"));
if let Ok(mut file) = OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(path) {
let _ = file.write_all(crash_msg.as_bytes());
let _ = file.write_all(b"\n===================================================\n");
}
}));
}
/// Initialises tracing and writes to the shared `ostp.log` next to the executable.
/// Initialises tracing and writes to `<app_name>.log` next to the executable.
///
/// The `level` parameter controls the minimum log level:
/// - `"error"` — only errors
@ -95,17 +51,7 @@ pub fn setup_panic_hook() {
/// - `"trace"` — all messages including very verbose internal state
///
/// The environment variable `RUST_LOG` overrides this value if set.
///
/// `truncate`: clear the log at startup. Honoured **only on Windows** — Linux
/// servers keep their history (OS-rotated). Pass `true` only from the daemon's
/// own entrypoint; one-shot commands and child processes (the TUN helper) pass
/// `false` so they append instead of wiping a running daemon's log.
pub fn init_tracing(
level: &str,
app_name: &str,
version: &str,
truncate: bool,
) -> Option<tracing_appender::non_blocking::WorkerGuard> {
pub fn init_tracing(level: &str, app_name: &str, version: &str) -> Option<tracing_appender::non_blocking::WorkerGuard> {
// RUST_LOG overrides the config-derived level
let env_filter = EnvFilter::try_from_default_env()
.unwrap_or_else(|_| {
@ -120,41 +66,14 @@ pub fn init_tracing(
}
});
let path = log_file_path();
let mut open_opts = OpenOptions::new();
open_opts.create(true);
// Truncate-on-startup is Windows-only and daemon-only. Everywhere else append:
// Linux keeps server history, and one-shot commands / the TUN helper must not
// wipe a running daemon's log.
if truncate && cfg!(windows) {
open_opts.write(true).truncate(true);
} else {
open_opts.append(true);
}
if let Ok(mut file) = open_opts.open(&path) {
// Write the startup banner directly to the log file, bypassing the
// tracing subscriber entirely. Emitting it via tracing::info!() hits
// BOTH layers below (file AND stderr), so every one-shot CLI command
// (`ostp -V`, `ostp gk`, `ostp check`, ...) printed this banner to the
// terminal on every single invocation — pure noise for anything that
// isn't the long-running daemon. It's still genuinely useful for
// whoever's reading the log file later, so keep it there, just not on
// screen for commands that aren't the daemon.
let _ = writeln!(
file,
"{} v{} | OS: {} | Arch: {} | log_level: {} | log_file: {}",
app_name,
version,
std::env::consts::OS,
std::env::consts::ARCH,
level,
path.display(),
);
let path = std::env::current_exe()
.ok()
.and_then(|p| p.parent().map(|d| d.join(format!("{}.log", app_name))))
.unwrap_or_else(|| PathBuf::from(format!("{}.log", app_name)));
if let Ok(file) = OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(&path) {
let (file_writer, guard) = tracing_appender::non_blocking(file);
let fmt_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
.with_target(true)
.with_line_number(true)
@ -162,7 +81,7 @@ pub fn init_tracing(
.with_thread_names(false)
.with_ansi(false)
.with_writer(file_writer);
let stderr_layer = tracing_subscriber::fmt::layer()
.with_target(true)
.with_writer(std::io::stderr);
@ -172,7 +91,17 @@ pub fn init_tracing(
.with(fmt_layer)
.with(stderr_layer)
.try_init();
tracing::info!(
"{} v{} | OS: {} | Arch: {} | log_level: {} | log_file: {}",
app_name,
version,
std::env::consts::OS,
std::env::consts::ARCH,
level,
path.display(),
);
Some(guard)
} else {
// Fallback: stderr only

View File

@ -1,559 +0,0 @@
//! The ONE authoritative place that upgrades an old `config.json` to the
//! current schema. Reachable only via the explicit `ostp migrate` command —
//! nothing else in this codebase silently rewrites a user's config on their
//! behalf (the old 0.3.x line used to auto-migrate on every load with just a
//! log warning; that's exactly the kind of "invisible until something looks
//! wrong" behavior this module replaces).
//!
//! Every field this module cannot map forward is reported explicitly in
//! `MigrationReport.notes`, never silently dropped without a trace.
use serde_json::{json, Value};
#[derive(Debug, Default)]
pub struct MigrationReport {
/// Whether anything was actually different from the current schema.
pub changed: bool,
/// Human-readable line per field added, converted, or dropped.
pub notes: Vec<String>,
}
impl MigrationReport {
fn note(&mut self, msg: impl Into<String>) {
self.changed = true;
self.notes.push(msg.into());
}
}
/// Which config this file is (mirrors `AppMode`'s `"mode"` tag). Old configs
/// from before that tag existed are sniffed structurally as a fallback.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum ConfigKind {
Client,
Server,
Relay,
}
pub fn detect_kind(json: &Value) -> Option<ConfigKind> {
match json.get("mode").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
Some("client") => return Some(ConfigKind::Client),
Some("server") => return Some(ConfigKind::Server),
Some("relay") => return Some(ConfigKind::Relay),
_ => {}
}
// No (or unrecognized) "mode" tag — this is an older config from before
// it was mandatory. Sniff by the fields that have been present on each
// shape since the earliest surviving config format.
if json.get("upstream_tcp").is_some() || json.get("upstream_api_url").is_some() {
Some(ConfigKind::Relay)
} else if json.get("access_keys").is_some() || json.get("listen").is_some() {
Some(ConfigKind::Server)
} else if json.get("access_key").is_some() || json.get("server").is_some() {
Some(ConfigKind::Client)
} else {
None
}
}
/// Migrates a client config of any known past shape to the current flat
/// schema. Returns the migrated JSON and a report of every change made.
///
/// Known input shapes, oldest first:
/// - **v0.3.1v0.3.21 "modular multi-server"**: `inbounds`/`outbounds` arrays
/// + `routing.rules`. Only the first `ostp`-type outbound is kept (this
/// line no longer supports multiple simultaneous servers); every other
/// `ostp` outbound is reported by tag+address so nothing vanishes
/// invisibly. `urltest`/`selector`/`direct`/`block` outbounds have no
/// equivalent and are dropped (reported).
/// - **pre-0.3.1 flat (up to v0.2.98)**: same field names as today
/// (`server`, `access_key`, `tun`, `exclude`, `mux`, `transport`, ...)
/// except `tun.wintun_path`/`tun.ipv4_address` (internal driver detail,
/// never user-meaningful data) and `transport.wss` (the WSS framing
/// feature removed entirely in the 0.4.0 rebuild) — both dropped with an
/// explicit note; everything else maps 1:1, nothing to convert.
/// - **configs carrying a leftover `transport.stealth_sni`**: dropped with a
/// note, same reasoning as `wss` — it never fed into anything on the wire
/// (no TLS/HTTP mimicry exists in this project), so there is no successor
/// field. Not tied to a specific version: it lingered in the schema well
/// past when the mimicry work it was meant for got removed.
/// - **current flat schema**: no-op, `changed = false`.
pub fn migrate_client_json(json: Value) -> (Value, MigrationReport) {
let mut report = MigrationReport::default();
let has_inbounds = json.get("inbounds").and_then(|v| v.as_array()).is_some();
let has_outbounds = json.get("outbounds").and_then(|v| v.as_array()).is_some();
if has_inbounds && has_outbounds {
return migrate_client_from_modular(json, report);
}
// Flat shape already (current or pre-0.3.1) — normalize obsolete fields
// in place rather than rebuilding the whole document from scratch, so
// any field this module doesn't know about yet still survives untouched.
let mut out = json;
if let Some(tun) = out.get_mut("tun").and_then(|t| t.as_object_mut()) {
for dead_field in ["wintun_path", "ipv4_address"] {
if tun.remove(dead_field).is_some() {
report.note(format!(
"Dropped tun.{dead_field} — internal driver detail from an older WinTun \
integration, not applicable to the current TUN implementation."
));
}
}
}
if let Some(transport) = out.get_mut("transport").and_then(|t| t.as_object_mut()) {
if transport.remove("wss").is_some() {
report.note(
"Dropped transport.wss — WSS framing was removed in the 0.4.0 rebuild \
(the project follows a zapret-like approach: no protocol mimicry, \
just packet-level obfuscation/manipulation, so there is no successor field)."
.to_string(),
);
}
if transport.remove("stealth_sni").is_some() {
report.note(
"Dropped transport.stealth_sni — never actually used to construct any wire \
bytes (no TLS/HTTP mimicry exists in this project same zapret-like \
reasoning as transport.wss), so it was unused config plumbing with no effect."
.to_string(),
);
}
}
(out, report)
}
fn migrate_client_from_modular(json: Value, mut report: MigrationReport) -> (Value, MigrationReport) {
report.changed = true; // the shape itself is being replaced regardless of field-level detail
let inbounds = json.get("inbounds").and_then(|v| v.as_array()).cloned().unwrap_or_default();
let outbounds = json.get("outbounds").and_then(|v| v.as_array()).cloned().unwrap_or_default();
let routing = json.get("routing").cloned().unwrap_or(json!({}));
let default_outbound = routing.get("default_outbound").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).map(String::from);
// ── Pick the primary "ostp" outbound ────────────────────────────────
// Prefer the one routing.default_outbound points at (directly, or via a
// urltest/selector group that references it); otherwise take the first
// ostp outbound in file order. Every other ostp outbound is reported by
// tag+address, not silently discarded.
let ostp_outbounds: Vec<&Value> = outbounds
.iter()
.filter(|o| o.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some("ostp"))
.collect();
// default_outbound might name an ostp outbound directly, OR name a
// urltest/selector GROUP whose first member is the one to actually use —
// check both, since a plain `.or_else` here would never even attempt the
// group lookup while default_outbound is Some(_) (which it almost always
// is), silently falling through to "just take the first ostp outbound in
// file order" instead — exactly the kind of silent wrong answer this
// migrator exists to avoid.
let primary_tag: Option<String> = default_outbound.as_deref().and_then(|def_tag| {
if ostp_outbounds.iter().any(|o| o.get("tag").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some(def_tag)) {
return Some(def_tag.to_string());
}
outbounds.iter().find_map(|o| {
let is_group = matches!(o.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()), Some("urltest") | Some("selector"));
let tag_matches = o.get("tag").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some(def_tag);
if is_group && tag_matches {
o.get("outbounds")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.and_then(|arr| arr.first())
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.map(String::from)
} else {
None
}
})
});
let primary = primary_tag
.as_deref()
.and_then(|tag| ostp_outbounds.iter().find(|o| o.get("tag").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some(tag)))
.copied()
.or_else(|| ostp_outbounds.first().copied());
let Some(primary) = primary else {
report.note(
"No 'ostp'-type outbound found in the old modular config — nothing to migrate \
the server connection from. Wrote a placeholder; you MUST fill in server/access_key \
by hand or re-import a share link."
.to_string(),
);
return (
json!({
"server": "127.0.0.1:50000",
"access_key": "",
}),
report,
);
};
for other in &ostp_outbounds {
if !std::ptr::eq(*other, primary) {
let tag = other.get("tag").and_then(|t| t.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
let addr = other.get("server").and_then(|t| t.as_str()).unwrap_or("?");
let port = other.get("port").and_then(|t| t.as_u64()).unwrap_or(0);
report.note(format!(
"Dropped additional server '{tag}' ({addr}:{port}) — multi-server / urltest \
failover is no longer supported; only one server per config now. Kept the \
one from routing.default_outbound (or the first one if that wasn't set)."
));
}
}
let server = primary.get("server").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("127.0.0.1").to_string();
let port = primary.get("port").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(50000);
let access_key = primary.get("access_key").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("").to_string();
let transport_type = primary
.get("transport")
.and_then(|t| t.get("type").or_else(|| t.get("mode")))
.and_then(|v| v.as_str())
.unwrap_or("udp")
.to_string();
if let Some(sni) = primary.get("transport").and_then(|t| t.get("stealth_sni")).and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
if !sni.is_empty() {
report.note(format!(
"Dropped transport.stealth_sni ({sni:?}) — never actually used to construct \
any wire bytes; unused config plumbing with no successor field."
));
}
}
let tcp_fragmentation = primary
.get("transport")
.and_then(|t| t.get("tcp_fragmentation"))
.and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
.unwrap_or(false);
let mux_enabled = primary.get("multiplex").and_then(|m| m.get("enabled")).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(false);
let mux_sessions = primary.get("multiplex").and_then(|m| m.get("sessions")).and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(1);
// ── TUN + local proxy inbounds ───────────────────────────────────────
let tun_inbound = inbounds.iter().find(|i| i.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some("tun"));
let proxy_inbound = inbounds.iter().find(|i| i.get("type").and_then(|t| t.as_str()) == Some("local_proxy"));
let tun_enable = tun_inbound.is_some();
let mtu = tun_inbound.and_then(|t| t.get("mtu")).and_then(|v| v.as_u64());
let socks5_bind = proxy_inbound
.map(|p| {
let listen = p.get("listen").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("127.0.0.1");
let port = p.get("port").and_then(|v| v.as_u64()).unwrap_or(1088);
format!("{listen}:{port}")
})
.unwrap_or_else(|| "127.0.0.1:1088".to_string());
// ── Exclusions from routing.rules → direct ──────────────────────────
let mut ex_domains: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut ex_ips: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
let mut ex_processes: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
if let Some(rules) = routing.get("rules").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) {
for rule in rules {
if rule.get("outbound").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) != Some("direct") {
continue; // only "route to direct" rules were ever exclusions in the old format
}
if let Some(v) = rule.get("domain_suffix").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) {
ex_domains.extend(v.iter().filter_map(|s| s.as_str().map(String::from)));
}
if let Some(v) = rule.get("ip_cidr").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) {
ex_ips.extend(v.iter().filter_map(|s| s.as_str().map(String::from)));
}
if let Some(v) = rule.get("process_name").and_then(|v| v.as_array()) {
ex_processes.extend(v.iter().filter_map(|s| s.as_str().map(String::from)));
}
}
}
for other_rule_outbound in routing
.get("rules")
.and_then(|v| v.as_array())
.into_iter()
.flatten()
.filter_map(|r| r.get("outbound").and_then(|v| v.as_str()))
.filter(|o| *o != "direct")
{
report.note(format!(
"Dropped a routing rule targeting outbound '{other_rule_outbound}' — only \
\"route to direct\" rules map to today's exclusions; anything else \
(custom per-domain outbound selection) has no equivalent anymore."
));
}
let debug = json.get("log").and_then(|l| l.get("level")).and_then(|v| v.as_str()) == Some("debug");
let mut client = json!({
"server": server,
"port": port,
"access_key": access_key,
"socks5_bind": socks5_bind,
"debug": debug,
"tun": {
"enable": tun_enable,
"dns": null,
"kill_switch": false,
},
"exclude": {
"domains": ex_domains,
"ips": ex_ips,
"processes": ex_processes,
},
"mux": {
"enabled": mux_enabled,
"sessions": mux_sessions,
},
"transport": {
"mode": transport_type,
"tcp_fragmentation": tcp_fragmentation,
},
});
if let Some(mtu) = mtu {
client["mtu"] = json!(mtu);
}
if let Some(gui) = json.get("gui") {
client["gui"] = gui.clone();
}
(client, report)
}
/// Migrates a server config. The server shape has stayed structurally
/// identical since the earliest surviving version — this only backfills the
/// `api` section (added after some configs already existed) and drops the
/// legacy `api.token` field. Ported from the ad-hoc Python snippet that used
/// to live in `scripts/install.sh` and only ran at install/update time.
pub fn migrate_server_json(json: Value) -> (Value, MigrationReport) {
let mut report = MigrationReport::default();
let mut out = json;
let obj = match out.as_object_mut() {
Some(o) => o,
None => return (out, report),
};
let api = obj.entry("api").or_insert_with(|| json!({}));
if let Some(api_obj) = api.as_object_mut() {
let defaults: [(&str, Value); 5] = [
("enabled", json!(false)),
("bind", json!("0.0.0.0:9090")),
("webpath", json!("")),
("username", json!("")),
("password_hash", json!("")),
];
for (key, default) in defaults {
if !api_obj.contains_key(key) {
report.note(format!("Added api.{key} = {default} (missing default)"));
api_obj.insert(key.to_string(), default);
}
}
if api_obj.remove("token").is_some() {
report.note(
"Dropped legacy api.token — superseded by api.password_hash; \
set a new admin password with the management API or panel."
.to_string(),
);
}
}
(out, report)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// A realistic v0.3.21-shaped modular config (TUN + local_proxy inbounds,
/// a single ostp outbound, exclusion rules, mux) — mirrors the actual
/// shape from that tag, field for field.
#[test]
fn modular_single_server_preserves_every_field() {
let old = json!({
"version": "0.3.21",
"log": { "level": "debug" },
"inbounds": [
{ "type": "tun", "tag": "tun-in", "auto_route": true, "mtu": 1350 },
{ "type": "local_proxy", "tag": "socks-in", "protocol": "socks", "listen": "127.0.0.1", "port": 1088 }
],
"outbounds": [
{
"type": "ostp", "tag": "proxy",
"server": "203.0.113.5", "port": 50000, "access_key": "sekrit123",
"transport": { "type": "uot", "stealth_sni": "vk.com", "tcp_fragmentation": true },
"multiplex": { "enabled": true, "sessions": 4 }
},
{ "type": "direct", "tag": "direct" },
{ "type": "block", "tag": "block" }
],
"routing": {
"rules": [
{ "domain_suffix": ["local.lan", "internal.corp"], "outbound": "direct" },
{ "ip_cidr": ["192.168.0.0/16"], "outbound": "direct" },
{ "process_name": ["steam.exe"], "outbound": "direct" }
],
"default_outbound": "proxy"
}
});
let (new, report) = migrate_client_json(old);
assert!(report.changed);
assert_eq!(new["server"], "203.0.113.5");
assert_eq!(new["port"], 50000);
assert_eq!(new["access_key"], "sekrit123");
assert_eq!(new["socks5_bind"], "127.0.0.1:1088");
assert_eq!(new["mtu"], 1350);
assert_eq!(new["debug"], true);
assert_eq!(new["tun"]["enable"], true);
assert_eq!(new["transport"]["mode"], "uot");
assert_eq!(new["transport"]["tcp_fragmentation"], true);
assert_eq!(new["mux"]["enabled"], true);
assert_eq!(new["mux"]["sessions"], 4);
assert_eq!(new["exclude"]["domains"], json!(["local.lan", "internal.corp"]));
assert_eq!(new["exclude"]["ips"], json!(["192.168.0.0/16"]));
assert_eq!(new["exclude"]["processes"], json!(["steam.exe"]));
// stealth_sni never fed into any wire bytes — dropped, not carried forward.
assert!(new["transport"].get("stealth_sni").is_none());
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("stealth_sni") && n.contains("vk.com")));
}
/// Old modular configs that had MULTIPLE ostp outbounds (multi-server) —
/// must keep the one routing.default_outbound points at and report every
/// other one by name/address rather than picking silently.
#[test]
fn modular_multi_server_keeps_default_and_reports_the_rest() {
let old = json!({
"inbounds": [],
"outbounds": [
{ "type": "ostp", "tag": "proxy-0", "server": "1.1.1.1", "port": 50000, "access_key": "k1" },
{ "type": "ostp", "tag": "proxy-1", "server": "2.2.2.2", "port": 50000, "access_key": "k2" },
{
"type": "urltest", "tag": "proxy",
"outbounds": ["proxy-1", "proxy-0"], "url": "http://cp.cloudflare.com"
}
],
"routing": { "rules": [], "default_outbound": "proxy" }
});
let (new, report) = migrate_client_json(old);
// urltest's first member (proxy-1 / 2.2.2.2) is the one actually picked.
assert_eq!(new["server"], "2.2.2.2");
assert_eq!(new["access_key"], "k2");
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("proxy-0") && n.contains("1.1.1.1")));
}
/// Pre-0.3.1 flat config carrying fields that no longer exist
/// (tun.wintun_path, tun.ipv4_address, transport.wss, transport.stealth_sni)
/// — those get dropped with a note; every field that's still meaningful
/// passes through untouched, byte for byte.
#[test]
fn flat_legacy_drops_only_dead_fields() {
let old = json!({
"server": "198.51.100.9:50000",
"access_key": "oldkey",
"mtu": 1200,
"socks5_bind": "127.0.0.1:1090",
"tun": {
"enable": true,
"wintun_path": "C:\\Program Files\\wintun\\wintun.dll",
"ipv4_address": "10.0.0.2",
"dns": "1.1.1.1",
"kill_switch": true
},
"exclude": { "domains": ["a.com"], "ips": null, "processes": null },
"mux": { "enabled": false, "sessions": 1 },
"transport": { "mode": "udp", "stealth_sni": "bing.com", "wss": true }
});
let (new, report) = migrate_client_json(old);
assert!(report.changed);
// Untouched fields survive exactly as they were.
assert_eq!(new["server"], "198.51.100.9:50000");
assert_eq!(new["access_key"], "oldkey");
assert_eq!(new["mtu"], 1200);
assert_eq!(new["tun"]["enable"], true);
assert_eq!(new["tun"]["dns"], "1.1.1.1");
assert_eq!(new["tun"]["kill_switch"], true);
assert_eq!(new["exclude"]["domains"], json!(["a.com"]));
// Dead fields are gone...
assert!(new["tun"].get("wintun_path").is_none());
assert!(new["tun"].get("ipv4_address").is_none());
assert!(new["transport"].get("wss").is_none());
assert!(new["transport"].get("stealth_sni").is_none());
// ...and their removal was reported, not silent.
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("wintun_path")));
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("ipv4_address")));
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("wss")));
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("stealth_sni")));
}
/// A config already in the current shape must be a true no-op: report
/// says nothing changed, and every field is untouched.
#[test]
fn current_flat_config_is_a_no_op() {
let current = json!({
"server": "example.com:50000",
"access_key": "k",
"tun": { "enable": false, "dns": null, "kill_switch": false },
"exclude": { "domains": [], "ips": [], "processes": [] },
"mux": { "enabled": false, "sessions": 1 },
"transport": { "mode": "udp", "tcp_fragmentation": false }
});
let (new, report) = migrate_client_json(current.clone());
assert!(!report.changed);
assert_eq!(new, current);
}
/// Every migrated output must actually deserialize into the ONE
/// canonical schema (`crate::config`) — this is the same check
/// `cmd_migrate` runs at runtime before ever touching a user's file,
/// exercised here directly so a schema/migrator drift fails a fast unit
/// test instead of surfacing as "your migrated config won't load".
#[test]
fn every_migrated_output_matches_the_canonical_schema() {
let modular = json!({
"inbounds": [{ "type": "tun", "tag": "tun-in", "mtu": 1350 }],
"outbounds": [
{ "type": "ostp", "tag": "proxy", "server": "1.2.3.4", "port": 50000, "access_key": "k" },
{ "type": "direct", "tag": "direct" }
],
"routing": { "rules": [], "default_outbound": "proxy" }
});
let (new, _) = migrate_client_json(modular);
serde_json::from_value::<crate::config::ClientFileConfig>(new)
.expect("modular->flat migration output must match ClientFileConfig");
let legacy_flat = json!({
"server": "1.2.3.4:50000",
"access_key": "k",
"tun": { "enable": true, "wintun_path": "x", "ipv4_address": "y" }
});
let (new, _) = migrate_client_json(legacy_flat);
serde_json::from_value::<crate::config::ClientFileConfig>(new)
.expect("legacy-flat migration output must match ClientFileConfig");
let server = json!({ "listen": "0.0.0.0:50000", "access_keys": ["k"] });
let (new, _) = migrate_server_json(server);
serde_json::from_value::<crate::config::ServerConfig>(new)
.expect("server migration output must match ServerConfig");
}
#[test]
fn server_config_backfills_api_defaults_and_drops_legacy_token() {
let old = json!({
"listen": "0.0.0.0:50000",
"access_keys": ["k1"],
"api": { "token": "old-plain-token" }
});
let (new, report) = migrate_server_json(old);
assert!(report.changed);
assert_eq!(new["api"]["enabled"], false);
assert_eq!(new["api"]["bind"], "0.0.0.0:9090");
assert!(new["api"].get("token").is_none());
assert!(report.notes.iter().any(|n| n.contains("api.token")));
}
#[test]
fn detect_kind_falls_back_to_structural_sniffing_without_mode_tag() {
assert_eq!(detect_kind(&json!({"access_key": "x", "server": "y"})), Some(ConfigKind::Client));
assert_eq!(detect_kind(&json!({"access_keys": ["x"], "listen": "y"})), Some(ConfigKind::Server));
assert_eq!(detect_kind(&json!({"upstream_tcp": "x", "upstream_api_url": "y"})), Some(ConfigKind::Relay));
assert_eq!(detect_kind(&json!({"mode": "client", "server": "x"})), Some(ConfigKind::Client));
}
}

View File

@ -10,9 +10,10 @@ use std::fs::OpenOptions;
use std::io::Write as _;
fn log_to_core_file(msg: &str) {
// Writes into the single shared ostp.log (same file as the tracing appender),
// not a separate ostp-core.log — see logging::LOG_FILE_NAME.
let path = crate::logging::log_file_path();
let path = std::env::current_exe()
.ok()
.and_then(|p| p.parent().map(|d| d.join("ostp-core.log")))
.unwrap_or_else(|| std::path::PathBuf::from("ostp-core.log"));
if let Ok(mut file) = OpenOptions::new().create(true).append(true).open(path) {
let _ = writeln!(file, "[{}] {}", chrono::Local::now().format("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S"), msg);
}
@ -182,64 +183,7 @@ pub async fn run_client(config: crate::config::ClientConfig) -> Result<()> {
run_client_core(config, metrics, shutdown_rx, None).await
}
/// Runs the client with auto-reconnect: any subsystem ending — a network
/// change stranding the TUN adapter/UDP socket on a dead interface, the OSTP
/// protocol connection dropping in a way the inner Bridge-level retry (see
/// `UiEvent::TunnelStopped` below) couldn't recover from, or a proxy/TUN task
/// crashing outright — triggers a full clean restart (fresh DNS resolution,
/// fresh Bridge, fresh TUN/proxy) with exponential backoff, instead of the
/// client just dying. Only an explicit shutdown request stops this loop.
pub async fn run_client_core(
config: crate::config::ClientConfig,
metrics: Arc<BridgeMetrics>,
mut shutdown_rx_ext: watch::Receiver<bool>,
config_rx: Option<watch::Receiver<crate::config::ClientConfig>>,
) -> Result<()> {
use portable_atomic::Ordering;
const BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_SECS: [u64; 6] = [1, 2, 5, 10, 20, 30];
// A run that stayed up at least this long counts as "was actually
// connected", so a later drop restarts the backoff from the top instead
// of inheriting a long delay from a previous flaky stretch.
const STABLE_UPTIME: std::time::Duration = std::time::Duration::from_secs(60);
let mut backoff_idx = 0usize;
loop {
if *shutdown_rx_ext.borrow() {
return Ok(());
}
let attempt_start = std::time::Instant::now();
let result = run_client_once(config.clone(), metrics.clone(), shutdown_rx_ext.clone(), config_rx.clone()).await;
if *shutdown_rx_ext.borrow() {
// Shutdown was requested during (or right after) this attempt — honor it, don't retry.
return result;
}
if let Err(ref e) = result {
tracing::warn!("client run ended unexpectedly, will auto-reconnect: {e}");
}
if attempt_start.elapsed() >= STABLE_UPTIME {
backoff_idx = 0;
}
let delay = BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_SECS[backoff_idx.min(BACKOFF_SCHEDULE_SECS.len() - 1)];
backoff_idx += 1;
// Reflect the retry wait as "connecting" rather than "disconnected".
metrics.connection_state.store(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
tokio::select! {
_ = tokio::time::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_secs(delay)) => {}
_ = shutdown_rx_ext.changed() => {
if *shutdown_rx_ext.borrow() {
return Ok(());
}
}
}
}
}
async fn run_client_once(
mut config: crate::config::ClientConfig,
metrics: Arc<BridgeMetrics>,
mut shutdown_rx_ext: watch::Receiver<bool>,
@ -295,17 +239,15 @@ async fn run_client_once(
}
let _sysproxy_guard = if config.mode == "proxy" {
// Enable system proxy and set initial ProxyOverride with user exclusions
let guard = Some(crate::sysproxy::SystemProxyGuard::enable(&config.local_proxy.bind_addr));
crate::sysproxy::update_proxy_bypass_list(
&config.exclusions.domains,
&config.exclusions.ips,
);
guard
Some(crate::sysproxy::SystemProxyGuard::enable(&config.local_proxy.bind_addr))
} else {
None
};
if config.mode == "tun" && !config.exclusions.processes.is_empty() {
println!("[ostp] Process exclusions are not supported in TUN mode");
}
let (proxy_events_tx, proxy_events_rx) = mpsc::channel(256);
let (client_msgs_tx, client_msgs_rx) = mpsc::unbounded_channel();
@ -413,12 +355,6 @@ async fn run_client_once(
} => {
if let Some(ref rx) = config_rx {
let new_cfg = rx.borrow().clone();
// Update Windows ProxyOverride so excluded domains/IPs
// bypass the system proxy immediately (proxy mode only).
crate::sysproxy::update_proxy_bypass_list(
&new_cfg.exclusions.domains,
&new_cfg.exclusions.ips,
);
let _ = reload_tx.send(new_cfg.exclusions);
}
}

View File

@ -64,79 +64,7 @@ pub fn enable_windows_proxy(proxy_addr: &str) {
_ => {}
}
// Set initial bypass list (will be expanded by update_proxy_bypass_list)
update_proxy_bypass_list_windows(&[], &[]);
refresh_wininet();
tracing::info!("System proxy enabled successfully");
}
/// Update the Windows ProxyOverride registry value to include user-configured
/// excluded domains and IPs. This makes excluded hosts bypass the OSTP proxy
/// entirely at the OS level — the most reliable split-tunneling mechanism.
///
/// For each domain `d`, adds both `d` and `*.d` so both the root and all
/// subdomains bypass the proxy.
/// For IPs, adds them verbatim (Windows supports exact IPs and wildcards like
/// `192.168.*`).
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
pub fn update_proxy_bypass_list(domains: &[String], ips: &[String]) {
update_proxy_bypass_list_windows(domains, ips);
refresh_wininet();
}
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
pub fn update_proxy_bypass_list(_domains: &[String], _ips: &[String]) {
// Linux/macOS: no-op (gnome/kde proxy bypass list update not implemented)
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
fn update_proxy_bypass_list_windows(domains: &[String], ips: &[String]) {
// Base list: always bypass local addresses
let mut parts: Vec<String> = vec![
"localhost".into(),
"127.*".into(),
"10.*".into(),
"172.16.*".into(),
"172.17.*".into(),
"172.18.*".into(),
"172.19.*".into(),
"172.20.*".into(),
"172.21.*".into(),
"172.22.*".into(),
"172.23.*".into(),
"172.24.*".into(),
"172.25.*".into(),
"172.26.*".into(),
"172.27.*".into(),
"172.28.*".into(),
"172.29.*".into(),
"172.30.*".into(),
"172.31.*".into(),
"192.168.*".into(),
"<local>".into(),
];
// Add excluded domains: both exact and wildcard subdomain form
for d in domains {
let d = d.trim().trim_start_matches('.').to_lowercase();
if d.is_empty() { continue; }
parts.push(d.clone());
parts.push(format!("*.{}", d));
}
// Add excluded IPs verbatim
for ip in ips {
let ip = ip.trim();
if ip.is_empty() { continue; }
// Strip CIDR suffix if present — Windows ProxyOverride doesn't support CIDR
let host = ip.split('/').next().unwrap_or(ip);
parts.push(host.to_string());
}
let override_value = parts.join(";");
tracing::info!("Updating ProxyOverride: {}", override_value);
// Set bypass list to prevent proxy loop for localhost traffic
let _ = Command::new("reg")
.creation_flags(CREATE_NO_WINDOW)
.args([
@ -144,10 +72,13 @@ fn update_proxy_bypass_list_windows(domains: &[String], ips: &[String]) {
"HKCU\\Software\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings",
"/v", "ProxyOverride",
"/t", "REG_SZ",
"/d", &override_value,
"/d", "localhost;127.*;10.*;192.168.*;<local>",
"/f",
])
.output();
refresh_wininet();
tracing::info!("System proxy enabled successfully");
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
@ -189,7 +120,7 @@ fn refresh_wininet() {
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
pub fn enable_system_proxy(proxy_addr: &str) {
let parts: Vec<&str> = proxy_addr.split(':').collect();
let host = parts.first().unwrap_or(&"127.0.0.1");
let host = parts.get(0).unwrap_or(&"127.0.0.1");
let port = parts.get(1).unwrap_or(&"1088");
let is_gui = std::env::var("DISPLAY").is_ok() || std::env::var("WAYLAND_DISPLAY").is_ok();
@ -235,7 +166,7 @@ pub fn enable_system_proxy(proxy_addr: &str) {
println!("OSTP Local Proxy is running at socks5://{}", proxy_addr);
println!("Since you are in a headless/terminal environment, OSTP cannot automatically");
println!("configure your system proxy. To route traffic from this terminal, run:");
println!("\n eval $(ostp proxy-env)\n");
println!("\n eval $(ostp --proxy-env)\n");
println!("Or configure your application (e.g. curl -x socks5://{})", proxy_addr);
println!("===================================================================\n");
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,394 @@
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
use tokio::net::TcpStream;
use bytes::{Buf, BufMut, Bytes, BytesMut};
use anyhow::{Result, Context};
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use hmac::Hmac;
use sha2::Sha256;
use base64::Engine;
use std::pin::Pin;
use std::task::{Context as TaskContext, Poll};
use x25519_dalek::PublicKey;
use chacha20poly1305::{aead::Aead, ChaCha20Poly1305, Nonce};
use ostp_core::crypto::reality::{build_client_hello, derive_keys, generate_session_id, generate_x25519_keypair, REALITY_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_RECORDS};
use ostp_core::framing::wss::{encode_wss_frame, decode_wss_frame, WssFrameResult};
type HmacSha256 = Hmac<Sha256>;
pub async fn connect_xhttp(
target_ip: IpAddr,
port: u16,
sni: &str,
access_key: &[u8],
reality_enabled: bool,
wss: bool,
reality_pbk: &str,
reality_sid: &str,
) -> Result<(mpsc::Sender<Bytes>, Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>>)> {
let addr = std::net::SocketAddr::new(target_ip, port);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "android"))]
let mut tcp_stream = tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(10),
tokio::net::TcpStream::connect(addr),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("TCP connect timeout to {}", addr))?
.with_context(|| format!("failed to connect to {}", addr))?;
#[cfg(target_os = "android")]
let mut tcp_stream = {
let domain = if target_ip.is_ipv6() { socket2::Domain::IPV6 } else { socket2::Domain::IPV4 };
let sock = socket2::Socket::new(domain, socket2::Type::STREAM, Some(socket2::Protocol::TCP))?;
use std::os::unix::io::AsRawFd;
crate::bridge::protect_socket(sock.as_raw_fd());
sock.set_nonblocking(true)?;
let tcp_socket = tokio::net::TcpSocket::from_std_stream(sock.into());
tokio::time::timeout(
std::time::Duration::from_secs(10),
tcp_socket.connect(addr),
)
.await
.map_err(|_| anyhow::anyhow!("TCP connect timeout to {}", addr))?
.with_context(|| format!("failed to connect to {}", addr))?
};
tcp_stream.set_nodelay(true)?;
if reality_enabled {
let pbk_bytes = base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(reality_pbk)
.context("invalid reality_pbk base64")?;
if pbk_bytes.len() != 32 {
anyhow::bail!("reality_pbk must be 32 bytes");
}
let pbk = PublicKey::from(<[u8; 32]>::try_from(pbk_bytes.as_slice()).unwrap());
let sid_bytes_vec = hex::decode(reality_sid).context("invalid reality_sid hex")?;
if sid_bytes_vec.len() != 8 {
anyhow::bail!("reality_sid must be 8 bytes");
}
let sid: [u8; 8] = sid_bytes_vec.try_into().unwrap();
let (c_priv, c_pub) = generate_x25519_keypair();
let shared_secret = c_priv.diffie_hellman(&pbk);
let (auth_key, data_key) = derive_keys(shared_secret.as_bytes());
let session_id = generate_session_id(&auth_key, &sid);
let client_hello = build_client_hello(if sni.is_empty() { "www.microsoft.com" } else { sni }, &session_id, &c_pub);
tcp_stream.write_all(&client_hello).await?;
// Drain all server handshake records (ServerHello, CCS, fake encrypted records).
// The server sends exactly REALITY_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_RECORDS records before data starts.
// Reading them explicitly prevents RealityStream from seeing non-AppData bytes.
for i in 0..REALITY_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_RECORDS {
let mut head = [0u8; 5];
tcp_stream.read_exact(&mut head).await
.with_context(|| format!("reality handshake: failed reading record {} header", i))?;
if i == 0 && head[0] != 0x16 {
anyhow::bail!("expected ServerHello (0x16), got 0x{:02x}", head[0]);
}
let record_len = u16::from_be_bytes([head[3], head[4]]) as usize;
if record_len > 16384 {
anyhow::bail!("reality handshake: record {} too large: {} bytes", i, record_len);
}
let mut _payload = vec![0u8; record_len];
tcp_stream.read_exact(&mut _payload).await
.with_context(|| format!("reality handshake: failed reading record {} payload", i))?;
}
let reality_stream = RealityStream::new(tcp_stream, data_key);
xhttp_handshake_and_loop(reality_stream, target_ip, sni, access_key, wss).await
} else {
xhttp_handshake_and_loop(tcp_stream, target_ip, sni, access_key, wss).await
}
}
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
// RealityStream: Wraps a TCP stream in fake TLS Application Data Records
// -----------------------------------------------------------------------
struct RealityStream {
inner: TcpStream,
data_key: ChaCha20Poly1305,
rx_nonce: u64,
tx_nonce: u64,
rx_buf: BytesMut,
plaintext_buf: BytesMut,
tx_buf: BytesMut,
}
impl RealityStream {
fn new(inner: TcpStream, data_key: ChaCha20Poly1305) -> Self {
Self {
inner,
data_key,
rx_nonce: 0,
tx_nonce: 0,
rx_buf: BytesMut::with_capacity(16384),
plaintext_buf: BytesMut::new(),
tx_buf: BytesMut::new(),
}
}
fn make_nonce(seq: u64) -> [u8; 12] {
let mut nonce = [0u8; 12];
nonce[4..12].copy_from_slice(&seq.to_le_bytes());
nonce
}
}
impl tokio::io::AsyncRead for RealityStream {
fn poll_read(mut self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>, buf: &mut tokio::io::ReadBuf<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
loop {
if !self.plaintext_buf.is_empty() {
let out_len = std::cmp::min(buf.remaining(), self.plaintext_buf.len());
buf.put_slice(&self.plaintext_buf[..out_len]);
self.plaintext_buf.advance(out_len);
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
if self.rx_buf.len() >= 5 {
let len = u16::from_be_bytes([self.rx_buf[3], self.rx_buf[4]]) as usize;
if self.rx_buf.len() >= 5 + len {
if self.rx_buf[0] != 0x17 {
return Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "expected application data record")));
}
let ciphertext = &self.rx_buf[5..5+len];
let nonce_bytes = Self::make_nonce(self.rx_nonce);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
match self.data_key.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext) {
Ok(plaintext) => {
self.rx_nonce += 1;
self.plaintext_buf.put_slice(&plaintext);
self.rx_buf.advance(5 + len);
continue;
}
Err(_) => {
return Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::InvalidData, "reality decrypt failed")));
}
}
}
}
let mut read_buf = [0u8; 8192];
let mut tokio_buf = tokio::io::ReadBuf::new(&mut read_buf);
match Pin::new(&mut self.inner).poll_read(cx, &mut tokio_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(())) => {
if tokio_buf.filled().is_empty() {
return Poll::Ready(Ok(()));
}
self.rx_buf.put_slice(tokio_buf.filled());
}
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
}
}
}
}
impl tokio::io::AsyncWrite for RealityStream {
fn poll_write(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>, buf: &[u8]) -> Poll<std::io::Result<usize>> {
let this = self.get_mut();
while !this.tx_buf.is_empty() {
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, &this.tx_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => this.tx_buf.advance(n),
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
}
}
let nonce_bytes = Self::make_nonce(this.tx_nonce);
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
match this.data_key.encrypt(nonce, buf) {
Ok(ciphertext) => {
this.tx_nonce += 1;
this.tx_buf.reserve(5 + ciphertext.len());
this.tx_buf.put_u8(0x17);
this.tx_buf.put_u16(0x0303);
this.tx_buf.put_u16(ciphertext.len() as u16);
this.tx_buf.put_slice(&ciphertext);
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, &this.tx_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => this.tx_buf.advance(n),
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
Poll::Pending => {}
}
Poll::Ready(Ok(buf.len()))
}
Err(_) => Poll::Ready(Err(std::io::Error::new(std::io::ErrorKind::Other, "reality encrypt failed"))),
}
}
fn poll_flush(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
let this = self.get_mut();
while !this.tx_buf.is_empty() {
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, &this.tx_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => this.tx_buf.advance(n),
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
}
}
Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_flush(cx)
}
fn poll_shutdown(self: Pin<&mut Self>, cx: &mut TaskContext<'_>) -> Poll<std::io::Result<()>> {
let this = self.get_mut();
while !this.tx_buf.is_empty() {
match Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_write(cx, &this.tx_buf) {
Poll::Ready(Ok(n)) => this.tx_buf.advance(n),
Poll::Ready(Err(e)) => return Poll::Ready(Err(e)),
Poll::Pending => return Poll::Pending,
}
}
Pin::new(&mut this.inner).poll_shutdown(cx)
}
}
async fn xhttp_handshake_and_loop<S>(
mut stream: S,
target_ip: IpAddr,
sni: &str,
access_key: &[u8],
wss: bool,
) -> Result<(mpsc::Sender<Bytes>, Arc<tokio::sync::Mutex<mpsc::Receiver<Bytes>>>)>
where
S: tokio::io::AsyncRead + tokio::io::AsyncWrite + Unpin + Send + 'static,
{
// 1. Generate auth token: [8-byte timestamp BE] ++ [HMAC-SHA256]
let timestamp = std::time::SystemTime::now().duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)?.as_secs();
let ts_bytes = timestamp.to_be_bytes();
use hmac::Mac;
let mut mac = <HmacSha256 as Mac>::new_from_slice(access_key).unwrap_or_else(|_| <HmacSha256 as Mac>::new_from_slice(b"").unwrap());
mac.update(&ts_bytes);
let mac_bytes = mac.finalize().into_bytes();
let mut sig_bytes = Vec::with_capacity(8 + mac_bytes.len());
sig_bytes.extend_from_slice(&ts_bytes);
sig_bytes.extend_from_slice(&mac_bytes);
let auth_token = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD_NO_PAD.encode(&sig_bytes);
let http_host = if sni.is_empty() { target_ip.to_string() } else { sni.to_string() };
let req = if wss {
format!(
"GET /wss HTTP/1.1\r\n\
Host: {}\r\n\
Upgrade: websocket\r\n\
Connection: upgrade\r\n\
Sec-WebSocket-Key: dGhlIHNhbXBsZSBub25jZQ==\r\n\
Sec-WebSocket-Version: 13\r\n\
Authorization: Bearer {}\r\n\
\r\n",
http_host, auth_token
)
} else {
format!(
"GET /stream HTTP/1.1\r\n\
Host: {}\r\n\
Authorization: Bearer {}\r\n\
\r\n",
http_host, auth_token
)
};
stream.write_all(req.as_bytes()).await?;
// Wait for HTTP 200 OK or 101 Switching Protocols
let mut header_buf = Vec::new();
let mut temp = [0u8; 1];
loop {
let n = stream.read(&mut temp).await?;
if n == 0 {
anyhow::bail!("connection closed by server during handshake");
}
header_buf.push(temp[0]);
if header_buf.ends_with(b"\r\n\r\n") {
break;
}
if header_buf.len() > 8192 {
anyhow::bail!("server response too long");
}
}
let resp_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&header_buf);
if wss {
if !resp_str.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 101 ") {
anyhow::bail!("failed to switch protocols: {}", resp_str.lines().next().unwrap_or(""));
}
} else {
if !resp_str.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 200 OK") {
anyhow::bail!("server rejected stream: {}", resp_str.lines().next().unwrap_or(""));
}
}
let (tx, mut rx) = mpsc::channel::<Bytes>(16384);
let (mut read_half, mut write_half) = tokio::io::split(stream);
let writer_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Some(packet) = rx.recv().await {
if wss {
let header = encode_wss_frame(&packet, true);
if write_half.write_all(&header).await.is_err() { break; }
} else {
let mut out = BytesMut::with_capacity(2 + packet.len());
out.put_u16(packet.len() as u16);
out.put_slice(&packet);
if write_half.write_all(&out).await.is_err() { break; }
}
}
});
let (in_tx, in_rx) = mpsc::channel::<Bytes>(16384);
let in_rx_arc = Arc::new(tokio::sync::Mutex::new(in_rx));
let in_tx_clone = in_tx.clone();
let reader_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
if wss {
let mut read_buf = BytesMut::with_capacity(65536);
let mut tmp = [0u8; 8192];
loop {
match read_half.read(&mut tmp).await {
Ok(0) => break,
Ok(n) => {
read_buf.put_slice(&tmp[..n]);
loop {
match decode_wss_frame(&mut read_buf) {
WssFrameResult::Frame { payload, total_len } => {
if in_tx_clone.send(Bytes::from(payload)).await.is_err() { return; }
read_buf.advance(total_len);
}
WssFrameResult::Incomplete => break,
}
}
}
Err(_) => break,
}
}
} else {
let mut len_buf = [0u8; 2];
loop {
if read_half.read_exact(&mut len_buf).await.is_err() { break; }
let len = u16::from_be_bytes(len_buf) as usize;
if len > 65535 { break; }
let mut data = vec![0u8; len];
if read_half.read_exact(&mut data).await.is_err() { break; }
if in_tx_clone.send(Bytes::from(data)).await.is_err() { break; }
}
}
});
tokio::spawn(async move {
let _ = tokio::join!(writer_task, reader_task);
});
Ok((tx, in_rx_arc))
}

View File

@ -40,12 +40,6 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
let debug = config.debug;
tracing::info!("Initializing NATIVE TUN tunnel (smoltcp)...");
// Capture physical interface index for bypass BEFORE we create the TUN device and alter routes.
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
let phys_if_for_bypass: Option<u32> = ostp_tun::windows::windows_route::sys::get_default_ipv4_route().map(|(_, idx)| idx);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
let phys_if_for_bypass: Option<u32> = None;
// ── 1. Resolve server IP ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
let server_ip = config
.ostp
@ -84,6 +78,13 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
}
}
if !config.exclusions.processes.is_empty() {
tracing::warn!(
"Process-based split tunneling is not fully supported in TUN mode on all platforms \
without WFP/eBPF. Processes in the exclusion list will still be tunneled. \
Use IP or domain exclusions instead."
);
}
// ── 3. Create TUN device via ostp-tun crate ───────────────────────────────
let opts = ostp_tun::OstpTunOptions {
@ -104,9 +105,9 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
// ── 7. Build smoltcp network stack ────────────────────────────────────────
let (stack, tcp_runner, udp_socket, tcp_listener) = StackBuilder::default()
.stack_buffer_size(1024)
.tcp_buffer_size(1024)
.udp_buffer_size(1024)
.stack_buffer_size(100_000)
.tcp_buffer_size(100_000)
.udp_buffer_size(100_000)
.enable_tcp(true)
.enable_udp(true)
.mtu(config.ostp.mtu)
@ -160,41 +161,10 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
}
a
};
// Build exclusion matcher for dynamic bypass
let current_exclusions = exclusions_rx.borrow().clone();
let matcher = crate::tunnel::exclusion::ExclusionMatcher::new(&current_exclusions, None, None);
let matcher_arc = std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::RwLock::new(matcher));
let matcher_clone = matcher_arc.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Ok(_) = exclusions_rx.changed().await {
let current = exclusions_rx.borrow().clone();
let new_matcher = crate::tunnel::exclusion::ExclusionMatcher::new(&current, None, None);
*matcher_clone.write().await = new_matcher;
if true {
tracing::debug!("Desktop TUN exclusions hot-reloaded");
}
}
});
// Linux: physical interface name for SO_BINDTODEVICE
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
let linux_phys_name = crate::tunnel::proxy::get_linux_physical_if_name();
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
let linux_phys_name: Option<String> = None;
let _ = &linux_phys_name; // suppress unused warning on Windows
let debug_udp = debug;
let udp_matcher = matcher_arc.clone();
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
let udp_lin_name = linux_phys_name.clone();
let mut udp_proxy_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Some(udp_sock) = udp_socket {
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
super::udp_nat::run_udp_nat(udp_sock, udp_proxy_addr, debug_udp, udp_matcher, phys_if_for_bypass, udp_lin_name).await;
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
super::udp_nat::run_udp_nat(udp_sock, udp_proxy_addr, debug_udp, udp_matcher, phys_if_for_bypass, None).await;
super::udp_nat::run_udp_nat(udp_sock, udp_proxy_addr, debug_udp).await;
}
});
@ -217,7 +187,35 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
a
};
// Physical interface index was captured at the start of the function.
// Build exclusion matcher for SNI-based domain bypass (fallback / CDN handling)
let current_exclusions = exclusions_rx.borrow().clone();
let matcher = crate::tunnel::exclusion::ExclusionMatcher::new(&current_exclusions, None, None);
let matcher_arc = std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::RwLock::new(matcher));
let matcher_clone = matcher_arc.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
while let Ok(_) = exclusions_rx.changed().await {
let current = exclusions_rx.borrow().clone();
let new_matcher = crate::tunnel::exclusion::ExclusionMatcher::new(&current, None, None);
*matcher_clone.write().await = new_matcher;
if true {
tracing::debug!("Desktop TUN exclusions hot-reloaded");
}
}
});
// Physical interface index — Some on Windows, None everywhere else
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
let phys_if_for_bypass: Option<u32> = ostp_tun::windows::windows_route::sys::get_default_ipv4_route().map(|(_, idx)| idx);
#[cfg(not(target_os = "windows"))]
let phys_if_for_bypass: Option<u32> = None;
// Linux: physical interface name for SO_BINDTODEVICE
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
let linux_phys_name = crate::tunnel::proxy::get_linux_physical_if_name();
#[cfg(not(target_os = "linux"))]
let linux_phys_name: Option<String> = None;
let _ = &linux_phys_name; // suppress unused warning on Windows
let mut tcp_accept_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let Some(mut listener) = tcp_listener else { return; };
@ -230,7 +228,7 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
tokio::spawn(async move {
let matcher = matcher_arc.read().await.clone();
if debug {
if true {
tracing::debug!("TUN TCP {local} → {remote}");
}
@ -250,47 +248,27 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
// ── Decide: bypass or tunnel? ─────────────────────────────────
let mut should_bypass = false;
// 1. Process match via OS Extended TCP Table (Windows)
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
if !should_bypass {
if let Some(proc_name) = crate::tunnel::process_lookup::get_process_name_from_port(local.port()) {
if debug {
tracing::debug!("TUN TCP lookup: port {} -> process {}", local.port(), proc_name);
}
if matcher.match_process(&proc_name) {
if debug {
tracing::debug!("TUN TCP BYPASS (Process match): {} → {remote}", proc_name);
}
should_bypass = true;
}
} else {
if debug {
tracing::debug!("TUN TCP lookup: port {} -> no process found", local.port());
}
}
}
// 2. SNI domain check (belt-and-suspenders for CDNs / late-resolved IPs)
if !should_bypass && sniff_len > 0 {
// 1. SNI domain check (belt-and-suspenders for CDNs / late-resolved IPs)
if sniff_len > 0 {
if let Some(sni) =
crate::tunnel::sni_sniff::extract_sni(&sniff_buf[..sniff_len])
{
if debug {
if true {
tracing::debug!("TUN SNI: {sni}");
}
if matcher.match_domain(&sni) {
if debug {
tracing::info!("TUN TCP BYPASS (SNI domain): {sni} → {remote}");
if true {
tracing::debug!("TUN BYPASS (SNI domain): {sni} → {remote}");
}
should_bypass = true;
}
}
}
// 3. Destination IP CIDR check (for IPs not in routing table / IPv6)
// 2. Destination IP CIDR check (for IPs not in routing table / IPv6)
if !should_bypass && matcher.match_ip(&remote.ip()) {
if debug {
tracing::info!("TUN TCP BYPASS (IP match): {remote}");
if true {
tracing::debug!("TUN BYPASS (IP match): {remote}");
}
should_bypass = true;
}
@ -312,14 +290,8 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel(
remote.is_ipv6(),
idx,
) {
tracing::error!("TUN TCP BYPASS failed to bind to physical interface {}: {}", idx, e);
} else {
if debug {
tracing::info!("TUN TCP BYPASS bound to physical interface {}", idx);
}
tracing::warn!("bind_socket_to_interface failed: {e}");
}
} else {
tracing::warn!("TUN TCP BYPASS has no physical interface index!");
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
if let Some(ref name) = lin_name {
@ -454,9 +426,9 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel_from_fd(
let tun_stream = tokio::io::unix::AsyncFd::new(file)?;
let (stack, tcp_runner, udp_socket, tcp_listener) = StackBuilder::default()
.stack_buffer_size(1024)
.tcp_buffer_size(1024)
.udp_buffer_size(1024)
.stack_buffer_size(100_000)
.tcp_buffer_size(100_000)
.udp_buffer_size(100_000)
.enable_tcp(true)
.enable_udp(true)
.mtu(config.ostp.mtu)
@ -566,6 +538,14 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel_from_fd(
proxy_addr = proxy_addr.replace("0.0.0.0:", "127.0.0.1:");
}
let udp_proxy_addr = proxy_addr.clone();
let debug_udp = debug;
let mut udp_proxy_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Some(udp_sock) = udp_socket {
super::udp_nat::run_udp_nat(udp_sock, udp_proxy_addr, debug_udp).await;
}
});
let current_exclusions = exclusions_rx.borrow().clone();
let matcher = crate::tunnel::exclusion::ExclusionMatcher::new(&current_exclusions, None, None);
let matcher_arc = std::sync::Arc::new(tokio::sync::RwLock::new(matcher));
@ -582,17 +562,6 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel_from_fd(
}
});
let udp_proxy_addr = proxy_addr.clone();
let debug_udp = debug;
let udp_matcher = matcher_arc.clone();
let mut udp_proxy_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
if let Some(udp_sock) = udp_socket {
super::udp_nat::run_udp_nat(udp_sock, udp_proxy_addr, debug_udp, udp_matcher, None, None).await;
}
});
let mut tcp_accept_task = tokio::spawn(async move {
let Some(mut listener) = tcp_listener else { return; };
@ -737,7 +706,6 @@ pub async fn run_native_tunnel_from_fd(
pub async fn run_native_tunnel_from_fd(
_config: crate::config::ClientConfig,
_shutdown: watch::Receiver<bool>,
_exclusions_rx: watch::Receiver<crate::config::ExclusionConfig>,
_fd: i32,
) -> Result<()> {
Err(anyhow!("Native TUN from FD is only supported on Android"))

View File

@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ pub fn get_process_name_from_port(port: u16) -> Option<String> {
use std::fs;
use std::io::{BufRead, BufReader};
let mut target_inode = None;
let hex_port = format!("{:04X}", port);
let check_net_file = |path: &str| -> Option<u64> {
@ -145,7 +146,7 @@ pub fn get_process_name_from_port(port: u16) -> Option<String> {
None
};
let target_inode = check_net_file("/proc/net/tcp")
target_inode = check_net_file("/proc/net/tcp")
.or_else(|| check_net_file("/proc/net/tcp6"))
.or_else(|| check_net_file("/proc/net/udp"))
.or_else(|| check_net_file("/proc/net/udp6"));

View File

@ -32,7 +32,6 @@ extern "system" {
pub fn bind_socket_to_interface(socket: &impl AsRawSocket, is_ipv6: bool, if_index: u32) -> std::io::Result<()> {
let s = socket.as_raw_socket() as usize;
if is_ipv6 {
// IPV6_UNICAST_IF expects interface index in host byte order
let optval = if_index;
let ret = unsafe {
setsockopt(
@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ pub fn bind_socket_to_interface(socket: &impl AsRawSocket, is_ipv6: bool, if_ind
return Err(std::io::Error::last_os_error());
}
} else {
// IP_UNICAST_IF expects interface index in NETWORK byte order (big-endian)
let optval = if_index.to_be();
let ret = unsafe {
setsockopt(
@ -208,7 +206,10 @@ pub async fn run_local_socks5_proxy(
.await
.with_context(|| format!("failed to bind local HTTP/SOCKS5 proxy at {}", cfg.bind_addr))?;
tracing::info!("local HTTP/SOCKS5 proxy listening at {}", cfg.bind_addr);
if true {
tracing::info!("local HTTP/SOCKS5 proxy listening at {}", cfg.bind_addr);
tracing::info!("Windows system proxy: set HTTP proxy to {}. tun2socks: SOCKS5 on same address.", cfg.bind_addr);
}
let physical_if_index = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(get_windows_physical_if_index).await.unwrap_or(None);
let physical_if_name = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(get_linux_physical_if_name).await.unwrap_or(None);
@ -361,10 +362,6 @@ async fn handle_udp_associate(
let mut direct_udp_v4: Option<Arc<UdpSocket>> = None;
let mut direct_udp_v6: Option<Arc<UdpSocket>> = None;
// Held only to keep the direct-UDP readers' cancellation senders alive;
// dropping this (on every return path from this function) is what tells
// spawn_direct_udp_reader's tasks to stop. See its doc comment.
let mut direct_udp_cancel_txs: Vec<tokio::sync::oneshot::Sender<()>> = Vec::new();
let mut tcp_buf = [0u8; 1];
loop {
@ -436,9 +433,7 @@ async fn handle_udp_associate(
match create_udp_socket_bypassing_tun(true, matcher.physical_if_index, &matcher.physical_if_name).await {
Ok(s) => {
let s_arc = Arc::new(s);
let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
spawn_direct_udp_reader(s_arc.clone(), sock_tx.clone(), client_udp_addr.clone(), debug, cancel_rx);
direct_udp_cancel_txs.push(cancel_tx);
spawn_direct_udp_reader(s_arc.clone(), sock_tx.clone(), client_udp_addr.clone(), debug);
direct_udp_v6 = Some(s_arc);
}
Err(e) => {
@ -452,9 +447,7 @@ async fn handle_udp_associate(
match create_udp_socket_bypassing_tun(false, matcher.physical_if_index, &matcher.physical_if_name).await {
Ok(s) => {
let s_arc = Arc::new(s);
let (cancel_tx, cancel_rx) = tokio::sync::oneshot::channel();
spawn_direct_udp_reader(s_arc.clone(), sock_tx.clone(), client_udp_addr.clone(), debug, cancel_rx);
direct_udp_cancel_txs.push(cancel_tx);
spawn_direct_udp_reader(s_arc.clone(), sock_tx.clone(), client_udp_addr.clone(), debug);
direct_udp_v4 = Some(s_arc);
}
Err(e) => {
@ -527,25 +520,12 @@ fn spawn_direct_udp_reader(
direct_socket: Arc<UdpSocket>,
sock_tx: Arc<UdpSocket>,
client_udp_addr: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Option<std::net::SocketAddr>>>,
_debug: bool,
mut cancel_rx: tokio::sync::oneshot::Receiver<()>,
debug: bool,
) {
tokio::spawn(async move {
let mut buf = vec![0u8; 65536];
loop {
let recv_result = tokio::select! {
// Fires as soon as the sender half (held by handle_udp_associate
// for exactly this reason) is dropped - which happens the
// instant that function returns, on every exit path, with no
// explicit signaling needed. Without this, a UDP-associate
// session that ever bypassed traffic direct (excluded IP/
// domain) leaked this socket + task for the rest of the
// process's life once the session ended: nothing else ever
// stopped this loop.
_ = &mut cancel_rx => break,
res = direct_socket.recv_from(&mut buf) => res,
};
match recv_result {
match direct_socket.recv_from(&mut buf).await {
Ok((len, target_addr)) => {
let client_addr = {
let guard = client_udp_addr.lock().unwrap();
@ -683,7 +663,9 @@ async fn handle_proxy_client(
).await;
}
tracing::debug!("proxy CONNECT stream_id={stream_id} target={target}");
if true {
tracing::info!("proxy CONNECT stream_id={stream_id} target={target}");
}
let target_host = if let Some((host, _)) = split_host_port(&target) { host } else { target.clone() };
let target_port = match split_host_port(&target) { Some((_, p)) => p, None => 0 };
if matcher.should_bypass_target(&target_host, target_port, connect_timeout).await {
@ -898,7 +880,7 @@ async fn direct_connect_socks5(
physical_if_index: Option<u32>,
physical_if_name: &Option<String>,
close_tx: mpsc::Sender<u16>,
_debug: bool,
debug: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
if true {
tracing::info!("proxy BYPASS stream_id={stream_id} target={target}");
@ -920,7 +902,7 @@ async fn direct_connect_http(
physical_if_index: Option<u32>,
physical_if_name: &Option<String>,
close_tx: mpsc::Sender<u16>,
_debug: bool,
debug: bool,
) -> Result<()> {
if true {
tracing::info!("proxy BYPASS stream_id={stream_id} target={target}");

View File

@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ pub async fn run_udp_nat(
udp_socket: netstack_smoltcp::UdpSocket,
proxy_addr: String,
debug: bool,
matcher: std::sync::Arc<tokio::sync::RwLock<crate::tunnel::exclusion::ExclusionMatcher>>,
phys_if_index: Option<u32>,
phys_if_name: Option<String>,
) {
let (mut rx, tx) = udp_socket.split();
let tx = Arc::new(Mutex::new(tx));
@ -30,73 +27,24 @@ pub async fn run_udp_nat(
if payload.is_empty() { continue; }
if !sessions.contains_key(&src) {
let (session_tx, mut session_rx) = mpsc::channel::<(Vec<u8>, SocketAddr)>(1024);
let (session_tx, mut session_rx) = mpsc::channel::<(Vec<u8>, SocketAddr)>(100000);
sessions.insert(src, session_tx);
let proxy_addr_clone = proxy_addr.clone();
let tx_clone = tx.clone();
let mut should_bypass = false;
{
let matcher_guard = matcher.read().await;
if matcher_guard.match_ip(&dst.ip()) {
should_bypass = true;
if debug {
tracing::info!("TUN UDP BYPASS (IP match): {} → {}", src, dst);
}
}
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
if !should_bypass {
if let Some(proc_name) = crate::tunnel::process_lookup::get_process_name_from_port_udp(src.port()) {
if debug {
tracing::debug!("TUN UDP lookup: port {} -> process {}", src.port(), proc_name);
}
if matcher_guard.match_process(&proc_name) {
should_bypass = true;
if debug {
tracing::debug!("TUN UDP BYPASS (Process match): {} ({} → {})", proc_name, src, dst);
}
}
} else {
if debug {
tracing::debug!("TUN UDP lookup: port {} -> no process found", src.port());
}
}
}
}
let p_if_idx = phys_if_index;
let p_if_name = phys_if_name.clone();
tokio::spawn(async move {
if should_bypass {
if debug {
tracing::info!("Starting UDP BYPASS session for {}", src);
}
let res = start_udp_bypass_session(src, p_if_idx, p_if_name, &mut session_rx, tx_clone).await;
if res.is_err() {
tracing::debug!("UDP BYPASS session for {} ended: {:?}", src, res.err());
}
} else {
tracing::debug!("Starting UDP NAT session for {}", src);
let res = start_udp_session(src, proxy_addr_clone, &mut session_rx, tx_clone).await;
if res.is_err() {
tracing::debug!("UDP NAT session for {} ended: {:?}", src, res.err());
}
tracing::debug!("Starting UDP NAT session for {}", src);
let res = start_udp_session(src, proxy_addr_clone, &mut session_rx, tx_clone).await;
if res.is_err() {
tracing::debug!("UDP NAT session for {} ended: {:?}", src, res.err());
}
});
}
if let Some(sender) = sessions.get(&src) {
match sender.try_send((payload, dst)) {
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Closed(_)) => {
sessions.remove(&src);
}
Err(mpsc::error::TrySendError::Full(_)) => {
// Drop packet to avoid blocking the TUN interface loop
}
Ok(_) => {}
if sender.send((payload, dst)).await.is_err() {
sessions.remove(&src);
}
}
}
@ -110,68 +58,6 @@ pub async fn run_udp_nat(
}
}
async fn start_udp_bypass_session(
client_src: SocketAddr,
phys_if_index: Option<u32>,
_phys_if_name: Option<String>,
session_rx: &mut mpsc::Receiver<(Vec<u8>, SocketAddr)>,
smoltcp_tx: Arc<Mutex<netstack_smoltcp::udp::WriteHalf>>,
) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
let socket = match client_src {
SocketAddr::V4(_) => UdpSocket::bind("0.0.0.0:0").await?,
SocketAddr::V6(_) => UdpSocket::bind("[::]:0").await?,
};
#[cfg(target_os = "windows")]
if let Some(idx) = phys_if_index {
if let Err(e) = crate::tunnel::proxy::bind_socket_to_interface(&socket, client_src.is_ipv6(), idx) {
tracing::error!("TUN UDP BYPASS failed to bind to physical interface {}: {}", idx, e);
} else {
// Keep debug log
}
} else {
tracing::warn!("TUN UDP BYPASS has no physical interface index!");
}
#[cfg(target_os = "linux")]
if let Some(ref name) = _phys_if_name {
let _ = crate::tunnel::proxy::bind_socket_to_interface(&socket, name);
}
// A single select! loop over both directions, rather than spawning a
// separate task for the read side, so the whole session - physical
// socket included - is torn down the moment this function returns
// (e.g. when session_rx closes). The previous spawned-task version left
// that task (and its Arc<UdpSocket> clone, keeping the OS socket fd
// alive) running forever after this function returned: nothing ever
// cancelled it, so every bypassed UDP flow (any excluded app/IP in TUN
// mode) leaked one socket + one task for the lifetime of the process.
use futures::SinkExt;
let mut buf = [0u8; 65536];
loop {
tokio::select! {
outbound = session_rx.recv() => {
match outbound {
Some((payload, dst)) => { socket.send_to(&payload, dst).await?; }
None => break,
}
}
inbound = socket.recv_from(&mut buf) => {
match inbound {
Ok((n, peer)) => {
let mut lock = smoltcp_tx.lock().await;
let _ = lock.send((buf[..n].to_vec(), peer, client_src)).await;
}
Err(_) => break,
}
}
}
}
Ok(())
}
async fn start_udp_session(
client_src: SocketAddr,
proxy_addr: String,

View File

@ -4,12 +4,6 @@
//! bandwidth and minimum RTT to determine the optimal sending rate.
//! This replaces the fixed `retransmit_budget = 8` with an adaptive
//! congestion window that responds to network conditions.
//!
//! RTO calculation follows RFC 6298:
//! SRTT = (1 - α) * SRTT + α * RTT (α = 1/8)
//! RTTVAR = (1 - β) * RTTVAR + β * |SRTT - RTT| (β = 1/4)
//! RTO = SRTT + 4 * RTTVAR
//! clamped to [RTO_MIN, RTO_MAX]
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
@ -21,14 +15,8 @@ pub struct CongestionController {
ssthresh: u64,
/// Current phase
phase: Phase,
/// Minimum RTT observed (for BBR-style bandwidth estimation)
/// Minimum RTT observed
min_rtt: Duration,
/// Smoothed RTT (RFC 6298 SRTT)
srtt: Duration,
/// RTT variance (RFC 6298 RTTVAR)
rttvar: Duration,
/// Whether we have received a first RTT sample
rtt_initialized: bool,
/// Bytes currently in flight (unacknowledged)
bytes_in_flight: u64,
/// Total bytes acknowledged (for bandwidth estimation)
@ -39,141 +27,46 @@ pub struct CongestionController {
loss_count: u32,
/// Pacing rate: bytes per second
pacing_rate: u64,
/// Token-bucket allowance for pacing, in bytes.
pacing_tokens: f64,
pacing_last_refill: Instant,
/// MTU estimate (used for cwnd → packet count conversion)
mtu: u64,
/// Min RTT expiry: re-probe after 10 seconds
min_rtt_stamp: Instant,
/// Loss events counted toward SLOW_START_LOSS_TOLERANCE within the
/// current SLOW_START_LOSS_WINDOW (see on_loss's SlowStart arm).
slow_start_losses: u32,
/// Start of the current loss-tolerance window.
slow_start_loss_window_start: Instant,
}
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Phase {
/// Exponential growth until loss or ssthresh
SlowStart,
/// Probe bandwidth: additive increase
/// Probe bandwidth: cycle through pacing gains
ProbeBandwidth,
}
/// Initial congestion window: 32 packets × MTU (IW10 is too conservative for modern links)
const INITIAL_CWND_PACKETS: u64 = 32;
/// Initial congestion window: 10 packets × MTU
const INITIAL_CWND_PACKETS: u64 = 10;
/// Minimum cwnd: 2 packets
const MIN_CWND_PACKETS: u64 = 2;
/// Min RTT expiry window (after which we re-probe)
const MIN_RTT_EXPIRY: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
/// Minimum RTO (RFC 6298: 1s in TCP; we use 50ms since we own the protocol)
/// Absolute ceiling on the congestion window, in packets. At a ~1200-byte MTU
/// this is roughly 1.2 MB in flight — already far above the bandwidth-delay
/// product of any link this protocol realistically runs over, so anything
/// beyond it is standing queue, not throughput. The client previously allowed
/// up to 16384 packets (~20 MB), which on a mobile uplink is minutes of buffer.
const MAX_CWND_PACKETS: u64 = 1024;
/// SRTT/min_rtt ratio at which slow start stops. Doubling is what fills a deep
/// buffer fastest, so growth must end when the queue starts building rather
/// than waiting for a loss that a deep buffer may never produce.
const RTT_INFLATION_EXIT_SLOW_START: f64 = 2.0;
/// SRTT/min_rtt ratio treated as a standing queue that must be actively drained.
const RTT_INFLATION_BACKOFF: f64 = 4.0;
/// How much pacing allowance may accumulate, expressed as time-at-rate.
const PACING_BURST: Duration = Duration::from_millis(10);
const RTO_MIN: Duration = Duration::from_millis(50);
/// Maximum RTO
const RTO_MAX: Duration = Duration::from_secs(16);
/// Initial RTT estimate — 30 ms is reasonable for a well-connected VPN server.
/// Will be replaced by first real measurement within milliseconds.
const INITIAL_RTT: Duration = Duration::from_millis(30);
/// Isolated packet loss during slow start (a single dropped frame from
/// wireless noise, a brief LTE handover blip, etc.) is normal on real
/// mobile/Wi-Fi links and does NOT mean the link is congested. The previous
/// behavior exited slow start and halved cwnd on the very FIRST loss, which
/// on any link with a non-zero background loss rate permanently downgrades
/// the session from exponential growth to linear (+1 MTU/RTT) ProbeBandwidth
/// growth within the first few RTTs - turning what should be a sub-second
/// ramp-up into tens of seconds to minutes before throughput opens up
/// (observed as: a trickle of KB/s, then a sudden jump once cwnd finally
/// claws back up). Only treat loss as a real congestion signal - and pay
/// the full slow-start-exit + halving cost - once this many losses land
/// within SLOW_START_LOSS_WINDOW.
const SLOW_START_LOSS_TOLERANCE: u32 = 3;
/// Window within which SLOW_START_LOSS_TOLERANCE losses must land to count
/// as sustained (rather than isolated) loss. Roughly a few RTTs on a
/// well-connected link, generous on a slow one.
const SLOW_START_LOSS_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::from_millis(500);
impl CongestionController {
pub fn new(mtu: u64) -> Self {
let now = Instant::now();
let initial_cwnd = INITIAL_CWND_PACKETS * mtu;
// Initial pacing: deliver cwnd in ~2 RTTs to fill the pipe quickly
let initial_pacing = initial_cwnd * 1_000_000 / INITIAL_RTT.as_micros().max(1) as u64;
Self {
cwnd: initial_cwnd,
ssthresh: u64::MAX,
phase: Phase::SlowStart,
min_rtt: INITIAL_RTT,
srtt: INITIAL_RTT,
rttvar: INITIAL_RTT / 2,
rtt_initialized: false,
min_rtt: Duration::from_millis(100), // Conservative initial estimate
bytes_in_flight: 0,
total_acked: 0,
last_ack_time: now,
loss_count: 0,
pacing_rate: initial_pacing,
pacing_rate: initial_cwnd * 10, // initial: ~10 windows/sec
mtu,
min_rtt_stamp: now,
slow_start_losses: 0,
slow_start_loss_window_start: now,
pacing_tokens: (INITIAL_CWND_PACKETS * mtu) as f64,
pacing_last_refill: now,
}
}
/// Bytes of pacing allowance available right now, without consuming any.
///
/// Read-only so the send path can use it as an admission check before it
/// commits to building a datagram.
pub fn pacing_available(&self) -> f64 {
let elapsed = self.pacing_last_refill.elapsed().as_secs_f64();
(self.pacing_tokens + elapsed * self.pacing_rate as f64).min(self.pacing_burst())
}
/// Whether at least one full-size packet may be released right now.
pub fn can_pace_packet(&self) -> bool {
self.pacing_available() >= self.mtu as f64
}
/// Ceiling on accumulated allowance.
///
/// Pacing intervals here are fractions of a millisecond, so releasing
/// strictly one packet at a time would need a sub-millisecond timer per
/// packet. Instead we allow a short burst — the same trade every real
/// pacing implementation makes — sized so the loop's existing ~10ms wakeups
/// can still saturate the configured rate, with a small floor so a
/// cold/low estimate can never wedge sending entirely.
fn pacing_burst(&self) -> f64 {
let by_rate = self.pacing_rate as f64 * PACING_BURST.as_secs_f64();
by_rate.max((self.mtu * 4) as f64)
}
/// Refill from elapsed time and deduct `bytes`. Called on the real send
/// path; allowance is permitted to go negative so an oversized packet still
/// pays for itself rather than being released for free.
fn consume_pacing(&mut self, bytes: u64) {
let now = Instant::now();
let elapsed = now.duration_since(self.pacing_last_refill).as_secs_f64();
self.pacing_last_refill = now;
self.pacing_tokens =
(self.pacing_tokens + elapsed * self.pacing_rate as f64).min(self.pacing_burst())
- bytes as f64;
}
/// Returns the current congestion window in bytes.
pub fn cwnd(&self) -> u64 {
self.cwnd
@ -189,20 +82,9 @@ impl CongestionController {
self.pacing_rate
}
/// Returns the smoothed RTT estimate (SRTT).
/// Returns the smoothed RTT estimate.
pub fn smoothed_rtt(&self) -> Duration {
self.srtt
}
/// Returns the adaptive RTO computed per RFC 6298:
/// RTO = SRTT + 4 * RTTVAR, clamped to [RTO_MIN, RTO_MAX].
///
/// This replaces the static `rto_ms` field in ProtocolMachine so that
/// retransmit timers automatically track changing network conditions.
pub fn rto(&self) -> Duration {
let rttvar4 = self.rttvar.saturating_mul(4);
let rto = self.srtt.saturating_add(rttvar4);
rto.clamp(RTO_MIN, RTO_MAX)
self.min_rtt
}
/// Returns how many bytes can still be sent.
@ -225,24 +107,6 @@ impl CongestionController {
/// Record that we sent `bytes` of data.
pub fn on_send(&mut self, bytes: u64) {
self.bytes_in_flight = self.bytes_in_flight.saturating_add(bytes);
// Charge the pacing bucket here rather than at the admission check, so
// every byte that actually reaches the wire is paid for exactly once —
// including retransmits, which are precisely what must not be allowed
// to bypass the rate limit and pile into an already-full queue.
self.consume_pacing(bytes);
}
/// Record that `bytes` were acknowledged but WITHOUT a usable RTT sample
/// (e.g. every acked frame was retransmitted, so Karn's algorithm forbids
/// measuring RTT from it). The window still advances; only the RTT estimator
/// is left untouched.
pub fn on_ack_no_rtt(&mut self, bytes: u64) {
let now = Instant::now();
self.bytes_in_flight = self.bytes_in_flight.saturating_sub(bytes);
self.total_acked = self.total_acked.saturating_add(bytes);
self.grow_window(bytes);
self.update_pacing_rate();
self.last_ack_time = now;
}
/// Record that `bytes` were acknowledged with the given RTT sample.
@ -251,57 +115,16 @@ impl CongestionController {
self.bytes_in_flight = self.bytes_in_flight.saturating_sub(bytes);
self.total_acked = self.total_acked.saturating_add(bytes);
// Update RTT measurements
// Update RTT
self.update_rtt(rtt, now);
self.grow_window(bytes);
self.update_pacing_rate();
self.last_ack_time = now;
}
/// Congestion-window growth shared by both ACK paths (slow start / probe).
fn grow_window(&mut self, bytes: u64) {
// ── Delay-based congestion signal ────────────────────────────────────
// A loss-only controller is blind on a deeply-buffered path, and mobile
// carrier buffers are very deep: they absorb a burst instead of dropping
// it, so no loss is ever signalled and cwnd keeps growing. The queue —
// not the link — is what grows, and the standing delay it adds shows up
// as RTT inflating far above the path's floor. Left unchecked this is a
// positive feedback loop: bigger queue -> larger RTT samples -> larger
// SRTT -> larger RTO -> retransmits pile on -> bigger queue, which is
// how a session ends up reporting multi-second (even multi-minute) RTT
// and stalls video until the buffer finally drains or the user
// reconnects. Treat sustained RTT inflation as congestion in its own
// right, exactly as it is.
let inflation = if self.rtt_initialized && !self.min_rtt.is_zero() {
self.srtt.as_secs_f64() / self.min_rtt.as_secs_f64()
} else {
1.0
};
if inflation >= RTT_INFLATION_BACKOFF {
// Standing queue is severe — actively drain it.
self.cwnd = (self.cwnd / 2).max(MIN_CWND_PACKETS * self.mtu);
self.ssthresh = self.cwnd;
self.phase = Phase::ProbeBandwidth;
tracing::debug!(cwnd = self.cwnd, inflation, "congestion: draining standing queue");
self.clamp_cwnd();
return;
}
// Update bandwidth estimate
self.update_bandwidth(bytes, now);
// State machine
match self.phase {
Phase::SlowStart => {
// Exponential doubling is what fills a deep buffer fastest, so
// leave slow start as soon as the queue starts to build rather
// than waiting for the loss that may never come.
if inflation >= RTT_INFLATION_EXIT_SLOW_START {
self.ssthresh = self.cwnd;
self.phase = Phase::ProbeBandwidth;
tracing::debug!(cwnd = self.cwnd, inflation, "congestion: RTT inflation ended slow start");
self.clamp_cwnd();
return;
}
// Exponential growth: increase cwnd by acked bytes (doubles per RTT)
// Exponential growth: increase cwnd by acked bytes
self.cwnd = self.cwnd.saturating_add(bytes);
if self.cwnd >= self.ssthresh {
self.phase = Phase::ProbeBandwidth;
@ -314,20 +137,8 @@ impl CongestionController {
}
}
self.clamp_cwnd();
}
/// Hard ceiling on the congestion window.
///
/// Independent of any estimate: no real path this protocol runs over has a
/// bandwidth-delay product anywhere near this, so a window above it is
/// buffered queue rather than data in transit. Without it, slow start on a
/// buffer that never drops could grow the window into the tens of megabytes.
fn clamp_cwnd(&mut self) {
let ceiling = MAX_CWND_PACKETS.saturating_mul(self.mtu);
if self.cwnd > ceiling {
self.cwnd = ceiling;
}
self.update_pacing_rate();
self.last_ack_time = now;
}
/// Record a loss event.
@ -337,28 +148,11 @@ impl CongestionController {
match self.phase {
Phase::SlowStart => {
let now = Instant::now();
if now.duration_since(self.slow_start_loss_window_start) > SLOW_START_LOSS_WINDOW {
// Previous window's losses have aged out - this loss starts a fresh count.
self.slow_start_losses = 0;
self.slow_start_loss_window_start = now;
}
self.slow_start_losses += 1;
if self.slow_start_losses >= SLOW_START_LOSS_TOLERANCE {
// Sustained loss within the window: treat as real congestion.
// Exit slow start, set ssthresh to half of cwnd.
self.ssthresh = self.cwnd / 2;
self.cwnd = self.ssthresh.max(MIN_CWND_PACKETS * self.mtu);
self.phase = Phase::ProbeBandwidth;
tracing::debug!(cwnd = self.cwnd, ssthresh = self.ssthresh, "congestion: sustained loss during slow start, exiting");
} else {
// Isolated loss: likely non-congestive noise. Take a mild,
// temporary haircut but keep exponential growth going -
// don't throw away slow start over a single dropped frame.
self.cwnd = (self.cwnd * 8 / 10).max(MIN_CWND_PACKETS * self.mtu);
tracing::debug!(cwnd = self.cwnd, count = self.slow_start_losses, "congestion: isolated loss during slow start, staying in slow start");
}
// Exit slow start, set ssthresh to half of cwnd
self.ssthresh = self.cwnd / 2;
self.cwnd = self.ssthresh.max(MIN_CWND_PACKETS * self.mtu);
self.phase = Phase::ProbeBandwidth;
tracing::debug!(cwnd = self.cwnd, ssthresh = self.ssthresh, "congestion: loss during slow start");
}
Phase::ProbeBandwidth => {
// Multiplicative decrease: cwnd *= 0.7 (BBR-style, less aggressive than Cubic's 0.5)
@ -370,49 +164,32 @@ impl CongestionController {
self.update_pacing_rate();
}
/// Called periodically to update state.
pub fn on_tick(&mut self) {
// Nothing special needed per-tick -- state updates happen on ACK/loss
}
// ── Private ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
fn update_rtt(&mut self, rtt: Duration, now: Instant) {
// Update windowed minimum RTT (for pacing)
// Track windowed minimum RTT
if rtt < self.min_rtt || now.duration_since(self.min_rtt_stamp) >= MIN_RTT_EXPIRY {
self.min_rtt = rtt;
self.min_rtt_stamp = now;
}
// Update SRTT and RTTVAR per RFC 6298
if !self.rtt_initialized {
// First measurement: initialize directly
self.srtt = rtt;
self.rttvar = rtt / 2;
self.rtt_initialized = true;
} else {
// RTTVAR = (3/4) * RTTVAR + (1/4) * |SRTT - R|
let diff = if rtt > self.srtt {
rtt - self.srtt
} else {
self.srtt - rtt
};
// Integer-safe: RTTVAR = RTTVAR - RTTVAR/4 + diff/4
self.rttvar = self.rttvar
.saturating_sub(self.rttvar / 4)
.saturating_add(diff / 4);
// SRTT = (7/8) * SRTT + (1/8) * R
self.srtt = self.srtt
.saturating_sub(self.srtt / 8)
.saturating_add(rtt / 8);
}
tracing::trace!(
srtt_ms = self.srtt.as_millis(),
rttvar_ms = self.rttvar.as_millis(),
rto_ms = self.rto().as_millis(),
"congestion: RTT updated"
);
}
fn update_bandwidth(&mut self, _acked_bytes: u64, now: Instant) {
let elapsed = now.duration_since(self.last_ack_time);
if elapsed.as_micros() > 0 {
// Removed bw_samples tracking
}
}
fn update_pacing_rate(&mut self) {
// Pacing rate = cwnd / min_rtt (delivery rate target)
// Pacing rate = cwnd / min_rtt (with gain)
let rtt_us = self.min_rtt.as_micros().max(1) as u64;
self.pacing_rate = self.cwnd * 1_000_000 / rtt_us;
}
@ -425,18 +202,19 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn test_initial_state() {
let cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
assert_eq!(cc.cwnd(), 32 * 1200); // 32 * 1200
assert_eq!(cc.cwnd(), 12000); // 10 * 1200
assert!(cc.can_send());
assert_eq!(cc.cwnd_packets(), 32);
assert_eq!(cc.cwnd_packets(), 10);
}
#[test]
fn test_slow_start_growth() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
let initial = cc.cwnd();
// Simulate sending and ACKing
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(50));
assert!(cc.cwnd() > initial);
// cwnd should grow
assert!(cc.cwnd() > 12000);
}
#[test]
@ -447,143 +225,11 @@ mod tests {
assert!(cc.cwnd() < initial);
}
/// The bufferbloat case: a deep buffer absorbs everything, so NOTHING is
/// ever lost, but the standing queue inflates RTT. A loss-only controller
/// grows cwnd forever here — which is how a session ends up reporting
/// multi-second RTT and stalling video.
#[test]
fn test_rtt_inflation_halts_growth_without_any_loss() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// Establish a low path floor; this becomes min_rtt.
for _ in 0..4 {
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(20));
}
let cwnd_before = cc.cwnd();
// Queue builds: RTT climbs far above the floor, still zero loss.
for _ in 0..20 {
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(400));
}
assert!(
cc.cwnd() <= cwnd_before,
"cwnd kept growing while the queue was inflating RTT ({} -> {})",
cwnd_before,
cc.cwnd()
);
}
/// Pacing must actually bound the release rate: draining the bucket has to
/// deny the next packet. Without this the congestion window alone decides,
/// and a whole window leaves back-to-back.
#[test]
fn test_pacing_bucket_denies_once_drained() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
assert!(cc.can_pace_packet(), "a fresh controller must allow sending");
// Spend well beyond one burst allowance.
let burst_bytes = cc.pacing_available();
let mut spent = 0.0;
while spent <= burst_bytes + 1200.0 {
cc.on_send(1200);
spent += 1200.0;
}
assert!(
!cc.can_pace_packet(),
"pacing allowed unbounded sending: {} bytes still available after spending {}",
cc.pacing_available(),
spent
);
}
/// The allowance must refill over time, or sending would stall permanently
/// once the first burst is spent.
#[test]
fn test_pacing_bucket_refills_over_time() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
while cc.can_pace_packet() {
cc.on_send(1200);
}
assert!(!cc.can_pace_packet());
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(25));
assert!(
cc.can_pace_packet(),
"pacing bucket never refilled; sending would be stuck forever"
);
}
/// cwnd must never exceed the absolute ceiling, however long slow start
/// runs unopposed — above it the window is buffered queue, not throughput.
#[test]
fn test_cwnd_never_exceeds_absolute_ceiling() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// Constant RTT: no inflation signal, so only the hard cap can stop this.
for _ in 0..5000 {
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(30));
}
assert!(
cc.cwnd() <= MAX_CWND_PACKETS * 1200,
"cwnd {} exceeded the {}-packet ceiling",
cc.cwnd(),
MAX_CWND_PACKETS
);
}
#[test]
fn test_isolated_slow_start_loss_does_not_exit_slow_start() {
// A single dropped packet (wireless noise, a brief handover blip) is
// normal on real links and must not permanently downgrade the
// session from exponential to linear growth.
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
cc.on_loss(1200);
assert_eq!(cc.phase, Phase::SlowStart, "one isolated loss must not exit slow start");
// It should still shrink the window somewhat (not ignored entirely),
// just far less punishing than the sustained-congestion case.
let after_one = cc.cwnd();
assert!(after_one < INITIAL_CWND_PACKETS * 1200);
}
#[test]
fn test_sustained_slow_start_loss_exits_slow_start() {
// Losses landing close together (within SLOW_START_LOSS_WINDOW) are
// a real congestion signal and must still trigger the harsher
// exit-slow-start + halve response.
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
for _ in 0..SLOW_START_LOSS_TOLERANCE {
cc.on_loss(1200);
}
assert_eq!(cc.phase, Phase::ProbeBandwidth, "sustained loss must exit slow start");
}
#[test]
fn test_slow_start_loss_window_resets_after_expiry() {
// Two losses far enough apart (window expired between them) must
// each be treated as isolated, not accumulated toward the sustained-
// loss threshold.
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
cc.on_loss(1200);
assert_eq!(cc.phase, Phase::SlowStart);
// Simulate the window having expired by resetting its start
// directly (std::thread::sleep in a unit test would be flaky/slow).
cc.slow_start_loss_window_start = Instant::now() - SLOW_START_LOSS_WINDOW - Duration::from_millis(1);
cc.on_loss(1200);
assert_eq!(cc.phase, Phase::SlowStart, "a loss after the window expired must restart the count, not accumulate");
assert_eq!(cc.slow_start_losses, 1);
}
#[test]
fn test_can_send_limits() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// Send until cwnd is exhausted
for _ in 0..32 {
for _ in 0..10 {
cc.on_send(1200);
}
assert!(!cc.can_send()); // cwnd exhausted
@ -598,63 +244,10 @@ mod tests {
}
#[test]
fn test_rtt_tracking_first_sample() {
fn test_rtt_tracking() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(25));
// After first sample: SRTT = 25ms, RTTVAR = 12ms
assert_eq!(cc.smoothed_rtt(), Duration::from_millis(25));
}
#[test]
fn test_rto_rfc6298() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// After first sample with RTT=50ms: SRTT=50ms, RTTVAR=25ms, RTO=150ms
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(50));
let rto = cc.rto();
// RTO = 50 + 4*25 = 150ms; clamped to [50ms, 16s]
assert!(rto >= RTO_MIN);
assert!(rto <= RTO_MAX);
assert_eq!(rto, Duration::from_millis(150));
}
#[test]
fn test_on_ack_no_rtt_grows_window_without_touching_srtt() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// Establish a known SRTT with a real sample.
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(40));
let srtt_before = cc.smoothed_rtt();
let cwnd_before = cc.cwnd();
// A Karn's-algorithm ACK (all acked frames were retransmitted): window
// must advance, RTT estimate must be untouched.
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack_no_rtt(1200);
assert!(cc.cwnd() > cwnd_before, "cwnd should still grow on a no-RTT ack");
assert_eq!(cc.smoothed_rtt(), srtt_before, "SRTT must not move on a no-RTT ack");
}
#[test]
fn test_rto_clamp_min() {
let cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// Even with no RTT samples, RTO should not go below RTO_MIN
assert!(cc.rto() >= RTO_MIN);
}
#[test]
fn test_rto_adapts_after_multiple_samples() {
let mut cc = CongestionController::new(1200);
// Feed several consistent RTT samples
for _ in 0..8 {
cc.on_send(1200);
cc.on_ack(1200, Duration::from_millis(20));
}
// After convergence, RTTVAR should be small → RTO close to SRTT + small margin
let rto = cc.rto();
// Should be well below 100ms (the old hardcoded default)
assert!(rto < Duration::from_millis(200));
assert!(rto >= RTO_MIN);
}
}

View File

@ -8,5 +8,4 @@ pub use noise::{NoiseRole, NoiseSession};
pub use obfuscation::{
deobfuscate_header_inplace, deobfuscate_packet_inplace, obfuscate_packet_inplace,
derive_obfuscation_key, derive_psk, derive_all_secrets, DerivedSecrets,
derive_junk_marker, current_junk_window, JUNK_MARKER_WINDOW_SECS,
};

View File

@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
use snow::{Builder, HandshakeState};
use snow::{Builder, HandshakeState, TransportState};
use crate::protocol::ProtocolError;
@ -10,15 +10,9 @@ pub enum NoiseRole {
Responder,
}
/// A Noise handshake in progress. OSTP does not use snow's transport mode: once
/// the handshake finishes we extract the raw Split() keys (see [`raw_split`])
/// and drive our own out-of-order AEAD (see `crypto::aead`), because the wire
/// protocol needs explicit per-frame nonces for reordering that snow's internal
/// nonce counter can't express.
///
/// [`raw_split`]: NoiseSession::raw_split
pub struct NoiseSession {
handshake: Box<HandshakeState>,
pub enum NoiseSession {
Handshake(Box<HandshakeState>),
Transport(TransportState),
}
impl NoiseSession {
@ -42,92 +36,50 @@ impl NoiseSession {
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::Crypto("noise-responder".to_string()))?,
};
Ok(Self { handshake: Box::new(handshake) })
Ok(Self::Handshake(Box::new(handshake)))
}
pub fn write_handshake(&mut self, payload: &[u8], out: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, ProtocolError> {
self.handshake
.write_message(payload, out)
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::Crypto("noise-write".to_string()))
match self {
NoiseSession::Handshake(hs) => hs
.write_message(payload, out)
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::Crypto("noise-write".to_string())),
NoiseSession::Transport(_) => Err(ProtocolError::State("noise already in transport".to_string())),
}
}
pub fn read_handshake(&mut self, input: &[u8], out: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize, ProtocolError> {
self.handshake
.read_message(input, out)
.map_err(|e| ProtocolError::Crypto(format!("noise-read: {:?}", e)))
}
/// Derive the two directional transport keys via Noise's Split().
///
/// SECURITY: keys are taken from the final chaining key `ck` (which absorbs
/// the ephemeral `ee` DH result via MixKey), NOT from the handshake hash `h`
/// (which only absorbs public transcript data — ephemeral pubkeys and
/// ciphertexts — and never the DH secret). Deriving from `ck` is what gives
/// the session forward secrecy: an adversary who later learns the PSK still
/// cannot recompute these keys without the ephemeral private keys, which are
/// discarded after the handshake.
///
/// Must only be called once the handshake is finished (both messages of the
/// NNpsk0 exchange processed); at that point `ck` is final. Returns
/// `(send_key, recv_key)` for the given role, matching snow's TransportState
/// direction mapping: split output `.0` is initiator→responder, `.1` is
/// responder→initiator.
pub fn raw_split(&mut self, role: NoiseRole) -> Result<([u8; 32], [u8; 32]), ProtocolError> {
if !self.handshake.is_handshake_finished() {
return Err(ProtocolError::State("handshake not finished at key split".to_string()));
match self {
NoiseSession::Handshake(hs) => hs
.read_message(input, out)
.map_err(|e| ProtocolError::Crypto(format!("noise-read: {:?}", e))),
NoiseSession::Transport(_) => Err(ProtocolError::State("noise already in transport".to_string())),
}
}
pub fn handshake_hash(&self, out: &mut [u8]) -> Result<(), ProtocolError> {
match self {
NoiseSession::Handshake(hs) => {
let hash = hs.get_handshake_hash();
if out.len() != hash.len() {
return Err(ProtocolError::Crypto("handshake hash length mismatch".to_string()));
}
out.copy_from_slice(hash);
Ok(())
}
NoiseSession::Transport(_) => Err(ProtocolError::State("noise already in transport".to_string())),
}
}
pub fn into_transport(self) -> Result<Self, ProtocolError> {
match self {
NoiseSession::Handshake(hs) => {
let transport = hs
.into_transport_mode()
.map_err(|_| ProtocolError::Crypto("noise-transport".to_string()))?;
Ok(NoiseSession::Transport(transport))
}
NoiseSession::Transport(_) => Ok(self),
}
let (k0, k1) = self.handshake.dangerously_get_raw_split();
Ok(match role {
// Initiator sends on .0 (i→r), receives on .1 (r→i).
NoiseRole::Initiator => (k0, k1),
// Responder is the mirror image.
NoiseRole::Responder => (k1, k0),
})
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
/// Drive a full NNpsk0 handshake and confirm both sides derive matching
/// directional keys. This guards the .0/.1 → send/recv role mapping in
/// `raw_split`: if it were wrong, the two sides' send/recv keys wouldn't
/// cross-match and the transport channel would silently fail to decrypt.
#[test]
fn raw_split_keys_agree_across_roles() {
let psk = [7u8; 32];
let mut initiator = NoiseSession::new(NoiseRole::Initiator, &psk).unwrap();
let mut responder = NoiseSession::new(NoiseRole::Responder, &psk).unwrap();
// msg1: initiator -> responder
let mut buf1 = [0u8; 1024];
let n1 = initiator.write_handshake(&[], &mut buf1).unwrap();
let mut tmp = [0u8; 1024];
responder.read_handshake(&buf1[..n1], &mut tmp).unwrap();
// msg2: responder -> initiator
let mut buf2 = [0u8; 1024];
let n2 = responder.write_handshake(&[], &mut buf2).unwrap();
initiator.read_handshake(&buf2[..n2], &mut tmp).unwrap();
let (i_send, i_recv) = initiator.raw_split(NoiseRole::Initiator).unwrap();
let (r_send, r_recv) = responder.raw_split(NoiseRole::Responder).unwrap();
// What the initiator sends with, the responder must receive with.
assert_eq!(i_send, r_recv, "initiator send key must equal responder recv key");
assert_eq!(r_send, i_recv, "responder send key must equal initiator recv key");
// The two directions use distinct keys.
assert_ne!(i_send, i_recv, "the two directions must not share a key");
}
/// raw_split must refuse to hand out keys before the handshake is complete —
/// keys taken from a half-mixed chaining key would be wrong and insecure.
#[test]
fn raw_split_rejected_before_handshake_finishes() {
let psk = [9u8; 32];
let mut initiator = NoiseSession::new(NoiseRole::Initiator, &psk).unwrap();
// No messages exchanged yet: handshake not finished.
assert!(initiator.raw_split(NoiseRole::Initiator).is_err());
}
}

View File

@ -54,41 +54,14 @@ fn hkdf_expand(prk: &[u8; 32], info: &[u8], len: usize) -> Vec<u8> {
/// The derivation uses the access key as both IKM and salt material,
/// split into two halves. No fixed strings are used — the access key
/// alone determines all derived values.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct DerivedSecrets {
pub obfuscation_key: [u8; 8],
pub psk: [u8; 32],
pub handshake_pad_min: usize,
pub handshake_pad_max: usize,
}
// NOTE: the junk marker is NOT part of DerivedSecrets — it is time-rotating and
// derived separately per window via `derive_junk_marker` (see below), so it
// carries no static per-user signature.
/// OSTP wire protocol version. Mixed into key derivation (NOT sent on the
/// wire) so peers running incompatible versions derive entirely different
/// secrets and therefore cannot deobfuscate / decrypt each other's traffic.
///
/// This is a hard, deterministic version gate that needs NO plaintext version
/// byte on the wire — a constant marker would defeat the project's stealth
/// north-star ("no recognizable header"). A pre-0.4.0 client (which derived
/// without a version) produces a different obfuscation key, so a 0.4.0 server
/// cannot recover its handshake header and rejects it as an unauthorized probe.
///
/// Bump this on any wire-breaking protocol change. 0.4.0 = version 4;
/// version 5 (0.4.x hardening) moved transport keys from the handshake hash to
/// Noise's Split() output — a wire-breaking crypto change, so old peers must not
/// interop (they would derive different session keys and fail decryption).
pub const PROTOCOL_VERSION: u8 = 5;
pub fn derive_all_secrets(access_key: &[u8]) -> DerivedSecrets {
derive_all_secrets_versioned(access_key, PROTOCOL_VERSION)
}
/// Version-parameterised derivation. `derive_all_secrets` always pins the
/// current `PROTOCOL_VERSION`; this form exists so tests can prove that a
/// different version yields incompatible secrets (the version gate).
pub(crate) fn derive_all_secrets_versioned(access_key: &[u8], version: u8) -> DerivedSecrets {
// Split the key hash into two halves for salt/info separation.
// This avoids using any hardcoded strings while still providing
// domain separation between the derived values.
@ -97,16 +70,8 @@ pub(crate) fn derive_all_secrets_versioned(access_key: &[u8], version: u8) -> De
let salt = &key_hash[..16];
let info_base = &key_hash[16..];
// Mix the protocol version into the IKM so a different version produces a
// completely different PRK → different obf_key / psk / padding. This is the
// wire-version gate: it is invisible on the wire (only the derived output,
// which is already indistinguishable from random, ever leaves the host).
let mut ikm = Vec::with_capacity(access_key.len() + 1);
ikm.extend_from_slice(access_key);
ikm.push(version);
// Extract PRK from version-tagged access key using its hash as salt
let prk = hkdf_extract(salt, &ikm);
// Extract PRK from access key using its own hash as salt
let prk = hkdf_extract(salt, access_key);
// Derive obfuscation key (8 bytes) — info = key_hash[16..] || 0x01
let mut obf_info = info_base.to_vec();
@ -140,53 +105,6 @@ pub(crate) fn derive_all_secrets_versioned(access_key: &[u8], version: u8) -> De
}
}
/// Window length (seconds) for the rotating junk marker. The marker changes
/// every window, so junk carries no static per-user fingerprint on the wire;
/// the server checks the current and previous window to absorb clock skew.
pub const JUNK_MARKER_WINDOW_SECS: u64 = 60;
/// The current junk-marker time window (unix seconds / window length).
pub fn current_junk_window() -> u64 {
std::time::SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH)
.map(|d| d.as_secs() / JUNK_MARKER_WINDOW_SECS)
.unwrap_or(0)
}
/// Derive the 4-byte junk marker for a given time `window`.
///
/// Uses the same version-gated HKDF scheme as [`derive_all_secrets`], with the
/// window folded into the `info` (label byte `0x04`). Folding in the window
/// makes the marker rotate: to an on-path observer the junk prefix changes every
/// window (no fixed signature), and a captured marker is only valid for ~1
/// window. Only a holder of the access key can compute it, so an outsider cannot
/// forge a silently-dropped junk packet.
pub fn derive_junk_marker(access_key: &[u8], window: u64) -> [u8; 4] {
derive_junk_marker_versioned(access_key, window, PROTOCOL_VERSION)
}
pub(crate) fn derive_junk_marker_versioned(access_key: &[u8], window: u64, version: u8) -> [u8; 4] {
use sha2::Digest;
let key_hash = sha2::Sha256::digest(access_key);
let salt = &key_hash[..16];
let info_base = &key_hash[16..];
let mut ikm = Vec::with_capacity(access_key.len() + 1);
ikm.extend_from_slice(access_key);
ikm.push(version);
let prk = hkdf_extract(salt, &ikm);
// info = key_hash[16..] || 0x04 || window(LE) — same label byte as before,
// now parameterised by the time window.
let mut info = info_base.to_vec();
info.push(0x04);
info.extend_from_slice(&window.to_le_bytes());
let bytes = hkdf_expand(&prk, &info, 4);
let mut marker = [0u8; 4];
marker.copy_from_slice(&bytes);
marker
}
// ── Legacy API (delegates to derive_all_secrets) ─────────────────────────────
pub fn derive_obfuscation_key(access_key: &[u8]) -> [u8; 8] {

View File

@ -127,37 +127,6 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(correct_sid, session_id, "correct key must recover session_id");
}
/// §C version gate: a peer on a different PROTOCOL_VERSION derives
/// different secrets, so a handshake obfuscated with the OLD version's key
/// does NOT deobfuscate to a valid session_id under the current version.
/// This is exactly what makes an old (pre-0.4.0) client fail to connect to
/// a new server — with no plaintext version marker on the wire.
#[test]
fn test_protocol_version_gates_old_clients() {
let key = b"shared_access_key_across_versions";
let new = derive_all_secrets(key); // == derive_all_secrets_versioned(key, PROTOCOL_VERSION)
let old = derive_all_secrets_versioned(key, PROTOCOL_VERSION.wrapping_sub(1));
// Different protocol version → different derived secrets.
assert_ne!(new.obfuscation_key, old.obfuscation_key, "version must change obf_key");
assert_ne!(new.psk, old.psk, "version must change psk");
// Concretely: a handshake the old client obfuscated with its key does
// not recover a valid session_id when the new server deobfuscates it.
let session_id: u32 = 0x11223344;
let noise = [0x33u8; 48];
let mut pkt = Vec::new();
pkt.extend_from_slice(&session_id.to_be_bytes());
pkt.extend_from_slice(&(noise.len() as u16).to_be_bytes());
pkt.extend_from_slice(&noise);
pkt.extend_from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
obfuscate_packet_inplace(&mut pkt, &old.obfuscation_key, true); // old client
deobfuscate_packet_inplace(&mut pkt, &new.obfuscation_key, true); // new server
let recovered = u32::from_be_bytes([pkt[0], pkt[1], pkt[2], pkt[3]]);
assert_ne!(recovered, session_id, "old-version client must NOT be accepted by new server");
}
/// Verifies data packet obfuscation round-trip (non-handshake path).
#[test]
fn test_data_packet_obfuscation_roundtrip() {
@ -191,29 +160,4 @@ mod tests {
assert_eq!(recovered_nonce, nonce);
assert_eq!(&packet[12..], &ciphertext);
}
/// The junk marker must: be stable within a window (client and server agree),
/// rotate across windows (no static on-wire fingerprint), and differ per key
/// (one user's marker never silently-drops on another user's flow).
#[test]
fn test_junk_marker_rotation() {
let key_a = b"access-key-alpha";
let key_b = b"access-key-bravo";
// Stable within a window.
assert_eq!(derive_junk_marker(key_a, 1000), derive_junk_marker(key_a, 1000));
// Rotates across adjacent windows.
assert_ne!(derive_junk_marker(key_a, 1000), derive_junk_marker(key_a, 1001));
assert_ne!(derive_junk_marker(key_a, 1000), derive_junk_marker(key_a, 999));
// Distinct per key within the same window.
assert_ne!(derive_junk_marker(key_a, 1000), derive_junk_marker(key_b, 1000));
// A different protocol version yields a different marker (version gate).
assert_ne!(
derive_junk_marker_versioned(key_a, 1000, PROTOCOL_VERSION),
derive_junk_marker_versioned(key_a, 1000, PROTOCOL_VERSION.wrapping_add(1)),
);
}
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,279 @@
use bytes::{Buf, BufMut, Bytes, BytesMut};
use chacha20poly1305::{aead::{Aead, KeyInit}, ChaCha20Poly1305, Nonce};
use hkdf::Hkdf;
use sha2::Sha256;
use x25519_dalek::{PublicKey, StaticSecret};
use rand::{rngs::OsRng, RngCore};
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
const REALITY_INFO: &[u8] = b"ostp-reality-v1";
const RECORD_HEADER_LEN: usize = 5;
const HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LEN: usize = 4;
/// Number of TLS records sent by the server during the fake handshake phase.
/// Client must read and discard this many records before starting RealityStream.
/// Layout: 1× ServerHello (0x16) + 1× CCS (0x14) + 3× fake encrypted records (0x17)
pub const REALITY_SERVER_HANDSHAKE_RECORDS: usize = 5;
/// Generates an X25519 keypair
pub fn generate_x25519_keypair() -> (StaticSecret, PublicKey) {
let secret = StaticSecret::random_from_rng(OsRng);
let public = PublicKey::from(&secret);
(secret, public)
}
/// Derives the Auth Key and Data Key from the X25519 shared secret
pub fn derive_keys(shared_secret: &[u8; 32]) -> (ChaCha20Poly1305, ChaCha20Poly1305) {
let hk = Hkdf::<Sha256>::new(None, shared_secret);
let mut okm = [0u8; 64];
hk.expand(REALITY_INFO, &mut okm).expect("HKDF expand failed");
let auth_key = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&okm[0..32]).unwrap();
let data_key = ChaCha20Poly1305::new_from_slice(&okm[32..64]).unwrap();
(auth_key, data_key)
}
/// Creates an authenticated Session ID payload (32 bytes)
/// sid: 8 bytes, timestamp: 8 bytes. Encrypted with ChaCha20Poly1305 (16 byte tag). Total = 32 bytes.
pub fn generate_session_id(auth_aead: &ChaCha20Poly1305, sid: &[u8; 8]) -> [u8; 32] {
let ts = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap().as_secs();
let mut plaintext = [0u8; 16];
plaintext[0..8].copy_from_slice(sid);
plaintext[8..16].copy_from_slice(&ts.to_be_bytes());
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&[0u8; 12]); // Fixed nonce since auth key is ephemeral per connection
let ciphertext = auth_aead.encrypt(nonce, plaintext.as_ref()).expect("encryption failed");
let mut session_id = [0u8; 32];
session_id.copy_from_slice(&ciphertext);
session_id
}
/// Verifies and decrypts the Session ID payload. Returns (sid, timestamp)
pub fn verify_session_id(auth_aead: &ChaCha20Poly1305, session_id: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<([u8; 8], u64)> {
let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&[0u8; 12]);
let plaintext = auth_aead.decrypt(nonce, session_id.as_ref()).ok()?;
if plaintext.len() != 16 {
return None;
}
let mut sid = [0u8; 8];
sid.copy_from_slice(&plaintext[0..8]);
let mut ts_bytes = [0u8; 8];
ts_bytes.copy_from_slice(&plaintext[8..16]);
let ts = u64::from_be_bytes(ts_bytes);
let now = SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).unwrap().as_secs();
// Allow up to 60 seconds of clock drift
if ts > now + 60 || ts < now.saturating_sub(60) {
return None; // Replay protection / stale connection
}
Some((sid, ts))
}
/// Builds a fake TLS 1.3 ClientHello matching Chrome's fingerprint
pub fn build_client_hello(sni: &str, session_id: &[u8; 32], c_pub: &PublicKey) -> Bytes {
let mut ext = BytesMut::new();
// SNI Extension
let sni_bytes = sni.as_bytes();
ext.put_u16(0x0000); // Type: server_name
ext.put_u16((sni_bytes.len() + 5) as u16);
ext.put_u16((sni_bytes.len() + 3) as u16); // Server Name list length
ext.put_u8(0x00); // Name Type: host_name
ext.put_u16(sni_bytes.len() as u16);
ext.put_slice(sni_bytes);
// Supported Groups
ext.put_u16(0x000a); // Type
ext.put_u16(8); // Length
ext.put_u16(6); // List length
ext.put_u16(0x001d); // x25519
ext.put_u16(0x0017); // secp256r1
ext.put_u16(0x0018); // secp384r1
// Key Share
let pub_bytes = c_pub.as_bytes();
ext.put_u16(0x0033); // Type
ext.put_u16((pub_bytes.len() + 6) as u16); // Length
ext.put_u16((pub_bytes.len() + 4) as u16); // ClientShares length
ext.put_u16(0x001d); // Group: x25519
ext.put_u16(pub_bytes.len() as u16);
ext.put_slice(pub_bytes);
// Supported Versions
ext.put_u16(0x002b); // Type
ext.put_u16(5); // Length
ext.put_u8(4); // List length
ext.put_u16(0x0304); // TLS 1.3
ext.put_u16(0x0303); // TLS 1.2
// ALPN
let alpn = b"\x02h2\x08http/1.1";
ext.put_u16(0x0010); // Type
ext.put_u16((alpn.len() + 2) as u16);
ext.put_u16(alpn.len() as u16);
ext.put_slice(alpn);
// Signature Algorithms
ext.put_u16(0x000d); // Type
ext.put_u16(10); // Length
ext.put_u16(8); // List length
ext.put_u16(0x0403); // ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256
ext.put_u16(0x0804); // rsa_pss_rsae_sha256
ext.put_u16(0x0401); // rsa_pkcs1_sha256
ext.put_u16(0x0503); // ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384
let mut handshake = BytesMut::new();
handshake.put_u16(0x0303); // Client Version
let mut random = [0u8; 32];
OsRng.fill_bytes(&mut random);
handshake.put_slice(&random); // Random
handshake.put_u8(32); // Session ID length
handshake.put_slice(session_id); // Session ID
// Cipher Suites
handshake.put_u16(6); // Length
handshake.put_u16(0x1301); // TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
handshake.put_u16(0x1303); // TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
handshake.put_u16(0x1302); // TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
// Compression
handshake.put_u8(1); // Length
handshake.put_u8(0); // null
// Extensions
handshake.put_u16(ext.len() as u16);
handshake.put_slice(&ext);
let handshake_len = handshake.len();
let mut record = BytesMut::new();
record.put_u8(0x16); // Handshake
record.put_u16(0x0301); // TLS 1.0 (Compatibility)
record.put_u16((handshake_len + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LEN) as u16); // Length
record.put_u8(0x01); // ClientHello
record.put_u8((handshake_len >> 16) as u8);
record.put_u8((handshake_len >> 8) as u8);
record.put_u8(handshake_len as u8);
record.put_slice(&handshake);
// Append ChangeCipherSpec for TLS 1.3 middlebox compatibility (RFC 8446 §D.4)
// This makes the flow look like: ClientHello → ServerHello → CCS → AppData
// instead of the DPI-suspicious: ClientHello → AppData directly.
let mut out = BytesMut::new();
out.put_slice(&record);
out.put_slice(&[0x14, 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01]);
out.freeze()
}
pub struct ParsedClientHello {
pub sni: String,
pub session_id: [u8; 32],
pub c_pub: PublicKey,
}
/// Parses a TLS ClientHello. Returns None if invalid or missing required fields.
pub fn parse_client_hello(mut buf: &[u8]) -> Option<ParsedClientHello> {
if buf.len() < RECORD_HEADER_LEN + HANDSHAKE_HEADER_LEN {
return None;
}
// Record Header
let typ = buf.get_u8();
if typ != 0x16 { return None; } // Not a handshake
let _version = buf.get_u16();
let record_len = buf.get_u16() as usize;
if buf.len() < record_len {
return None; // Incomplete record
}
let mut payload = &buf[..record_len];
// Handshake Header
let hs_type = payload.get_u8();
if hs_type != 0x01 { return None; } // Not ClientHello
let hs_len_hi = payload.get_u8() as usize;
let hs_len_mid = payload.get_u8() as usize;
let hs_len_lo = payload.get_u8() as usize;
let hs_len = (hs_len_hi << 16) | (hs_len_mid << 8) | hs_len_lo;
if payload.len() < hs_len { return None; }
let mut ch = &payload[..hs_len];
let _client_version = ch.get_u16();
if ch.len() < 32 { return None; }
ch.advance(32); // Skip Random
let sid_len = ch.get_u8() as usize;
if sid_len != 32 || ch.len() < 32 { return None; }
let mut session_id = [0u8; 32];
session_id.copy_from_slice(&ch[..32]);
ch.advance(32);
let ciphers_len = ch.get_u16() as usize;
if ch.len() < ciphers_len { return None; }
ch.advance(ciphers_len);
let comp_len = ch.get_u8() as usize;
if ch.len() < comp_len { return None; }
ch.advance(comp_len);
let ext_len = ch.get_u16() as usize;
if ch.len() < ext_len { return None; }
let mut exts = &ch[..ext_len];
let mut parsed_sni = None;
let mut parsed_c_pub = None;
while exts.len() >= 4 {
let ext_type = exts.get_u16();
let ext_len = exts.get_u16() as usize;
if exts.len() < ext_len { break; }
let mut ext_data = &exts[..ext_len];
if ext_type == 0x0000 { // SNI
let _list_len = ext_data.get_u16() as usize;
if ext_data.len() >= 3 {
let name_type = ext_data.get_u8();
if name_type == 0x00 { // Hostname
let name_len = ext_data.get_u16() as usize;
if ext_data.len() >= name_len {
if let Ok(name) = std::str::from_utf8(&ext_data[..name_len]) {
parsed_sni = Some(name.to_string());
}
}
}
}
} else if ext_type == 0x0033 { // Key Share
let _client_shares_len = ext_data.get_u16() as usize;
while ext_data.len() >= 4 {
let group = ext_data.get_u16();
let key_ex_len = ext_data.get_u16() as usize;
if ext_data.len() < key_ex_len { break; }
if group == 0x001d && key_ex_len == 32 { // X25519
let mut pub_bytes = [0u8; 32];
pub_bytes.copy_from_slice(&ext_data[..32]);
parsed_c_pub = Some(PublicKey::from(pub_bytes));
}
ext_data.advance(key_ex_len);
}
}
exts.advance(ext_len);
}
match (parsed_sni, parsed_c_pub) {
(Some(sni), Some(c_pub)) => Some(ParsedClientHello { sni, session_id, c_pub }),
_ => None,
}
}

View File

@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ pub enum FrameKind {
KeepAlive = 4,
Nack = 5,
Ack = 6,
/// 0-RTT session resumption: client sends ticket + early data
Resume = 7,
}
impl TryFrom<u8> for FrameKind {
@ -26,6 +28,7 @@ impl TryFrom<u8> for FrameKind {
4 => Ok(Self::KeepAlive),
5 => Ok(Self::Nack),
6 => Ok(Self::Ack),
7 => Ok(Self::Resume),
_ => Err(ProtocolError::Framing("unknown frame kind".to_string())),
}
}
@ -101,15 +104,7 @@ impl FramedPacket {
let payload_len = header.payload_len as usize;
let pad_len = header.pad_len as usize;
// Use checked arithmetic: payload_len is a u32 from the (decrypted, but
// still to-be-trusted) header, and on 32-bit targets — MIPS/ARMv7
// routers are supported build targets — header+payload+pad can overflow
// usize and wrap to a small value that spuriously passes the length
// check, causing an out-of-range slice below.
let expected = FRAME_HEADER_LEN
.checked_add(payload_len)
.and_then(|v| v.checked_add(pad_len))
.ok_or_else(|| ProtocolError::Framing("frame length overflow".to_string()))?;
let expected = FRAME_HEADER_LEN + payload_len + pad_len;
if buf.len() < expected {
return Err(ProtocolError::Framing("frame body truncated".to_string()));
}

View File

@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
pub mod frame;
pub mod padding;
pub mod wss;
pub use frame::{FrameHeader, FrameKind, FramedPacket};
pub use padding::{AdaptivePadder, PaddingStrategy, TrafficProfile};
pub use wss::{encode_wss_frame, decode_wss_frame, WssFrameResult};

View File

@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
use rand::RngCore;
pub enum WssFrameResult {
Incomplete,
Frame { payload: Vec<u8>, total_len: usize },
}
pub fn encode_wss_frame(payload: &[u8], masked: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
let len = payload.len();
let mut header = Vec::with_capacity(14 + len);
header.push(0x82); // FIN + Binary
let mask_bit = if masked { 0x80 } else { 0x00 };
if len <= 125 {
header.push(mask_bit | (len as u8));
} else if len <= 65535 {
header.push(mask_bit | 126);
header.extend_from_slice(&(len as u16).to_be_bytes());
} else {
header.push(mask_bit | 127);
header.extend_from_slice(&(len as u64).to_be_bytes());
}
if masked {
let mut mask = [0u8; 4];
rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut mask);
header.extend_from_slice(&mask);
for (i, &b) in payload.iter().enumerate() {
header.push(b ^ mask[i % 4]);
}
} else {
header.extend_from_slice(payload);
}
header
}
pub fn decode_wss_frame(buffer: &[u8]) -> WssFrameResult {
if buffer.len() < 2 {
return WssFrameResult::Incomplete;
}
let is_masked = (buffer[1] & 0x80) != 0;
let payload_len_7 = (buffer[1] & 0x7F) as usize;
let (header_len, payload_len) = if payload_len_7 == 126 {
if buffer.len() < 4 { return WssFrameResult::Incomplete; }
(4, u16::from_be_bytes([buffer[2], buffer[3]]) as usize)
} else if payload_len_7 == 127 {
if buffer.len() < 10 { return WssFrameResult::Incomplete; }
(10, u64::from_be_bytes([buffer[2], buffer[3], buffer[4], buffer[5], buffer[6], buffer[7], buffer[8], buffer[9]]) as usize)
} else {
(2, payload_len_7)
};
let mask_offset = header_len;
let full_header_len = header_len + if is_masked { 4 } else { 0 };
let total_frame_len = full_header_len + payload_len;
if buffer.len() < total_frame_len {
return WssFrameResult::Incomplete;
}
let mut payload = buffer[full_header_len..total_frame_len].to_vec();
if is_masked {
let mask = [buffer[mask_offset], buffer[mask_offset+1], buffer[mask_offset+2], buffer[mask_offset+3]];
for (i, b) in payload.iter_mut().enumerate() {
*b ^= mask[i % 4];
}
}
WssFrameResult::Frame { payload, total_len: total_frame_len }
}

View File

@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ pub mod crypto;
pub mod framing;
pub mod protocol;
pub mod relay;
pub mod resumption;
pub use crypto::NoiseRole;
pub use framing::{TrafficProfile, PaddingStrategy};

View File

@ -1,14 +1,10 @@
use bytes::Bytes;
use rand::Rng;
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
use thiserror::Error;
use std::collections::{BTreeMap, VecDeque};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
/// Upper bound on a single frame's retransmit timer, after exponential backoff
/// is applied to the adaptive RTO. Past this the session is dead from the
/// user's point of view, and waiting longer only delays recovery.
const MAX_EFFECTIVE_RTO: Duration = Duration::from_secs(8);
use crate::congestion::CongestionController;
use crate::crypto::{NoiseRole, NoiseSession, SessionCipher};
use crate::framing::{AdaptivePadder, FrameHeader, FrameKind, FramedPacket, PaddingStrategy};
@ -107,17 +103,6 @@ pub struct ProtocolMachine {
_mtu: usize,
}
// ── Gap recovery (see `ProtocolMachine::recover_stalled_gap`) ────────────────
// How long the receive sequence may sit stuck behind a missing frame, with
// later frames already buffered, before that frame is declared unrecoverable
// and skipped. Derived from the live RTO so it scales with the path instead of
// guessing, then clamped: the floor keeps a fast link from discarding a frame
// that is merely late, the ceiling bounds how long a stall can be visible to
// the user before the tunnel unblocks itself.
const GAP_RECOVERY_RTO_MULTIPLIER: u32 = 8;
const GAP_RECOVERY_MIN: Duration = Duration::from_secs(2);
const GAP_RECOVERY_MAX: Duration = Duration::from_secs(10);
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
struct SentFrame {
nonce: u64,
@ -171,33 +156,10 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
self.sent_history.iter().filter(|f| f.is_retransmittable).count()
}
/// Sum of retry counters across in-flight frames. Test-only: lets a test
/// assert the core retransmit invariant (a retry is only ever charged to a
/// frame that was actually put on the wire) without needing to advance the
/// clock through several seconds of exponential backoff.
#[cfg(test)]
fn total_retries(&self) -> usize {
self.sent_history
.iter()
.filter(|f| f.is_retransmittable)
.map(|f| f.retries as usize)
.sum()
}
pub fn cwnd_packets(&self) -> usize {
self.cc.cwnd_packets() as usize
}
/// Whether the pacing bucket currently allows releasing another packet.
///
/// The congestion window bounds how much may be UNACKNOWLEDGED; it says
/// nothing about how fast that window is emptied onto the wire. Sending a
/// whole window back-to-back is what drives a deep buffer into standing
/// queue, so admission is gated on both.
pub fn can_pace_packet(&self) -> bool {
self.cc.can_pace_packet()
}
pub fn on_send(&mut self, bytes: u64) {
self.cc.on_send(bytes);
}
@ -245,16 +207,13 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
.map(ProtocolAction::SendDatagram)
}
(OstpState::Closing, OstpEvent::Inbound(raw)) => {
// The remote may still have data or ACKs in transit when we initiated
// Close. Stay in Closing and process them; handle_inbound transitions to
// Closed only when it actually receives the peer's Close frame — the old
// code force-closed after a single inbound packet, losing in-flight data.
// (Ported from 0.3.x 47d44fa.)
self.handle_inbound(raw)
// Process final in-flight packets to prevent data loss during teardown.
// The remote may still have data or ACKs in transit when we initiated Close.
let result = self.handle_inbound(raw);
self.state = OstpState::Closed;
result
}
(OstpState::Established, OstpEvent::Tick) => self.handle_tick(),
// Retransmit our Close frame (and drain pending) while waiting for teardown.
(OstpState::Closing, OstpEvent::Tick) => self.handle_tick(),
(OstpState::Closed, _) => Ok(ProtocolAction::Noop),
(_, OstpEvent::Close) => {
self.state = OstpState::Closed;
@ -275,9 +234,7 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
let session_id = u32::from_be_bytes([raw_vec[0], raw_vec[1], raw_vec[2], raw_vec[3]]);
if session_id != self.session_id {
// Per-packet, attacker-triggerable event: keep at debug and don't
// dump internal session ids (log-flood + info-leak surface).
tracing::debug!("session id mismatch (is_handshake={})", is_handshake);
tracing::error!("session id mismatch! expected={:#010x}, got={:#010x}, is_handshake={}, raw_len={}", self.session_id, session_id, is_handshake, raw_vec.len());
return Err(ProtocolError::State("session id mismatch".to_string()));
}
@ -303,7 +260,8 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
noise_len, raw_vec.len() - 6
)));
}
tracing::info!("handle_inbound: raw_vec.len()={}, noise_len={}, raw_vec[0..6]={:?}", raw_vec.len(), noise_len, &raw_vec[0..6]);
let mut read_out = vec![0_u8; 1024];
let n = self.noise.read_handshake(&raw_vec[6..6 + noise_len], &mut read_out).map_err(|e| {
ProtocolError::Crypto(format!("noise-read: {:?} (raw_len={}, noise_len={})", e, raw_vec.len(), noise_len))
@ -320,12 +278,9 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
NoiseRole::Initiator => None,
};
// Transport keys come from Noise's Split() over the final chaining key,
// so they depend on the ephemeral `ee` DH secret and give the session
// forward secrecy. (Previously these were derived from the handshake
// hash, which never absorbs the DH result — see raw_split's SECURITY
// note. That is the wire-breaking change gated by PROTOCOL_VERSION.)
let (send_key, recv_key) = self.noise.raw_split(self.role)?;
let mut key = [0_u8; 32];
self.noise.handshake_hash(&mut key)?;
let (send_key, recv_key) = derive_split_keys(&key, self.role);
self.send_cipher = Some(SessionCipher::new(&send_key));
self.recv_cipher = Some(SessionCipher::new(&recv_key));
self.state = OstpState::Established;
@ -335,107 +290,7 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
Ok(ProtocolAction::HandshakePayload(Bytes::from(extracted_payload), response))
}
/// Restores liveness when the receive sequence is stuck behind a frame that
/// can never arrive.
///
/// Delivery is gated on `expected_recv_nonce`, so a single missing frame
/// holds back every later frame. That is correct *while the sender can still
/// retransmit* — but the sender drops a frame from `sent_history` once it
/// exceeds `max_retries + 2` attempts (see the zombie eviction in
/// `handle_tick`). After that the frame is gone for good and the two sides
/// deadlock: the receiver buffers forever and NACKs a nonce nobody can
/// resend.
///
/// That deadlock is invisible to the keepalive watchdog, which is why it
/// presented as a hard freeze rather than a reconnect: retransmits, ACKs and
/// NACKs keep flowing, so the client's `last_valid_recv` keeps refreshing and
/// its stall detector never fires. The RTT readout freezes at its last value
/// for the same reason — Pong rides in a Data frame stuck behind the gap.
///
/// So: once we have been stuck long enough that retransmission has provably
/// given up, skip to the lowest buffered nonce and drain. This drops the
/// missing frame's payload (one RelayMessage — a chunk of one stream), which
/// is a real cost, but the alternative is a permanently dead tunnel.
fn recover_stalled_gap(&mut self) -> Vec<ProtocolAction> {
let mut recovered = Vec::new();
if self.reorder_buffer.is_empty() {
return recovered;
}
// Wait out the sender's full retransmit budget before giving up, so a
// frame that is merely late is never discarded. The sender backs off
// exponentially, so key this off the live RTO estimate rather than a
// flat constant, with a floor that keeps low-RTT links from skipping
// too eagerly and a ceiling that bounds the visible freeze.
let timeout = self
.cc
.rto()
.saturating_mul(GAP_RECOVERY_RTO_MULTIPLIER)
.clamp(GAP_RECOVERY_MIN, GAP_RECOVERY_MAX);
if self.last_recv_advance.elapsed() < timeout {
return recovered;
}
let Some(&resume_at) = self.reorder_buffer.keys().next() else {
return recovered;
};
let skipped = resume_at.saturating_sub(self.expected_recv_nonce);
tracing::warn!(
"Gap recovery: no progress for {:?}; skipping {} unrecoverable frame(s) \
(nonce {} -> {}) to unblock the session",
self.last_recv_advance.elapsed(),
skipped,
self.expected_recv_nonce,
resume_at
);
self.expected_recv_nonce = resume_at;
while let Some(buffered) = self.reorder_buffer.remove(&self.expected_recv_nonce) {
recovered.push(buffered);
match self.expected_recv_nonce.checked_add(1) {
Some(next) => self.expected_recv_nonce = next,
// u64 nonce space exhausted: stop draining rather than wrap.
// The session is finished either way; the caller's next decrypt
// will fail and tear it down.
None => break,
}
}
self.last_recv_advance = Instant::now();
// The peer must learn the sequence moved on, or it will keep
// retransmitting into the void.
self.ack_pending = true;
recovered
}
fn handle_data_inbound(&mut self, raw_vec: &[u8]) -> Result<ProtocolAction, ProtocolError> {
// Check for a stalled gap before classifying this frame, so the rest of
// the function sees an already-advanced `expected_recv_nonce`. Runs here
// rather than on Tick because both tick handlers discard DeliverApp
// actions, and because inbound frames keep arriving throughout the stall
// (retransmits/ACKs/NACKs/keepalives) — so this path is reliably reached.
let recovered = self.recover_stalled_gap();
let result = self.handle_data_inbound_frame(raw_vec)?;
if recovered.is_empty() {
return Ok(result);
}
// Recovered payloads are older than anything this frame produces, so
// they go first to preserve delivery order.
let mut all = recovered;
match result {
ProtocolAction::Noop => {}
ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => all.extend(list),
single => all.push(single),
}
Ok(if all.len() == 1 {
all.pop().unwrap()
} else {
ProtocolAction::Multiple(all)
})
}
fn handle_data_inbound_frame(&mut self, raw_vec: &[u8]) -> Result<ProtocolAction, ProtocolError> {
if raw_vec.len() < 12 {
return Err(ProtocolError::Framing("data datagram too short".to_string()));
}
@ -500,8 +355,13 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
FrameKind::Data => {
ProtocolAction::DeliverApp(packet.header.stream_id, packet.payload)
}
FrameKind::Resume => {
// 0-RTT: treat early data as application data
tracing::info!("0-RTT Resume frame received, processing early data");
ProtocolAction::DeliverApp(packet.header.stream_id, packet.payload)
}
FrameKind::Close => {
tracing::debug!("Received Close frame, terminating session");
tracing::info!("Received Close frame, terminating session");
self.state = OstpState::Closed;
ProtocolAction::Noop
}
@ -532,20 +392,18 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
self.last_recv_advance = Instant::now();
} else {
// Gap detected
if nonce >= self.expected_recv_nonce {
if self.reorder_buffer.len() < self.max_reorder_buffer {
self.reorder_buffer.insert(nonce, action);
} else {
tracing::warn!("Reorder buffer still full after gap recovery, dropping frame nonce={}", nonce);
}
if self.reorder_buffer.len() < self.max_reorder_buffer {
self.reorder_buffer.insert(nonce, action);
} else {
tracing::debug!("Frame nonce={} arrived too late after gap recovery, dropping", nonce);
tracing::warn!("Reorder buffer full ({}/{}), dropping frame nonce={}",
self.reorder_buffer.len(), self.max_reorder_buffer, nonce
);
}
// Rate-limited NACK: send at most once per (rto/2) to prevent retransmit storms.
// Using rto/2 means we send a NACK before the sender's timer fires, prompting
// fast retransmit without flooding. Floor at 10ms to handle very low-RTT links.
let nack_cooldown = (self.cc.rto() / 2).max(Duration::from_millis(10));
// Rate-limited NACK: send at most once per 30ms to prevent retransmit storms.
// Under high load with natural UDP reordering, sending a NACK per packet
// causes exponential retransmit explosion that saturates the channel.
let nack_cooldown = Duration::from_millis(30);
if self.last_nack_sent.elapsed() >= nack_cooldown {
self.last_nack_sent = Instant::now();
let nack_payload = self.expected_recv_nonce.to_be_bytes();
@ -653,18 +511,44 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
fn handle_tick(&mut self) -> Result<ProtocolAction, ProtocolError> {
let mut actions = Vec::new();
// ── Gap Recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────────
// If expected_recv_nonce hasn't advanced for 500ms+ and there
// are buffered frames waiting, the sender likely evicted the lost
// frame from sent_history. Skip the gap to restore data flow.
// This trades a small amount of data loss for connection liveness.
if !self.reorder_buffer.is_empty()
&& self.last_recv_advance.elapsed() > Duration::from_millis(500)
{
if let Some(&first_buffered) = self.reorder_buffer.keys().next() {
let skipped = first_buffered.saturating_sub(self.expected_recv_nonce);
self.expected_recv_nonce = first_buffered;
self.last_recv_advance = Instant::now();
let mut delivered = 0u64;
while let Some(buffered_action) = self.reorder_buffer.remove(&self.expected_recv_nonce) {
actions.push(buffered_action);
self.expected_recv_nonce = self.expected_recv_nonce.saturating_add(1);
delivered += 1;
}
self.ack_pending = true;
tracing::debug!("Gap recovery: skipped {} lost frames, delivered {} buffered frames (reorder_buf={})",
skipped, delivered, self.reorder_buffer.len()
);
}
}
// ── Pending ACK flush ─────────────────────────────────────────
if let Some(ack_frame) = self.build_ack_if_due()? {
actions.push(ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(ack_frame));
}
let now = Instant::now();
// Use the adaptive RTO from the congestion controller (RFC 6298 SRTT + 4*RTTVAR).
// Falls back to rto_initial before the first ACK is received.
let base_rto_ms = self.cc.rto().max(self.rto).as_millis().max(1) as u64;
let base_rto_ms = self.rto.as_millis().max(1) as u64;
// ── Zombie frame eviction ────────────────────────────────────
// Evict frames that exceeded max_retries + 2 grace retries.
// Shorter grace period than before (was +4) to free memory faster
// after high-throughput bursts.
let grace = self.max_retries.saturating_add(2);
let before = self.sent_history.len();
self.sent_history.retain(|f| !f.is_retransmittable || f.retries <= grace);
@ -675,46 +559,24 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
// ── Retransmit expired frames ────────────────────────────────
// Limit retransmits per tick to prevent bandwidth saturation
// Backoff starts from retry #0 (immediately effective):
// effective_rto = base_rto * 2^retries, capped at 2^6 = 64×
let mut retransmit_budget: usize = self.cc.retransmit_budget();
for frame in self.sent_history.iter_mut() {
if !frame.is_retransmittable {
continue;
}
// Out of budget for this tick — stop scanning rather than walking the
// rest of the queue. sent_history is in send order, so everything we
// skip is strictly newer than what we already handled; deferring it to
// the next tick preserves oldest-first retransmit priority.
if retransmit_budget == 0 {
break;
}
// Exponential backoff, but bounded in absolute terms. base_rto is
// itself adaptive and can reach RTO_MAX (16s) on a congested path;
// multiplying that by the 64x backoff cap yields a frame that sits
// unretransmitted for ~17 MINUTES, long past the point where the
// session is simply dead to the user. Cap the product so backoff
// stays a backoff rather than an outage.
let backoff_factor = 1u64 << (frame.retries as u64).min(6);
let effective_rto = Duration::from_millis(base_rto_ms.saturating_mul(backoff_factor))
.min(MAX_EFFECTIVE_RTO);
let retry_over = frame.retries.saturating_sub(self.max_retries);
let backoff_factor = 1u64 << retry_over.min(6);
let effective_rto = Duration::from_millis(base_rto_ms.saturating_mul(backoff_factor));
if now.duration_since(frame.last_sent) >= effective_rto {
// Only burn the retry counter and reset the RTO timer when the
// frame is ACTUALLY put on the wire. Doing it unconditionally
// meant that whenever the per-tick budget ran out — which is
// exactly when loss is heavy and retransmits matter most —
// frames accumulated "phantom retries" they never actually got,
// and the zombie eviction above then silently dropped them after
// `grace` such rounds. The peer never received that data and
// never would: that stream stalls forever while the session
// itself stays healthy, which is precisely the reported "tunnel
// frozen at 0 b/s but the session still up" symptom.
frame.last_sent = now;
frame.retries = frame.retries.saturating_add(1);
actions.push(ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(frame.bytes.clone()));
retransmit_budget -= 1;
if retransmit_budget > 0 {
actions.push(ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(frame.bytes.clone()));
retransmit_budget -= 1;
}
}
}
@ -843,34 +705,24 @@ impl ProtocolMachine {
fn drop_acked_frames(&mut self, ranges: &[(u64, u64)]) {
let now = Instant::now();
let mut acked_bytes = 0u64;
let mut min_rtt: Option<Duration> = None;
let mut min_rtt = Duration::from_secs(60);
// Compute RTT from the oldest acked frame's send timestamp
for frame in self.sent_history.iter() {
if nonce_in_ranges(frame.nonce, ranges) {
acked_bytes += frame.bytes.len() as u64;
// Karn's algorithm: never take an RTT sample from a frame that
// was retransmitted. `last_sent` is bumped on every retransmit,
// so an ACK for the ORIGINAL transmission would be measured
// against the retransmit time, yielding a spuriously small RTT
// that drags SRTT/RTO down and triggers more spurious
// retransmits. Only unambiguous (never-retried) frames qualify.
if frame.retries == 0 {
let rtt = now.duration_since(frame.last_sent);
min_rtt = Some(min_rtt.map_or(rtt, |m| m.min(rtt)));
let rtt = now.duration_since(frame.last_sent);
if rtt < min_rtt {
min_rtt = rtt;
}
}
}
self.sent_history.retain(|frame| !nonce_in_ranges(frame.nonce, ranges));
// Notify congestion controller. Feed an RTT sample only when we had at
// least one unambiguous ACK; otherwise update the window without
// polluting the RTT estimator.
// Notify congestion controller
if acked_bytes > 0 {
match min_rtt {
Some(rtt) => self.cc.on_ack(acked_bytes, rtt),
None => self.cc.on_ack_no_rtt(acked_bytes),
}
self.cc.on_ack(acked_bytes, min_rtt);
}
}
}
@ -900,6 +752,26 @@ fn nonce_in_ranges(nonce: u64, ranges: &[(u64, u64)]) -> bool {
ranges.iter().any(|(start, end)| nonce >= *start && nonce <= *end)
}
fn derive_split_keys(base_key: &[u8; 32], role: NoiseRole) -> ([u8; 32], [u8; 32]) {
let mut initiator_key = [0u8; 32];
let mut responder_key = [0u8; 32];
let mut h1 = Sha256::new();
h1.update(base_key);
h1.update(b"ostp-initiator");
initiator_key.copy_from_slice(&h1.finalize());
let mut h2 = Sha256::new();
h2.update(base_key);
h2.update(b"ostp-responder");
responder_key.copy_from_slice(&h2.finalize());
match role {
NoiseRole::Initiator => (initiator_key, responder_key),
NoiseRole::Responder => (responder_key, initiator_key),
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
@ -1131,154 +1003,4 @@ mod tests {
let _ = client.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap();
let _ = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap();
}
/// A retry may only be charged to a frame that was actually retransmitted.
///
/// The retransmit loop is budget-limited per tick. It used to bump
/// `retries` and reset `last_sent` for every due frame regardless of
/// whether the budget allowed it to actually send — so under heavy loss
/// (exactly when the budget runs out) frames racked up retries they never
/// received, and the zombie eviction dropped them after `max_retries + 2`
/// such rounds. That data was never delivered and never would be: the
/// stream stalls permanently while the session itself stays up.
#[test]
fn test_retransmit_budget_charges_retries_only_for_frames_actually_sent() {
let (mut client, _server) = do_handshake();
// Queue far more in-flight frames than a single tick's budget allows.
const FRAMES: usize = 40;
for i in 0..FRAMES {
let payload = Bytes::from(vec![i as u8; 200]);
client.on_event(OstpEvent::Outbound(1, payload)).unwrap();
}
assert_eq!(client.in_flight_count(), FRAMES);
assert_eq!(client.total_retries(), 0, "nothing retransmitted yet");
// Let every frame's RTO lapse so that on the next tick all FRAMES frames
// are due at once and the per-tick budget is guaranteed to run out. The
// effective RTO here is max(cc.rto(), config rto_ms) = 100ms at retries=0.
std::thread::sleep(Duration::from_millis(150));
let sent = count_datagrams(&client.on_event(OstpEvent::Tick).unwrap());
assert!(sent > 0, "expected some retransmits after the RTO lapsed");
assert!(
sent < FRAMES,
"budget should have capped this tick below the {FRAMES} due frames, got {sent}"
);
assert_eq!(
client.total_retries(),
sent,
"charged {} retries but only put {} frames on the wire — the \
difference is phantom retries that will silently evict live data",
client.total_retries(),
sent
);
assert_eq!(
client.in_flight_count(),
FRAMES,
"nothing was acked, so no frame may be evicted yet"
);
}
/// Count how many datagrams an action tree actually puts on the wire.
fn count_datagrams(action: &ProtocolAction) -> usize {
match action {
ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(_) => 1,
ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => list.iter().map(count_datagrams).sum(),
_ => 0,
}
}
/// Count how many application payloads an action tree actually delivers.
fn delivered_payloads(action: &ProtocolAction) -> Vec<Bytes> {
match action {
ProtocolAction::DeliverApp(_, data) => vec![data.clone()],
ProtocolAction::Multiple(list) => list.iter().flat_map(delivered_payloads).collect(),
_ => Vec::new(),
}
}
/// Build `count` data frames on `client`, returning them without delivering
/// any — lets a test choose which ones to "lose" in transit.
fn make_data_frames(client: &mut ProtocolMachine, count: u8) -> Vec<Bytes> {
(0..count)
.map(|i| {
let payload = Bytes::from(vec![i; 32]);
match client.on_event(OstpEvent::Outbound(1, payload)).unwrap() {
ProtocolAction::SendDatagram(d) => d,
_ => panic!("expected SendDatagram for frame {i}"),
}
})
.collect()
}
/// The freeze this fixes: a frame is lost, the sender eventually stops
/// retransmitting it, and the receiver — which gates delivery on
/// `expected_recv_nonce` — waits for it forever. Every later frame piles up
/// undelivered while the transport itself stays healthy, so nothing upstream
/// notices. Recovery must eventually skip the hole and release the backlog.
#[test]
fn test_gap_recovery_releases_permanently_stalled_frames() {
let (mut client, mut server) = do_handshake();
let frames = make_data_frames(&mut client, 4);
// Frame 0 arrives in order and is delivered straight through.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
assert_eq!(delivered_payloads(&action).len(), 1, "in-order frame should deliver");
// Frame 1 is lost. 2 and 3 arrive but must be held back — delivering them
// now would reorder the stream.
for idx in [2usize, 3] {
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[idx].clone())).unwrap();
assert!(
delivered_payloads(&action).is_empty(),
"frame {idx} must stay buffered behind the missing frame"
);
}
// Stand in for "the sender exhausted its retries and dropped frame 1":
// the sequence has not advanced for longer than the recovery timeout.
server.last_recv_advance = Instant::now() - GAP_RECOVERY_MAX - Duration::from_secs(1);
// The next inbound frame (a retransmitted duplicate, which is exactly what
// a real stalled session keeps receiving) must unblock the backlog.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
let delivered = delivered_payloads(&action);
assert_eq!(
delivered.len(),
2,
"both buffered frames must be released once the gap is declared unrecoverable"
);
// ...and in order: frame 2 before frame 3.
assert_eq!(delivered[0][0], 2);
assert_eq!(delivered[1][0], 3);
}
/// Recovery must not be trigger-happy: a frame that is merely late still has
/// to be waited for, or we would discard data the sender is about to resend.
#[test]
fn test_gap_recovery_does_not_fire_before_timeout() {
let (mut client, mut server) = do_handshake();
let frames = make_data_frames(&mut client, 3);
server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[2].clone())).unwrap();
assert!(delivered_payloads(&action).is_empty());
// Well inside the timeout — the gap must still be respected.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[0].clone())).unwrap();
assert!(
delivered_payloads(&action).is_empty(),
"must keep waiting while retransmission is still plausible"
);
// And once the genuinely-late frame shows up, normal in-order delivery
// resumes with nothing dropped.
let action = server.on_event(OstpEvent::Inbound(frames[1].clone())).unwrap();
let delivered = delivered_payloads(&action);
assert_eq!(delivered.len(), 2, "late frame plus the buffered one");
assert_eq!(delivered[0][0], 1);
assert_eq!(delivered[1][0], 2);
}
}

307
ostp-core/src/resumption.rs Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
//! 0-RTT Session Resumption for OSTP.
//!
//! When a client has previously connected to a server, it can cache
//! a "session ticket" that allows it to send encrypted data in the
//! very first packet — eliminating the handshake round-trip entirely.
//!
//! How it works:
//! 1. After a successful handshake, the server issues a SessionTicket
//! containing enough state to resume the session.
//! 2. The client stores the ticket locally (encrypted with the PSK).
//! 3. On reconnection, the client sends a ResumptionRequest with the
//! ticket + early data in the first packet.
//! 4. The server validates the ticket and immediately begins processing
//! data, achieving 0-RTT.
//!
//! Security considerations:
//! - Tickets have a TTL (default 3600s) to limit replay window.
//! - The server maintains a ticket nonce set to prevent replay.
//! - Early data is idempotent by protocol design (relay CONNECT is safe
//! because duplicate CONNECTs to the same target are no-ops).
use std::collections::HashSet;
use std::time::{Duration, SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
/// A session ticket that allows 0-RTT resumption.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct SessionTicket {
/// Unique ticket identifier (prevents replay)
pub ticket_id: [u8; 16],
/// Server session ID to resume
pub session_id: u32,
/// Derived cipher key for early data
pub cipher_key: [u8; 32],
/// Timestamp of issuance (seconds since epoch)
pub issued_at: u64,
/// Time-to-live in seconds
pub ttl: u64,
}
/// Maximum ticket age (1 hour default)
const DEFAULT_TICKET_TTL: u64 = 3600;
/// Maximum tickets in the anti-replay set
const MAX_REPLAY_SET: usize = 10000;
impl SessionTicket {
/// Create a new session ticket from the transport key material.
pub fn new(session_id: u32, transport_key: &[u8; 32], psk: &[u8; 32]) -> Self {
let now = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs();
// Derive ticket ID from key material + timestamp
let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
hasher.update(transport_key);
hasher.update(now.to_be_bytes());
hasher.update(b"ostp-ticket-id");
let hash = hasher.finalize();
let mut ticket_id = [0u8; 16];
ticket_id.copy_from_slice(&hash[..16]);
// Derive cipher key for early data from PSK + ticket
let mut key_hasher = Sha256::new();
key_hasher.update(psk);
key_hasher.update(ticket_id);
key_hasher.update(b"ostp-early-data-key");
let cipher_key_hash = key_hasher.finalize();
let mut cipher_key = [0u8; 32];
cipher_key.copy_from_slice(&cipher_key_hash);
Self {
ticket_id,
session_id,
cipher_key,
issued_at: now,
ttl: DEFAULT_TICKET_TTL,
}
}
/// Check if the ticket has expired.
pub fn is_expired(&self) -> bool {
let now = SystemTime::now()
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
.unwrap_or_default()
.as_secs();
now > self.issued_at + self.ttl
}
/// Serialize the ticket to bytes for storage/transmission.
/// Wire format: [ticket_id:16][session_id:4][cipher_key:32][issued_at:8][ttl:8]
pub fn to_bytes(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(68);
out.extend_from_slice(&self.ticket_id);
out.extend_from_slice(&self.session_id.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&self.cipher_key);
out.extend_from_slice(&self.issued_at.to_be_bytes());
out.extend_from_slice(&self.ttl.to_be_bytes());
out
}
/// Deserialize a ticket from bytes.
pub fn from_bytes(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
if data.len() < 68 {
return None;
}
let mut ticket_id = [0u8; 16];
ticket_id.copy_from_slice(&data[0..16]);
let session_id = u32::from_be_bytes(data[16..20].try_into().ok()?);
let mut cipher_key = [0u8; 32];
cipher_key.copy_from_slice(&data[20..52]);
let issued_at = u64::from_be_bytes(data[52..60].try_into().ok()?);
let ttl = u64::from_be_bytes(data[60..68].try_into().ok()?);
Some(Self {
ticket_id,
session_id,
cipher_key,
issued_at,
ttl,
})
}
/// Encrypt the ticket with a PSK for client-side storage.
/// Uses a simple XOR cipher with HMAC-SHA256 derived key.
pub fn encrypt(&self, psk: &[u8; 32]) -> Vec<u8> {
let raw = self.to_bytes();
let mut enc_key_hasher = Sha256::new();
enc_key_hasher.update(psk);
enc_key_hasher.update(b"ostp-ticket-encryption");
let enc_key = enc_key_hasher.finalize();
let mut encrypted = raw.clone();
for (i, byte) in encrypted.iter_mut().enumerate() {
*byte ^= enc_key[i % 32];
}
encrypted
}
/// Decrypt a ticket from encrypted bytes.
pub fn decrypt(encrypted: &[u8], psk: &[u8; 32]) -> Option<Self> {
let mut enc_key_hasher = Sha256::new();
enc_key_hasher.update(psk);
enc_key_hasher.update(b"ostp-ticket-encryption");
let enc_key = enc_key_hasher.finalize();
let mut decrypted = encrypted.to_vec();
for (i, byte) in decrypted.iter_mut().enumerate() {
*byte ^= enc_key[i % 32];
}
Self::from_bytes(&decrypted)
}
}
/// Server-side anti-replay guard for session tickets.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub struct TicketValidator {
/// Set of consumed ticket IDs (prevents replay)
consumed: HashSet<[u8; 16]>,
/// PSK for ticket validation
psk: [u8; 32],
/// Maximum age for tickets
max_age: Duration,
}
impl TicketValidator {
pub fn new(psk: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
Self {
consumed: HashSet::new(),
psk,
max_age: Duration::from_secs(DEFAULT_TICKET_TTL),
}
}
/// Validate a ticket from the client. Returns the ticket if valid,
/// or None if expired, replayed, or invalid.
pub fn validate(&mut self, encrypted_ticket: &[u8]) -> Option<SessionTicket> {
let ticket = SessionTicket::decrypt(encrypted_ticket, &self.psk)?;
// Check expiry
if ticket.is_expired() {
tracing::debug!("0-RTT ticket rejected: expired");
return None;
}
// Check replay
if self.consumed.contains(&ticket.ticket_id) {
tracing::warn!("0-RTT ticket rejected: replay detected");
return None;
}
// Accept and mark as consumed
self.consumed.insert(ticket.ticket_id);
// Garbage collection: remove old entries when set grows too large
if self.consumed.len() > MAX_REPLAY_SET {
// Simple strategy: clear the entire set. This is safe because
// expired tickets would fail the expiry check anyway.
self.consumed.clear();
self.consumed.insert(ticket.ticket_id);
tracing::debug!("0-RTT replay set cleared (overflow)");
}
tracing::debug!("0-RTT ticket accepted: session_id={}", ticket.session_id);
Some(ticket)
}
/// Issue a new ticket for a completed session.
pub fn issue_ticket(&self, session_id: u32, transport_key: &[u8; 32]) -> SessionTicket {
SessionTicket::new(session_id, transport_key, &self.psk)
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn test_ticket_serialize_roundtrip() {
let psk = [42u8; 32];
let key = [1u8; 32];
let ticket = SessionTicket::new(12345, &key, &psk);
let bytes = ticket.to_bytes();
let restored = SessionTicket::from_bytes(&bytes).unwrap();
assert_eq!(ticket.ticket_id, restored.ticket_id);
assert_eq!(ticket.session_id, restored.session_id);
assert_eq!(ticket.cipher_key, restored.cipher_key);
assert_eq!(ticket.issued_at, restored.issued_at);
}
#[test]
fn test_ticket_encrypt_decrypt() {
let psk = [42u8; 32];
let key = [1u8; 32];
let ticket = SessionTicket::new(99, &key, &psk);
let encrypted = ticket.encrypt(&psk);
let decrypted = SessionTicket::decrypt(&encrypted, &psk).unwrap();
assert_eq!(ticket.ticket_id, decrypted.ticket_id);
assert_eq!(ticket.session_id, decrypted.session_id);
}
#[test]
fn test_ticket_wrong_psk_fails() {
let psk = [42u8; 32];
let wrong_psk = [99u8; 32];
let key = [1u8; 32];
let ticket = SessionTicket::new(1, &key, &psk);
let encrypted = ticket.encrypt(&psk);
// Decrypting with wrong PSK produces garbage, from_bytes should
// still return Some but ticket_id won't match
let decrypted = SessionTicket::decrypt(&encrypted, &wrong_psk);
// It may parse but the data will be wrong
if let Some(d) = decrypted {
assert_ne!(d.ticket_id, ticket.ticket_id);
}
}
#[test]
fn test_ticket_not_expired() {
let psk = [42u8; 32];
let key = [1u8; 32];
let ticket = SessionTicket::new(1, &key, &psk);
assert!(!ticket.is_expired());
}
#[test]
fn test_validator_replay_protection() {
let psk = [42u8; 32];
let key = [1u8; 32];
let mut validator = TicketValidator::new(psk);
let ticket = validator.issue_ticket(1, &key);
let encrypted = ticket.encrypt(&psk);
// First use should succeed
assert!(validator.validate(&encrypted).is_some());
// Replay should fail
assert!(validator.validate(&encrypted).is_none());
}
#[test]
fn test_validator_different_tickets() {
let psk = [42u8; 32];
let mut validator = TicketValidator::new(psk);
let ticket1 = validator.issue_ticket(1, &[1u8; 32]);
let ticket2 = validator.issue_ticket(2, &[2u8; 32]);
assert!(validator.validate(&ticket1.encrypt(&psk)).is_some());
assert!(validator.validate(&ticket2.encrypt(&psk)).is_some());
}
#[test]
fn test_truncated_ticket_fails() {
assert!(SessionTicket::from_bytes(&[0u8; 10]).is_none());
}
}

View File

@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
import java.io.FileInputStream
import java.util.Properties
plugins {
id("com.android.application")
id("kotlin-android")
@ -8,37 +5,6 @@ plugins {
id("dev.flutter.flutter-gradle-plugin")
}
// ── Release signing material ────────────────────────────────────────────────
// Supplied out-of-band and never committed: either an `android/key.properties`
// file (local release builds) or OSTP_KEYSTORE_* environment variables (CI).
//
// This exists because the release build used to be signed with the DEBUG
// keystore (the stock Flutter template TODO). Android identifies an app by
// applicationId + signing key, and refuses to update across a key change. The
// debug keystore is auto-generated per machine, and CI runners are ephemeral,
// so every published build carried a different random key — which is why
// updating on top of a previous install failed with "App not installed" /
// "unable to parse the package" and only a full uninstall+reinstall worked.
val keystoreProperties = Properties().apply {
val propsFile = rootProject.file("key.properties")
if (propsFile.exists()) {
FileInputStream(propsFile).use { load(it) }
}
}
// Blank counts as absent. GitHub Actions substitutes an EMPTY STRING (not an
// unset variable) for a secret that doesn't exist, so `getenv(...) ?: fallback`
// silently kept the empty value — the elvis operator only catches null. That is
// how an unset ANDROID_KEY_PASSWORD ended up being used as the literal key
// password instead of falling back to the store password, producing Gradle's
// "Get Key failed: Given final block not properly padded".
fun signingSetting(propKey: String, envKey: String): String? =
(keystoreProperties.getProperty(propKey) ?: System.getenv(envKey))
?.takeIf { it.isNotBlank() }
val releaseStorePath: String? = signingSetting("storeFile", "OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH")
val hasReleaseSigning: Boolean = !releaseStorePath.isNullOrBlank()
android {
namespace = "com.ospab.ostp_client"
compileSdk = flutter.compileSdkVersion
@ -62,49 +28,13 @@ android {
targetSdk = flutter.targetSdkVersion
versionCode = flutter.versionCode
versionName = flutter.versionName
ndk {
abiFilters += listOf("armeabi-v7a", "arm64-v8a", "x86_64")
}
}
signingConfigs {
create("release") {
if (hasReleaseSigning) {
val store = signingSetting("storePassword", "OSTP_KEYSTORE_PASSWORD")
storeFile = file(releaseStorePath!!)
storePassword = store
keyAlias = signingSetting("keyAlias", "OSTP_KEY_ALIAS")
// PKCS12 (the keytool default since Java 9, and what our upload
// keystore is) cannot hold a key password that differs from the
// store password — the format simply has no place to put one. So
// treat a missing key password as "same as the store password"
// instead of demanding a secret that, for this keystore, can only
// ever be a duplicate. An explicit value still wins, for the older
// JKS format where the two genuinely can differ.
keyPassword = signingSetting("keyPassword", "OSTP_KEY_PASSWORD") ?: store
}
}
}
buildTypes {
release {
// Use the real upload key when one was supplied; otherwise fall back to
// the debug keystore so a plain local `flutter build apk --release`
// still works for development. Anything PUBLISHED must take the first
// branch — a debug-signed build cannot be updated over, and its key is
// machine-local, so it also can't be reproduced later.
if (hasReleaseSigning) {
signingConfig = signingConfigs.getByName("release")
} else {
logger.warn(
"OSTP: no release keystore configured (android/key.properties or " +
"OSTP_KEYSTORE_PATH) - falling back to the DEBUG keystore. This APK " +
"is for local use only: users cannot update over it, and the key is " +
"not reproducible on another machine."
)
signingConfig = signingConfigs.getByName("debug")
}
// TODO: Add your own signing config for the release build.
// Signing with the debug keys for now, so `flutter run --release` works.
signingConfig = signingConfigs.getByName("debug")
proguardFiles(getDefaultProguardFile("proguard-android-optimize.txt"), "proguard-rules.pro")
}
}

View File

@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.QUERY_ALL_PACKAGES"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_CONNECTED_DEVICE"/>
@ -11,7 +10,6 @@
android:label="ostp_client"
android:name="${applicationName}"
android:icon="@mipmap/launcher_icon"
android:roundIcon="@mipmap/launcher_icon_round"
android:extractNativeLibs="true">
<activity
android:name=".MainActivity"
@ -47,7 +45,6 @@
<service
android:name=".OstpVpnService"
android:permission="android.permission.BIND_VPN_SERVICE"
android:foregroundServiceType="connectedDevice"
android:exported="false">
<intent-filter>
<action android:name="android.net.VpnService"/>

View File

@ -92,46 +92,28 @@ class MainActivity : FlutterActivity() {
val metrics = net.ostp.client.OstpClientSdk.getMetrics()
result.success(metrics ?: "{}")
} catch (e: Throwable) {
// Surfaced into the in-app log viewer (not just logcat) so a
// broken traffic counter is diagnosable from a user's bug
// report without adb access.
android.util.Log.e("MainActivity", "getMetrics failed", e)
try {
net.ostp.client.OstpClientSdk.addLog("getMetrics failed: ${e.javaClass.simpleName}: ${e.message}")
} catch (_: Throwable) {}
result.error("ERROR", e.message, null)
}
}
"getInstalledApps" -> {
// MethodChannel handlers run on the main/UI thread by default.
// Enumerating every installed package AND decoding+re-encoding
// each one's icon to PNG/base64 is expensive (100+ apps is
// common) — done inline here it blocked the main thread for
// 10-15s, during which Flutter couldn't render ANY frame, not
// even the "loading" spinner, so the screen just appeared to
// hang before jumping straight to the fully-loaded list.
// Do the work on a background thread; only the final
// `result.success(...)` needs to hop back onto the UI thread.
val pm = packageManager
Thread {
try {
val apps = pm.getInstalledApplications(PackageManager.GET_META_DATA)
val list = apps.map { app ->
val isSystem = ((app.flags and ApplicationInfo.FLAG_SYSTEM) != 0) &&
(pm.getLaunchIntentForPackage(app.packageName) == null)
val iconBase64 = getAppIconBase64(pm, app)
mapOf(
"name" to pm.getApplicationLabel(app).toString(),
"package" to app.packageName,
"isSystem" to isSystem,
"icon" to (iconBase64 ?: "")
)
}
runOnUiThread { result.success(list) }
} catch (e: Exception) {
runOnUiThread { result.error("ERROR", e.message, null) }
try {
val pm = packageManager
val apps = pm.getInstalledApplications(PackageManager.GET_META_DATA)
val list = apps.map { app ->
val isSystem = ((app.flags and ApplicationInfo.FLAG_SYSTEM) != 0) &&
(pm.getLaunchIntentForPackage(app.packageName) == null)
val iconBase64 = getAppIconBase64(pm, app)
mapOf(
"name" to pm.getApplicationLabel(app).toString(),
"package" to app.packageName,
"isSystem" to isSystem,
"icon" to (iconBase64 ?: "")
)
}
}.start()
result.success(list)
} catch (e: Exception) {
result.error("ERROR", e.message, null)
}
}
else -> result.notImplemented()
}
@ -151,6 +133,6 @@ class MainActivity : FlutterActivity() {
if (pendingConfigJson != null) {
intent.putExtra("configJson", pendingConfigJson)
}
androidx.core.content.ContextCompat.startForegroundService(this, intent)
startService(intent)
}
}

View File

@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ import java.io.IOException
import androidx.annotation.Keep
import androidx.core.app.NotificationCompat
import androidx.core.app.NotificationManagerCompat
import androidx.core.app.ServiceCompat
@Keep
class OstpVpnService : VpnService() {
@ -57,7 +56,7 @@ class OstpVpnService : VpnService() {
if (action == "START") {
val configJson = intent.getStringExtra("configJson") ?: return START_NOT_STICKY
// Launch foreground immediately so Android doesn't kill us
ServiceCompat.startForeground(this, NOTIF_ID, buildNotification(connecting = true), ServiceInfo.FOREGROUND_SERVICE_TYPE_CONNECTED_DEVICE)
startForeground(NOTIF_ID, buildNotification(connecting = true))
startVpn(configJson)
} else if (action == "STOP") {
stopVpn()
@ -272,9 +271,6 @@ class OstpVpnService : VpnService() {
} catch (e: Throwable) {
Log.e("OstpVpnService", "Error starting VPN", e)
android.os.Handler(android.os.Looper.getMainLooper()).post {
android.widget.Toast.makeText(applicationContext, "VPN Error: ${e.message}", android.widget.Toast.LENGTH_LONG).show()
}
stopVpn()
}

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@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<adaptive-icon xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android">
<background android:drawable="@color/ic_launcher_background"/>
<foreground android:drawable="@drawable/ic_launcher_foreground"/>
</adaptive-icon>

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